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  • A Lion Air Boeing 737

  • crashed into the sea this morning.

  • Rescuers have located debris,

  • but they do not expect to find any survivors.

  • Some of the warning signs, in retrospect

  • were there all along.

  • Some of the decisions, or changes,

  • were so subtle that people might not even have realized

  • the importance, as they were taking place.

  • And Ethiopian Airlines flight

  • has crashed shortly after takeoff

  • from Addis Ababa, killing all 157 passengers and crew

  • thought to be on board.

  • Boeing's best-selling plane

  • is coming under increased scrutiny

  • after another deadly accident.

  • We'll do everything possible to earn and re-earn

  • that trust and confidence

  • from our customers and the flying public

  • in the weeks and months ahead.

  • Boeing is an American icon,

  • revered around the world for its engineering innovation.

  • But with two crashes in under six months,

  • critics have asked if Boeing is straying

  • from its original mission.

  • The SEC is investigating whether Boeing

  • properly disclosed issues tied to the grounding

  • of its 737 Max Airliners.

  • One message described the 737 Max

  • as a plane designed by clowns, overseen by monkeys.

  • The safety culture at Boeing was corrupted

  • under pressure from Wall Street,

  • and executives, and board members

  • who were lookin' more at their bonuses

  • than they were at the integrity of the organization.

  • Boeing was playing a game, to a certain extent.

  • It was a game of numbers.

  • They were meeting Wall Street's expectations,

  • but unfortunately, that came

  • at the expense of the end customer, and the flying public.

  • The failures that happened at Boeing

  • are really complicated, and involve subtle forces

  • and cultural changes that have been underway

  • for decades at the company.

  • This is a story of how

  • an American icon lost its way,

  • and whether or not it can find it again.

  • 2019 was not the best year for Boeing.

  • Just five months apart, two Boeing 737 Max planes crashed,

  • and the planes have been grounded since March of 2019.

  • There's simply no precedent, in aviation,

  • for a plane this important to be grounded this long.

  • In the first crash, Lion air flight 610,

  • something was discovered with the technology on the plane.

  • Investigators believe the plane's sensors

  • or its computers, had bad data suggesting a potential stall.

  • There was this software system,

  • known as MCAST, that stands for

  • maneuvering characteristics augmentation system.

  • This obscure flight control software

  • was created so the Max handled the same way for pilots

  • as the previous generation of 737s.

  • Black box data indicated that

  • a bad sensor had triggered MCAST,

  • which automatically pushed the plane down.

  • Within probably 24 hours of them discovering this,

  • Boeing and the FAA put out a warning,

  • indicating that this could occur,

  • and then also telling them how to counteract it.

  • There is a fix, simply flipping a switch

  • should have turned the automatic system off.

  • The second crash, however, the same failure.

  • I've covered dozens and dozens of plane crashes,

  • and one of my mantras has always been

  • that crashes don't occur for the same cause.

  • China grounded the plane,

  • and it just set off a ripple effect.

  • Any plane currently in the air

  • will go to its destination, and thereafter be grounded.

  • Boeing is an incredible company,

  • and hopefully they'll very quickly come up with the answer.

  • What had been billed as

  • a relatively simple software fix proved not to be so simple.

  • Every time it seemed like Boeing was just around the corner,

  • then a new issue cropped up.

  • MCAST wasn't the only issue on this airplane,

  • you had issues where the computers

  • were getting overloaded with information,

  • now there's a new issue that

  • the computers don't start up properly,

  • when you want them to.

  • And then, the first batch of

  • really embarrassing employee emails leaked.

  • The FAA is demanding answers from Boeing

  • after they waited months to disclose to the agency

  • internal messages between test pilots

  • who were working in the 737 Max flight simulator.

  • "It's running rampant in the sim on me."

  • One pilot, referencing the flight simulator.

  • "The plane is trimming itself like crazy."

  • The emails came out two weeks before

  • Boeing's Chief Executive, Dennis Muilenburg,

  • was due to testify before Congress,

  • and it was a bipartisan shellacking.

  • 346 people are dead

  • because what these chief pilots describe as egregious.

  • You're the CEO, the buck stops with you,

  • did you read this document,

  • and how did your team not put it in front of you,

  • run in with their hair on fire, sayin'

  • 'We got a real problem here.'

  • Ultimately, we don't quite know

  • exactly what caused the MCAST design,

  • just like we don't know all the causes of the crash,

  • we don't quite know, but it's very clear

  • that the one big cultural change at Boeing

  • had been a disruption in the communication

  • between engineers and top management.

  • But this kind of cultural change

  • for a company as old as Boeing happens slowly,

  • over the course of not years, but decades.

