Unlike many of his colleagues, he often refused to wear a mask in Congress.

與許多同事不同，他經常拒絕在國會戴面具。

And then he tested positive for Covid-19.

然後他的Covid -19測試呈陽性。

But in an interview, he suggested that he got Covid-19 because of the times he did wear a mask.

但在接受採訪時，他提出自己之所以得到科維德-19，是因為他確實有戴口罩的時候。

"I might have put some of the virus onto the mask and breathed it in."

"我可能把一些病毒放到了面罩上，並把它吸了進去。"

Gohmert's distrust of masks is actually shared by a ton of Americans.

高默特對面具的不信任，其實是一大堆美國人的共同心聲。

A poll in July asked Americans how often they wear a mask.

7月的一項民調詢問美國人戴面具的頻率。

Among Democrats, almost everyone said they wore a mask in public.

在民主黨人中，幾乎每個人都說他們在公共場合戴著面具。

But significantly fewer Republicans said so.

但這樣說的共和黨人明顯較少。

Yet the messaging from public health officials today is clear:

然而，今天公共衛生官員發出的資訊是明確的。

Wearing a mask helps stop the spread of Covid-19.

戴上口罩有助於阻止科維德-19的傳播。

So where did this communication break down?

那麼，這種溝通是在哪裡中斷的呢？

How was something as simple as wearing a mask allowed to become political?

戴口罩這麼簡單的事情，怎麼就可以變成政治了呢？

In October of 2001, the US bungled a different public health crisis.

2001年10月，美國搞砸了一場不同的公共衛生危機。

Someone sent envelopes of deadly Anthrax to media organizations and government offices.

有人給媒體機構和政府機關寄去了致命炭疽病的信封。

First, the Secretary of Health and Human Services went on TV,

首先，衛生和人類服務部長上了電視。

and speculated about how the first victim might have gotten it.

並推測第一個受害者可能是如何得到的。

"We do know that he drank water out of a stream…"

"我們知道他喝的是溪水..."

"Why are you giving us that detail?"

"你為什麼要給我們說這些細節？"

"Just because he was an outdoorsman, and there's a possibility...

"就因為他是個戶外愛好者，而且有可能... ...

there's all kinds of possibilities."

有各種可能性。"

"Can you contract anthrax from drinking from a stream?"

"喝溪水會感染炭疽病嗎？"

We don't know.

我們不知道。

As the crisis continued, different officials gave different, conflicting information.

隨著危機的持續，不同的官員提供了不同的、相互矛盾的資訊。

No one was really in charge of communicating to the public.

沒有人真正負責與公眾溝通。

And it led the US Centers for Disease Control to make this:

而這也使得美國疾病控制中心做出了這。

the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication guide, or CERC.

* 危機和緊急風險通報指南，或CERC；

It's a guide to how to communicate during a public health crisis.

這是一個公共衛生危機期間如何溝通的指南。

The CERC guidelines are really a reflection of the lessons that were learned from failures.

CERC準則實際上反映了從失敗中吸取的教訓。

Glen Nowak used to be in charge of communications for the CDC.

Glen Nowak曾是疾控中心的通訊主管。

He's used the CERC and even wrote some of it.

他用過CERC，甚至寫過一些。

And he says one of the biggest lessons from the Anthrax attack is what the CERC now calls

他說，從炭疽襲擊中得到的最大教訓之一是CERC現在所說的。

"the most important role" in a crisis,

在危機中發揮 "最重要的作用"。

and the key to preventing mass confusion: having a single person as the spokesperson.

而防止大規模混亂的關鍵是：由一個人作為代言人。

It really helps to have one primary voice.

有一個主要的聲音真的很有幫助。

One primary face.

一個主面。

The CERC says the spokesperson should be someone who is familiar with the subject matter, and

CERC說，發言人應該是熟悉該主題的人，並且。

can talk about it clearly and confidently.

可以清楚而自信地談論它。

A lot of communications, particularly in a public health crisis, is about setting, guiding

很多傳播，特別是在公共衛生危機中的傳播，都是關於設定、引導。

and managing people's expectations.

和管理人們的期望。

It's important early on to not just talk about what you know, but what you don't know.

早期不要只談自己知道的，要談自己不知道的，這一點很重要。

Essentially, the spokesperson needs to be seen as trustworthy and credible.

從根本上說，發言人需要被視為值得信賴和可信的人。

Which is one reason you don't want your spokesperson to be a politician.

這也是你不希望你的代言人是政客的原因之一。

Because it's really hard for any politician to be seen as credible by everyone:

因為任何一個政治家都很難被大家看成是可信的。

They often only resonate with those who support them, and they don't resonate

他們往往只與支持他們的人產生共鳴，而他們並沒有產生共鳴。

with those who did not vote for them.

與那些沒有投票給他們的人。

That doesn't mean political leaders can't be involved in public health communication;

這並不意味著政治領導人不能參與公共衛生傳播。

they just can't take the lead on the science.

他們只是不能在科學上起主導作用。

A good example of a government following these principles during Covid-19 was in New Zealand,

新西蘭政府在Covid-19期間遵循這些原則的一個很好的例子。

where the Prime Minister was at many of the daily briefings, but wasn't leading it.

