perfectly, yet the species lacks any  subjective experience or awareness. 

外星物種互動，但該物種缺乏任何主觀經驗或意識。

This alien species moves and talks like  humans do, displaying a rich variety of  

這種外星物種像人類一樣行動和說話，表現出豐富多樣的

emotional and social responses. They shake hands, laugh at jokes,  

情感和社會反應。他們握手、講笑話

and show genuine excitement when discussing  their latest achievements. Their world is  

並在討論自己的最新成就時表現出真正的興奮。他們的世界

filled with art, music, and literature, and  they participate in social structures that  

充滿了藝術、音樂和文學，他們參與了與

parallel human families and communities. Their behavior is impeccably human-like.  

人類家庭和社區相似的社會結構。他們的行為無可挑剔地像人類。

However, they lack any inner world of  subjective experience or consciousness. 

然而，他們缺乏任何主觀經驗或意識的內在世界。

These aliens are what philosophers  might call "philosophical zombies" or  

這些外星人可能被哲學家稱為“哲學殭屍”或

"p-zombies," entities that outwardly appear  fully sentient but internally are devoid  

“p-殭屍”，這些實體表面上看起來完全有知覺，但內部卻缺乏

of awareness or subjective feeling. Despite their advanced behaviors and  

意識或主觀感覺。儘管它們具有先進的行為和

complex interactions, they are hollow vessels,  mere automata going through the motions. 

複雜的相互作用，但它們是空心的容器，只是走過場的自動機。

This concept highlights a haunting question about  the nature of consciousness: how can we ever truly  

這個概念凸顯了一個關於意識本質的令人困擾的問題：我們如何才能真正

know what lies within another being, and what is  it that gives rise to our own rich inner lives? 

知道另一個存在的內心是什麼，以及是什麼產生了我們自己豐富的內在生活？

So let's talk about it To delve into the implications  

所以讓我們來談談為了深入研究

of p-zombies, it will be helpful to talk  about the hard problem of consciousness. 

p-殭屍的意義，談論意識這個難題將會有所幫助。

So What is the hard problem of consciousness? 

那麼意識的難題是什麼呢？

The "hard problem of consciousness" is a  term coined by philosopher David Chalmers.  

「意識難題」是哲學家大衛·查爾默斯創造的術語。

It addresses the challenge of explaining why and  how subjective experiences, or qualia, arise from  

它解決了解釋主觀經驗或感受性為何以及如何從

neural processes. This contrasts with the "easy  problems" of consciousness, which deal with  

神經過程中產生的挑戰。這與意識的「簡單問題」形成鮮明對比，意識問題涉及

understanding the brain's functional aspects, like  information processing and behavioral responses. 

理解大腦的功能方面，例如訊息處理和行為反應。

While the term "easy problems" is used  somewhat tongue-in-cheek, Chalmers emphasizes  

雖然「簡單問題」這個詞的使用有些半開玩笑，但查爾默斯強調

that these issues are still quite challenging.  As cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker notes,  

這些問題仍然相當具有挑戰性。正如認知心理學家史蒂文·平克（Steven Pinker）指出的那樣，

they are "easy" only in comparison to the  hard problem. At least For the “easy problem”  

只有與困難問題相比，它們才「容易」。至少對於“簡單的問題”，

scientists know what to look for, and with  sufficient resources and intellectual effort,  

科學家們知道要尋找什麼，並且只要有足夠的資源和智力努力，

solutions might be found within this century. The hard problem, on the other hand, seeks to  

可能會在本世紀內找到解決方案。另一方面，難題試圖揭示

uncover why these processes are associated with  personal, internal experiences, such as the  

為什麼這些過程與個人的內在經驗相關，例如

redness of red or the pain of a headache. While science can map brain activity and  

紅色或頭痛。雖然科學可以繪製大腦活動圖並

understand its functions, this problem questions  why these processes give rise to a conscious state  

理解其功能，但這個問題質疑為什麼這些過程會產生意識狀態

rather than operating in darkness. It's  a philosophical issue that continues to  

而不是在黑暗中運作。這是一個持續

puzzle researchers in neuroscience,  cognitive science, and philosophy.