  • Boeing's history goes back over a century,

  • and while its early sea planes weren't iconic,

  • by World War Two, their military aircraft were.

  • When news of the successful raid

  • by the Flying Fortresses comes in,

  • these are the people who get the biggest thrill,

  • the thousands of Boeing workers who build them.

  • Boeing's an American manufacturing icon.

  • It was churning out bombers

  • that were critical to the allied defense effort,

  • and gave us Rosie the Riveter.

  • Sort of a symbol for American can-do culture.

  • Employers find that women can do

  • many jobs as well as men, some jobs better.

  • They were the great survivors of the post-World War Two

  • shakedown in aircraft design,

  • and the most successful new entrant

  • in the new jetliner market of the late 1950s.

  • The company gambled everything on a prototype

  • of what became its first jetliner, the Boeing 707.

  • Nearing completion

  • in the Boeing plant at Seattle,

  • America's first jet transport

  • is a unit of glistening beauty.

  • And that was followed by the 727,

  • and built this revolutionary behemoth, the 747,

  • you probably know it for the hump behind the nose,

  • and at the same time, they came up with what became

  • Boeing's greatest commercial success,

  • and that was the 737.

  • The 737 wasn't immediately successful.

  • It took several design and engineering iterations

  • to turn it into the plane that we see today.

  • It became a work horse for airlines like Southwest,

  • that fly primarily shorter routes,

  • and really brought travel to every day people.

  • And even as more and more

  • travelers flew on these aircraft,

  • the aviation safety record during this time

  • made flying one of the statistically safest ways to travel.

  • We've been the technology leader in aviation in the world.

  • Boeing was a magnificent company,

  • who made, in my opinion, the best airplanes in the world,

  • until some of these recent cultural changes,

  • which all came from pressure to Wall Street,

  • and bad management.

  • You know, over the years,

  • Boeing was this tremendously important

  • and innovative company,

  • but it wasn't necessarily a great stock.

  • In 1997, Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas,

  • another aerospace and defense giant.

  • Boeing said

  • 'let's do a merger, we'll continue with the innovation,

  • 'and maybe McDonnell Douglas will help us

  • 'in terms of our structure

  • 'and telling our story to Wall Street.'

  • Almost immediately you began to hear

  • kind of a bitter joke coming out of Seattle,

  • that McDonnell Douglas had used

  • Boeing's money to buy Boeing,

  • and certainly, in terms of management structure,

  • it began to look that way.

  • Harry Stonecipher, a former GE executive

  • and McDonnell Douglas CEO,

  • becomes COO of the combined companies.

  • And more and more of the company's style and culture

  • began to be more of a McDonnell Douglas sort of picture.

  • He almost immediately signaled

  • there was a new sheriff in town,

  • and he was gonna bring financial disciple to Boeing.

  • Stonecipher would eventually become CEO,

  • and continued his emphasis on

  • controlling costs within the company.

  • A culture that engineers within the company

  • would begin to feel.

  • We had breakfast with the president of the--

  • This is Stan Sorscher,

  • he was a physicist at Boeing for over 20 years,

  • and felt these changes firsthand.

  • And he said he was so proud of cutting his

  • capital expenditure budgets by 60%.

  • Capital expenditures, for us,

  • were improvements in the factory, in our shop floor,

  • in processes and materials and things like that.

  • By 2000, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction

  • with the way our

  • problem solving culture was being displaced,

  • and we thought it was just much more difficult

  • for us to do our job.

  • And that's when a lot of people trace

  • this sort of fundamental shift in thinking

  • in terms of what you prioritize,

  • whether that be profits, or whether that be engineering.

  • Further evidence of

  • a move away from engineering prowess

  • and innovation, to profit, was Boeing's decision

  • to move company headquarters to Chicago,

  • when Boeing's jet manufacturing

  • and airplane designers were in Seattle.

  • Probably the biggest motivation was

  • to send a message to the Street

  • that this was a company that was not going to make

  • investment decisions on the basis of legacy,

  • or heritage, or anything like that,

  • but rather, purely make investment decisions

  • on the basis of returns,

  • and by moving to a place where there were no

  • legacy loyalties, no heritage production facilities,

  • they were sending that message.

  • And it also started to shape how

  • Boeing viewed its own internal investments

  • in things like airplane programs,

  • tremendously important as the company

  • started planning for what became the 787 Dreamliner.

  • Ladies and gentlemen,

  • your 787 Dreamliner.

  • For this event, it was held on July 8, 2007, so 787,

  • Tom Brokaw was there,

  • I was there just sitting in the audience,

  • just trying to soak it all in.

  • I think they raised the factory door,

  • and there was the plane.

