Initsplace, the U.S. passedtheTaiwanRelationsAct, whichwas a promisetomaintaintradeandculturalrelationswithTaiwan, butcruciallynot a promisetodefendtheislandintheeventof a Chineseattack.
AsTaiwanstalledChina, itssecondadvantage, theUnitedStates, coulddecidetointerveneandmoveinitsmilitary, givingTaiwan a highchanceofsuccessfullyrepelling a Chineseinvasion.
Thekeyvariableherewhenwe'rethinkingabout U.S. interventiononTaiwan's behalfistime.
Whiletheseweaponsdon't giveTaiwantheabilitytodefeatChinaonitsown, theycouldlikelybuyitenoughtimetoallowthe U.S. todecidetocomehelp, whichwouldgiveit a higherchanceofsuccess.
RatherthantrytomatchChinashipforship, planeforplane, allitdoesisneedtoprevent a successfulinvasionofTaiwan.
Withoutheedingthewarning, thecoyotewalksinto a well-timedlefthook.
Switchingto a porcupinestrategywouldrequire a massiveshiftforTaiwan's military.
Butbeginninginthe 2010s, U.S. officialsbeganurgingTaiwantobuyweaponsthatfittheporcupinestrategy.
AndTaiwanseemedtomostlyagree.
In 2015, itpurchased 250 stingers, andabout 800 otherkindsofmissiles, allsmaller, moreagileweapons.
By 2020, itpurchasedhundredsmore, plusdronesandradarsystems.
The U.S. iscurrentlyTaiwan's onlysourceofweapons, meaningitcanpressureTaiwanintobuyingwhatitwants.
TheproblemisthatinTaiwan, someleadersbelievetheystillneedthesemoreadvancedweaponstocounterChina's increasinglyaggressivebehaviorthatfallsshortof a full-scaleinvasion.