困擾神經科學、認知科學和哲學研究人員的哲學問題。

This leads us to two predominant theories  in the philosophy of mind,Physicalism and  

這將我們引向心靈哲學中的兩個主要理論：物理主義和

Mind-Body Dualism : So 

身心二元論：那麼

What are the differences between  Physicalism and Mind-Body Dualism? 

物理主義和身心二元論之間有什麼區別？

Physicalism posits that everything is physical or  at least supervenes on the physical. Under this  

物理主義認為一切都是物理的，或至少是物理上的。根據這種

view, mental states, including consciousness,  are the result of physical interactions within  

觀點，包括意識在內的精神狀態是 大腦 內物理互動的結果

the brain. If true, the exact replication of  a human's physical brain state should yield  

。 如果這是真的，那麼人類物理大腦狀態的精確複製應該會產生

identical conscious experiences, leaving  no room for p-zombies—they simply cannot  

相同的意識體驗，不給p殭屍留下任何空間——它們根本不可能

exist because their physical equivalence  to humans necessitates consciousness. 

存在，因為它們與人類的物理等同性需要意識。

Mind-Body Dualism, on the other hand, argues  that mental phenomena are non-physical and thus,  

另一方面，身心二元論認為精神現像是非物理的，因此

not bound by physical laws. This perspective  allows for the possibility of p-zombies as  

不受物理定律的約束。這種觀點允許p-殭屍的可能性，因為

it suggests that physical replication  alone might not replicate consciousness.  

它表明單獨的物理複製可能無法複製意識。

The mental and physical are distinct,  and one can exist without the other. 

精神和身體是截然不同的，兩者可以互相獨立而存在。

These theories bring us to the  concept of the philosophical zombie. 

這些理論為我們帶來了哲學殭屍的概念。

So What is the philosophical zombie? 

那什麼是哲學殭屍呢？

The Philosophical Zombie Argument is a  thought experiment in the philosophy of mind,  

哲學殭屍論證是心靈哲學的思想實驗，

particularly in discussions about  consciousness and physicalism.

特別是在意識和物理主義的討論中。

Proposed by philosopher David Chalmers,  the argument presents the concept of a  

該論證由哲學家大衛·查爾默斯提出，提出了「哲學殭屍」的概念

"philosophical zombie," which is an entity  that is indistinguishable from a normal  

，這是一個

human being in every way except that it lacks  conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.

在各方面都與正常人沒有區別的實體，除了缺乏意識經驗、感受性或感知力。

The zombie behaves and appears  exactly like any other human;  

殭屍的行為和外表與任何其他人類完全相同；

it can speak about its emotions, respond to pain,  

它可以表達自己的情緒，對疼痛做出反應，

and behave as if it is conscious, but it does  not actually have any subjective experience.

表現得好像它是有意識的，但實際上它沒有任何主觀經驗。

The core of the zombie argument  is to challenge physicalism,  

殭屍論證的核心是挑戰物理主義，

the doctrine that everything is physical or that  the real world consists only of physical entities.

即一切都是物理的或現實世界僅由物理實體組成的理論。

Chalmers uses this argument to suggest that  

查爾默斯用這個論點表明，

conscious experience cannot be fully  explained by physical processes alone.

意識體驗不能只用物理過程來完全解釋。

If it is conceivable that there could be  a physical duplicate of a person without  

如果可以想像，可能存在一個沒有

consciousness, then consciousness  must involve something non-physical.

意識的人的物理複製品，那麼意識一定涉及某種非物質的東西。

This leads to the conclusion that physicalism  is false, as the existence of such zombies  

這導致了這樣的結論：物理主義是錯誤的，因為這種殭屍的存在

would mean that physical facts do not  exhaustively account for mental facts. 