  • But at the time, it was just, it was an empty shell.

  • We didn't know it, but it was all for appearances.

  • For the 787, Boeing attempted

  • a new system for designing the aircraft.

  • Instead of doing everything in house,

  • it would outsource much of the plane's

  • design and manufacturing to its biggest suppliers.

  • It was gonna be about outsourcing,

  • outsourcing to the places where

  • we could produce things more cheaply,

  • as opposed to the finest, best,

  • safest airplanes in the world,

  • which is what Boeing made for decades.

  • This works for running shoes, ladies garments,

  • cell phones, hard drives, integrated circuits,

  • it works for everybody, it'll work for you, and I thought

  • 'No, it won't.'

  • Boeing had never done a plane using the system before,

  • this was very different from

  • Boeing controlling the processes itself,

  • and it did not go well.

  • We launched the 787, the worst I could think of

  • was that we'd be three months late,

  • which is a shooting offense at Boeing.

  • It wasn't three months late, it was three years late,

  • it wasn't 5 billion dollars over budget,

  • it was 30 or 40 or 50 billion dollars over budget.

  • Grounded the fleet for three months.

  • The suppliers were just in over their heads,

  • most of them, we had years of issues,

  • there was an engine explosion at one point,

  • there was an electrical fire on flight test aircraft.

  • And I thought

  • 'Okay, this experiment is done.'

  • This didn't work.

  • And the executive said

  • 'The business model is fine, we just didn't execute it.'

  • Every new airplane has growing pains,

  • especially those that kind of

  • push the edge of the envelope in technology.

  • Eventually, Boeing would fix

  • many of the 787's issues,

  • and the Dreamliner slowly started to bring in big returns,

  • and with a profitable plane,

  • Boeing looked at other measures

  • to boost its returns to shareholders.

  • There's different ways of getting your profit up,

  • so one is just that you make the best product imaginable,

  • and everybody wants to buy it,

  • and so your sales go up,

  • and you make more money on that plane.

  • The other is that you do financial engineering.

  • One common technique

  • for companies to boost their stock price

  • is a practice known as stock buybacks,

  • where a company uses its capital

  • to buy back its own stock from the marketplace.

  • And the math is really simple to understand,

  • if you have fewer shares trading, absent all else,

  • the price goes up, the shares worth more,

  • they get a nice return on their investment.

  • Boeing's stock was on the rise,

  • and by 2015, new CEO Dennis Muilenburg

  • would ramp the program up even more.

  • From 2014 to 2019, Boeing would re-purchase

  • about 38 billion of its own shares.

  • They went from a relatively normal percentage,

  • something like 30%, to over 90%

  • of cash being returned to investors.

  • And the contrast to pensions being cut

  • was really shocking,

  • and sort of a bitter moment for some people.

  • Buying back shares, and paying huge dividends,

  • while you're laying off senior engineers

  • to hire cheap labor in India, that's a sickness.

  • But while long time employees at Boeing

  • may have been frustrated, at the time,

  • this was viewed as a huge success.

  • In less than a decade, the company's stock price tripled.

  • Wall Street just loved this company, its stock shot up.

  • I see a new Boeing, I just see just straight line growth.

  • And Muilenburg was getting the rockstar treatment.

  • You're obviously a very accomplished executive,

  • you've done a great job for Boeing and its shareholders,

  • I wish I had bought the stock when you took over.

  • It's still a good deal. Still a good deal.

  • Around the same time all of this was happening,

  • Boeing was selling record numbers of its newest plane,

  • the 737 Max.

  • The 737 Max was born out of a competition with Airbus.

  • The aviation industry is

  • a duopoly between Boeing and Airbus,

  • with the two giants controlling

  • almost all of the jetliner market.

  • For both companies, it's beating commercial heart

  • is an enormously profitable family of single-aisle jets,

  • the Boeing 737, and Airbus A320.

  • While Boeing had planned to build an all-new jet

  • to replace the 737,

  • it was sidetracked by the Dreamliner debacle.

  • Airbus shocked everyone by announcing a simple upgrade

  • to its A320 family of planes,

  • in what became known as the A320 Neo.

  • Since the new planes had engines

  • that increased fuel efficiency

  • and required no lengthy training for pilots to fly,

  • it became a huge cost saver for airlines,

  • and a big hit for Airbus.

  • So Boeing had to do the same thing,

  • if Boeing didn't act, or waited too long,

  • they could lose significant market share.

  • American Airlines called Boeing and said

  • 'We're gonna buy 400 planes,

  • 'and they will all be Airbus

  • 'unless you can match their fuel economy,

  • 'and the fact that no pilot training is required,

  • 'it's identical to their other Airbus models.'