在那裡，總理參加了許多日常簡報會，但不是上司。

"As is our usual practice I'll begin by handing over to Dr. Bloomfield."

"按照我們的慣例，我先交給布盧姆菲爾德博士。"

What's important is that everybody is on the same page with respect to the overall messaging.

重要的是，在整體資訊傳遞方面，大家要保持一致。

But in the US, there hasn't been a clear spokesperson.

但在美國，一直沒有明確的代言人。

Or a clear message.

或者是一個明確的資訊。

Press conferences were led by President Trump

新聞發佈會由總統特朗普主持

and would feature politicians as well as public health experts.

並將邀請政治家和公共衛生專家參加。

And they often contradicted each other.

而且他們經常互相矛盾。

"We do expect more cases."

"我們確實期待更多的案件。"

"When you have 15 people, and the 15 within a couple of days,

"當你有15個人，而這15個人在幾天之內。

is going to be down to close to zero."

是會下降到接近零。"

Especially when it came to guiding those expectations:

尤其是在引導這些期望的時候。

"We will have coronavirus in the fall."

"我們秋天會有冠狀病毒。"

"It may not come back at all."

"可能根本就回不來了。"

"Developing very rapidly a vaccine..."

"快速開發疫苗..."

"That could be a year to a year and a half."

"那可能是一年到一年半的時間。"

These conflicts asked many Americans to pick a side:

這些衝突要求許多美國人選擇一方。

Who do you believe - the president, or public health officials?

你相信誰--總統，還是公共衛生官員？

"Medical 'experts.'"

"醫學'專家'。"

"Dr. Anthony Fauci seems to favor what the Democrats want..."

"Anthony Fauci博士似乎喜歡民主黨人想要的東西..."

"Dr. Fauci, who appears to believe he's in charge of the country."

"Fauci博士，他似乎認為他是國家的主人"

"It's important that we listen to our elected leaders -- not the medical bureaucracy."

"重要的是，我們要聽從我們選出來的領導人的意見，而不是醫療官僚機構的意見。"

That breakdown between public health officials and politicians can get especially dangerous

公共衛生官員和政治家之間的分崩離析可能會變得特別危險。

if the information starts to change.

如果資訊開始變化。

Which it almost always does during a crisis.

在危機期間，它幾乎總是這樣。

You need to remind people very frequently that you're going to be making changes based

你需要經常提醒人們，你要根據自己的情況做出改變。

on the growing body of knowledge

越來越多的知識

and that as a result, it's going to look like you're being inconsistent.

而結果，它會看起來像你是不一致的。

But more importantly you're learning and you're learning what works best.

但更重要的是你在學習，你在學習什麼是最有效的。

Early on, the CDC advised people not to wear masks.

早期，疾控中心建議大家不要戴口罩。

But as they learned more about the new virus, they changed the guidelines.

但隨著他們對新病毒的瞭解越來越多，他們改變了指導方針。

"What has changed in our recommendation?

"我們的建議有什麼變化？

We now know from recent studies that a significant

我們現在從最近的研究中知道，大量的

portion of individuals with coronavirus lack symptoms.

部分冠狀病毒患者缺乏症狀。

CDC is always, always looking at the data.

疾控中心一直，一直在看數據。

We've told you that from the beginning — Dr. Birx says it every single press conference --

我們從一開始就告訴你了 Birx博士在每次新聞發佈會上都會說...

we're looking at the data, we're evolving our recommendations."

我們在研究數據，我們在不斷地發展我們的建議。"

But this shift wasn't supported by Trump personally.

但這種轉變並沒有得到特朗普本人的支持。

"The masks, it's going to be really a voluntary thing.

"面具，這要真的是自願的事情。

You can do it, you don't have to do it, I'm choosing not to do it."

你可以不做，你不用做，我選擇不做。"

Soon, masks became the symbol of the war between Trump and the medical experts.

很快，口罩成了特朗普與醫學專家之間戰爭的象徵。

"I think it's a political hoax."

"我認為這是一個政治騙局。"

"No, I don't wear a mask."

"不，我不戴面具。"

"Shame on you for voting for a mask.

"丟人，你投了一個面具。

And I say Trump 2020."

而我說特朗普2020年。"

By June, more Republicans trusted Trump than the CDC for facts about the coronavirus.

到6月，更多的共和黨人信任特朗普，而不是CDC關於冠狀病毒的事實。

It was exactly the scenario the communication guidelines had been written to avoid.

這正是通信準則所要避免的情況。

What's frustrating is knowing that many of the challenges are self-inflicted wounds

令人沮喪的是，知道很多挑戰都是自己造成的傷口。

or they're things that, you know, could have been avoided based on past experience.

或者他們的事情，你知道， 可以避免基於過去的經驗。

In 2001, the US got lucky.

2001年，美國幸運了。

The anthrax attacks eventually stopped.

炭疽病的襲擊最終停止了。

The problem went away.

問題就消失了。

In 2020, the US made the same mistakes.

2020年，美國也犯了同樣的錯誤。

But we haven't been so lucky.

但我們沒有這麼幸運。