意味著物理事實不能詳盡地解釋心理事實。

Chalmers argues that the mere logical possibility  of p-zombies suggests that physicalism is  

查爾默斯認為，p-殭屍的純粹邏輯可能性顯示物理主義不足以

insufficient to explain consciousness. If we  can coherently conceive of a human devoid of  

解釋意識。如果我們能夠連貫地設想一個沒有

consciousness, then consciousness and the  physical brain state cannot be identical. 

意識的人類，那麼意識和大腦的物理狀態就不可能是相同的。

A related thought experiment, known as  Mary's Room, further supports this notion. 

一個相關的思想實驗，稱為瑪麗的房間，進一步支持了這個觀點。

So What is  

那麼

Mary's room thought experiment? The Mary's Room thought experiment,  

瑪莉的房間思想實驗 是什麼 呢？ 瑪麗的房間思想實驗

a thought experiment proposed by philosopher  Frank Jackson, provides an intriguing insight  

是哲學家法蘭克傑克森提出的思想實驗，它

into the nature of subjective experience. In this scenario, he imagines a scientist  

為主觀經驗的本質提供了有趣的見解。在這個場景中，他想像了一位名叫瑪麗的科學家

named Mary who lives her entire life in a  black-and-white room. Despite her confinement,  

，她一生都住在黑白房間裡。儘管被禁閉，

Mary becomes an expert on the science  of color vision and understands all the  

瑪麗還是成為了色覺科學的專家，並了解

physical and neurological facts  about how humans perceive color.

有關人類如何感知顏色的所有物理和神經學事實。

However, she herself has never actually seen  any colors firsthand. The experiment raises the  

然而，她本人從未親眼見過任何顏色。實驗提出了一個

question: what happens when Mary finally steps  out of her monochromatic environment and sees a  

問題：當瑪麗最終走出單色環境並

vibrant color, such as red, for the first time? According to Jackson, when Mary finally sees  

第一次看到鮮豔的顏色（例如紅色）時，會發生什麼？根據傑克森的說法，當瑪麗最終看到

the color red, she gains new knowledge, that  is- what red truly looks like. This suggests  

紅色時，她獲得了新的知識，那就是紅色真正的樣子。這表明

that the subjective experience of seeing red  provides a distinct kind of information that  

看到紅色的主觀體驗提供了一種獨特的訊息，

cannot be fully captured by objective, physical  descriptions alone. The thought experiment is  

無法僅透過客觀的物理描述來完全捕捉。這個思想實驗旨在

designed to demonstrate that there is an aspect of  consciousness, often referred to as "qualia," that  

證明意識的一個方面，通常被稱為“感受性”，它

goes beyond physical explanations, challenging  purely physicalist accounts of the mind.

超越了物理解釋，挑戰了純粹物理主義對心靈的解釋。

However, some argue that the philosophical zombie  actually cannot prove physicalism is wrong. 

然而，有些人認為哲學殭屍其實不能證明物理主義是錯的。

Here are some counter-arguments  

以下是一些

against philosophical zombie argument : Inconceivability: Critics like Daniel Dennett  

反對哲學殭屍論點的 反駁 ：不可想像性：像丹尼爾·丹尼特這樣的批評家

argue that if a being acts indistinguishably  from a conscious being, it must, by necessity,  

認為，如果一個存在的行為與有意識的存在沒有區別，那麼它必然是

be conscious. Thus, p-zombies are not genuinely  conceivable—they are a contradiction in terms. 

有意識的。因此，p-殭屍並不是真正可以想像的——它們在術語上是矛盾的。

Dennett, a prominent philosopher and  cognitive scientist, suggests that  

著名哲學家和認知科學家丹尼特認為，

if a being behaves indistinguishably from a  conscious being, it must be conscious itself  

如果一個存在的行為與有意識的存在沒有區別，那麼它本身一定是有意識的，

because the behavior is a manifestation of  the processes we associate with consciousness. 