  • And the Boeing CEO said

  • 'No no no no, we'll match that,

  • 'we want half that order.'

  • With the Max, Boeing was also trying to shake

  • the image of incompetence that had followed

  • the 787 debacle,

  • so there was a lot of pressure there,

  • to show that the,

  • 'Hey, look, we can design planes,

  • 'and we can meet deadlines with the Max.'

  • And to their credit, with the Max, they did.

  • Unfortunately for Boeing,

  • some of the critical engineering decisions that were made

  • came back to haunt them.

  • In late 2015,

  • Boeing's first 737 Max takes shape, right on schedule.

  • Flight testing begins in early 2016,

  • and in 2017, the Max enters the commercial market,

  • months early, and it is, in fact,

  • that fastest selling aircraft in company history.

  • You saw huge orders coming for both companies,

  • airlines seemed generally pleased with it,

  • and to be honest, they still are.

  • Even after the crisis, some of the biggest customers say

  • 'You know what, this is a good airplane.'

  • But internal emails,

  • made public from investigators,

  • revealed that Boeing had gone to extraordinary measures

  • to get the Max into the air,

  • including some employees lying to the FAA.

  • The Chief Technical Pilot on the plane

  • described how he used Jedi mind tricks on regulators.

  • In one exchange, a Boeing employee says

  • "I still haven't been forgiven by God

  • "for the covering up I did last year."

  • The most disturbing thing we've found is,

  • there was a 2013 meeting,

  • and they conspired to conceal the system.

  • MCAST was created

  • so that the larger, more fuel-efficient engines on the Max

  • wouldn't make the plane handle any differently

  • than the previous generation of 737s.

  • At that meeting, they said

  • 'Well wait a minute, wait a minute,

  • 'if we tell anybody about this system,

  • 'then they might require that

  • 'pilots have additional training,

  • 'and our bosses, from the top, in Boeing,

  • 'and our contracts with the airlines say

  • 'no additional training required,

  • 'so we have to conceal this,

  • 'no one outside Boeing can know

  • 'that this safety-critical system exists.'

  • Another week, another shakeup at Boeing.

  • The company's former CEO, Dennis Muilenburg,

  • forced out after 35 years with the company,

  • and four years as CEO.

  • After firing Muilenburg,

  • Boeing would close their books

  • on one of the worst financial performances in history,

  • estimating 18.6 billion in total costs

  • for the grounded 737 Max,

  • and it would report its first annual loss since 1997.

  • Dave Calhoun, a member of Boeing's board,

  • was tapped as the next CEO,

  • and immediately starts to make

  • sweeping changes within the company.

  • The first couple of weeks on the job,

  • he moved very quickly to get any embarrassing overhang

  • from the last year, just clean out the cobwebs,

  • get all the bad news out there right now.

  • Trying to be more transparent,

  • Calhoun dumped even more damning documents,

  • and holds a conference call with reporters.

  • When boards reach a conclusion to change a CEO,

  • they expect change.

  • And they recognize the arguments

  • that have been presented from the outside world as legit,

  • and they're gonna experience

  • a different style of leadership,

  • a different way of doin' things.

  • But it's unclear whether or not Calhoun

  • will shift Boeing's priority away from pleasing Wall Street,

  • and return the company to its engineering roots

  • and heritage of creating top flight planes.

  • We believe this airplane's safer

  • than the safest airplane flying today.

  • Every next airplane has to be that way,

  • it has to be that way for Boeing,

  • it has to be that way for our competitors.

  • He's been on the board since mid-2009,

  • and also one of the, well,

  • almost all of the board members

  • that do not have an engineering degrees,

  • from a purely accounting background,

  • private equity, hedge funds, that kind of thing.

  • This is a bit strange, because on one level

  • a company really needs to change.

  • On the other hand, other than a shareholder emergency,

  • I'm not really sure

  • what would be the instigator of that change.

  • We are gonna have the most open book

  • the world's ever seen, on this subject.

  • Transparency is what we lost for a moment,

  • and it's something we have to regain,

  • because it speaks to the trust that the world has in us.

  • I am very hopeful that he can restore

  • the safety culture there,

  • so that they can focus on making safe airplanes.

  • The old days of simply harvesting cash

  • from legacy programs,

  • and returning it to shareholders, needs to stop,

  • and the idea of engineers being some sort of a commodity

  • that you can rely upon to come through for you,

  • that needs to stop, too.

  • The bigger issue of setting the tone,

  • changing culture, which, these things happen gradually,

  • bit by bit, he's saying all the right things right now,

  • about correcting course,

  • but we won't know for awhile as to whether

  • Boeing's on the right course.

A Lion Air Boeing 737

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