因為這種行為是我們與意識相關的過程的表現。

This reasoning challenges the concept  of p-zombies, which as we mentioned were  

這種推理挑戰了 p-殭屍的概念，正如我們所提到的，p-殭屍是

introduced by philosopher David Chalmers  as hypothetical beings who act exactly  

由哲學家 David Chalmers 引入的，作為假設的生物，其行為

like conscious beings but lack inner experiences.  They would hypothetically react to stimuli, hold  

與有意識的生物完全相同，但缺乏內在體驗。假設他們會

conversations, and express emotions like conscious  humans, but without any subjective experience. 

像有意識的人類一樣對刺激做出反應、進行對話並表達情感，但沒有任何主觀經驗。

Dennett argues that p-zombies are  not genuinely conceivable because  

丹尼特認為，p-殭屍並不是真正可以想像的，因為

if a being behaves exactly like a conscious  person, they must also possess consciousness. 

如果一個生物的行為完全像一個有意識的人，那麼他們也必須擁有意識。

According to Dennett, the concept of a p-zombie  implies that consciousness is a distinct,  

根據丹尼特的說法，p-殭屍的概念意味著意識是一種獨特的

non-physical property. He rejects this, arguing  that consciousness is not separate from the  

非物理屬性。他拒絕了這一點，認為意識與

physical processes occurring in the brain. This  view is rooted in functionalism and the idea  

大腦中發生的物理過程並不是分開的。這種觀點植根於功能主義和

that mental states can be fully explained by the  physical and functional processes of the brain. 

精神狀態可以透過大腦的物理和功能過程完全解釋的觀點。

For example, imagine a robot programmed to act  exactly like a human: it could hold conversations,  

例如，想像一個機器人被編程為與人類完全相同：它可以進行對話，

detect and respond to emotions, and even write  poetry. Dennett would argue that if such a robot  

檢測和回應情緒，甚至寫詩。丹尼特認為，如果這樣的機器人

perfectly replicated the behaviors and responses  of a conscious being, it would essentially possess  

完美地複製了有意識生物的行為和反應，那麼它本質上就會

consciousness by virtue of its functioning, even  if it did not have a brain made of organic matter. 

憑藉其功能而擁有意識，即使它沒有由有機物構成的大腦。

Circular Reasoning: This criticism points out  that p-zombie arguments assume a conclusion  

循環推理：這種批評指出 p-zombie 論證假設了一個結論

within their premises: they begin by assuming  that consciousness is non-physical and use  

在他們的前提下：他們首先假設意識是非物理的，並用

that assumption to argue against physicalism. This fallacy becomes evident in the following  

這個假設來反對物理主義。這種謬論透過以下

way: proponents of p-zombies often start by  presuming that consciousness has non-physical  

方式變得明顯：p-殭屍的支持者通常首先假設意識具有非物理

properties and use that assumption to argue  against physicalist views of consciousness. 

屬性，並使用該假設來反對物理主義的意識觀點。

To understand this critique, consider the standard  p-zombie thought experiment presented by David  

要理解這一批評，請考慮大衛·查爾默斯提出的標準 p-殭屍思想實驗

Chalmers. He proposes that we can conceive of  beings who look and behave like us in every way  

。他提出，我們可以想像出一種在各方面都與我們外表和行為相似

but lack subjective experience, or qualia. If  such beings are conceivable, Chalmers argues,  

但缺乏主觀經驗或感受性的生物。查爾默斯認為，如果這樣的存在是可以想像的，

this suggests that consciousness cannot be reduced  to physical processes alone, and thus physicalism  

這表明意識不能僅僅被簡化為物理過程，因此物理主義

(the view that everything about the mind can  be explained by physical processes) is false. 

（關於心靈的一切都可以用物理過程來解釋的觀點）是錯誤的。

However, critics point out that Chalmers's  argument relies on an assumption about the  

然而，批評者指出，查爾默斯的論點依賴關於

non-physical nature of consciousness  to even define a p-zombie. By defining  

意識非物理性質的假設，甚至定義了 p-殭屍。透過將

a p-zombie as physically identical to a  conscious being but lacking consciousness,  

p-殭屍定義為在物理上與有意識的存在相同但缺乏意識，

he presupposes that consciousness is something  over and above physical processes—a non-physical  

他預設意識是超越物理過程的東西 - 一種非物理

phenomenon. He then uses this presupposition  to conclude that consciousness cannot be fully  

現象。然後，他用這個預設得出結論：意識不能完全

explained by physicalism, which is the  circular reasoning critics highlight. 

用物理主義來解釋，這是批評家強調的循環推理。

For example, a critic might argue that the  mere conceptualization of a p-zombie does not  

例如，批評者可能會爭辯說，僅僅對 p-zombie 進行概念化並不能

prove that such entities are metaphysically  possible. Instead, the concept of a p-zombie  

證明此類實體在形而上學上是可能的。相反，p-殭屍的概念

relies on our intuitions about consciousness  being something different from brain processes,  

依賴我們對意識與大腦過程不同的直覺，

which physicalists might reject as incorrect.  A physicalist would instead argue that a being  

而物理主義者可能會認為這是不正確的。相反，物理主義者會認為，行為像我們一樣的生物

that behaves like us must necessarily have  the same mental states, as mental states  

必然具有相同的心理狀態，因為心理狀態

are defined by their physical correlates. Thus, opponents of the p-zombie thought  

是由其物理相關性定義的。因此，像丹尼特這樣的 p-殭屍思想

experiment, like Dennett, contend that  it doesn't provide a genuine challenge  

實驗的反對者認為，它並沒有對物理主義提出真正的挑戰，

to physicalism because it begs the question.  They believe the argument against physicalism  

因為它迴避了問題。他們認為，反對物理主義的論點

is embedded within the assumptions used to define  p-zombies, making it circular and unpersuasive.

嵌入在用於定義 p-殭屍的假設中，使其循環且缺乏說服力。

Functionalism: This viewpoint suggests that  mental states are constituted solely by their  

功能主義：這種觀點認為，心理狀態僅由其功能作用所構成

functional role—by their causal relations  to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs,  

──由其與感覺輸入、行為輸出 和其他心理狀態的 因果關係

and other mental states. Thus, any being that  functionally behaves like a human must have  

所構成。 因此，任何在功能上表現得像人類的生物都必須具有

conscious experiences identical to a human's. Essentially, this viewpoint posits that what makes  

與人類相同的意識經驗。從本質上講，這種觀點認為，

something a mental state is its causal relations  to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and other  

某些事物之所以成為精神狀態，是因為它與感覺輸入、行為輸出和其他

mental states. Therefore, any entity capable of  fulfilling these roles should possess the same  

精神狀態之間存在因果關係。因此，任何能夠履行這些角色的實體都應該擁有相同的

mental experiences, regardless of the specific  material composition of its brain or body. 

心理體驗，無論其大腦或身體的特定物質組成如何。

A classic example illustrating this concept  involves pain. According to functionalism,  

說明這一概念的一個典型例子涉及疼痛。根據功能主義，

what matters about the experience of pain is  not that it's caused by a particular type of  

疼痛體驗重要的不是它是由特定類型的

neural activity (e.g., C-fiber stimulation in  humans), but rather that it serves specific  

神經活動（例如人類的 C 纖維刺激）引起的，而是它具有特定的

functions like producing avoidance behavior,  triggering emotional responses, and motivating  

功能，例如產生迴避行為、觸發情緒反應、並激勵

decisions to protect the body. Thus, if an alien  species or an artificial intelligence system could  

做出保護身體的決定。因此，如果外來物種或人工智慧系統能夠

functionally replicate this pattern of responses  and interactions, functionalism asserts that they,  

在功能上複製這種反應和相互作用的模式，功能主義斷言它們

too, would be experiencing pain, even if  their neural architecture is vastly different. 

也會經歷疼痛，即使它們的神經結構有很大不同。

This framework challenges the idea of p-zombies  because it insists that any being that behaves  

這個框架挑戰了 p-殭屍的想法，因為它堅持認為，任何行為

indistinguishably from a conscious human  would necessarily have the same conscious  

與有意識的人類沒有區別的生物都必然具有相同的有意識

experiences. According to functionalism,  consciousness isn't a mystical property  

體驗。根據功能主義，意識並不是

separate from physical processes but is a result  of the functional roles these processes fulfill. 

獨立於物理過程的神秘屬性，而是這些過程所扮演的功能作用的結果。

Critics of the p-zombie argument, like Daniel  Dennett, leverage functionalism to argue  

p-zombie 論點的批評者，如 Daniel Dennett，利用功能主義來論證

that p-zombies are conceptually incoherent. If a  hypothetical being behaves and reacts to the world  

p-zombie 在概念上是不連貫的。如果一個假設的存在的行為方式和對世界的反應與

in the same way a conscious person does, then,  by the functionalist account, it is necessarily  

有意識的人相同，那麼根據功能主義的解釋，它必然是

conscious. Dennett's famous "intentional stance"  further supports this by suggesting that if  

有意識的。丹尼特著名的「意向立場」進一步支持了這一點，他認為，如果

treating something as a conscious  agent reliably predicts its behavior,  

將某物視為有意識的主體，就可以可靠地預測其行為，

then it should be considered a conscious agent. Moreover, functionalism provides a theoretical  

那麼它應該被認為是一個有意識的代理人。 此外，功能主義

basis for understanding artificial intelligence  and the consciousness of non-human entities. For  

為理解人工智慧和非人類實體的意識 提供了理論 基礎。 例如

instance, if a computer program could replicate  all the functional aspects of human cognition,  

，如果電腦程式可以複製人類認知的所有功能方面，

many functionalists would argue that the  program could be considered conscious. 

許多功能主義者會認為該程式可以被認為是有意識的。

Functionalism presents a compelling challenge to  p-zombie thought experiments by denying that there  

功能主義對 p-殭屍思想實驗提出了令人信服的挑戰，它否認

could be an entity that behaves in every way like  a conscious human but lacks consciousness itself.  

可能存在一個在各方面都表現得像有意識的人類但本身缺乏意識的實體。

Instead, it emphasizes that mental states are  fully defined by the patterns of interactions  

相反，它強調精神狀態完全由 與之相關的

and behaviors associated with them. Ok, so who is right here? The answer is,  

互動和行為模式定義 。 好吧，那誰在這裡？答案是，

currently no one knows, but here are some  statistics that I hope you find helpful: 

目前沒有人知道，但這裡有一些統計數據，希望對你有所幫助：

A 2013 survey of professional philosophers by  Bourget and Chalmers found that 36% said P Zombies  

布爾歇和查爾默斯 2013 年對專業哲學家的一項調查發現，36% 的人認為 P 殭屍

were conceivable but metaphysically impossible;  23% said they were metaphysically possible;  

是可以想像的，但在形上學上是不可能的； 23% 的人表示它們在形而上學上是可能的；

16% said they were inconceivable;  and 25% responded "other". In 2020,  

16%的人表示難以想像； 25% 的人回答「其他」。 2020年，

the same survey yielded almost identical  results: "inconceivable" 16%, conceivable  

同一項調查幾乎得出了相同的結果：「不可思議」16%，可以想像

but impossible 37%, "metaphysically  possible" 24%, and "other" 23%.

但不可能37%，「形而上學可能」24%，「其他」23%。

So here you go, If you want to learn  more about the topics I shared today,  

那麼就到這裡吧，如果你想了解更多我今天分享的主題，

you can check out the further reading list in  the description, and if you want to learn more  

可以查看說明中的延伸閱讀列表，如果你想了解更多

random knowledge, please subscribe. I am Shao  from What People Also Ask, see you next time.

隨機知識，請訂閱。我是《人亦問》的邵，下次見。