It's nice to see you.

I'm joined at the briefing today by David Cohen

from the Treasury Department.

We spent a lot of time over the last several weeks, even months,

discussing the strategy that the President has put

in place to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL.

We have, for understandable reasons,

spent a lot of time talking about our strategy related

to the military -- military airstrikes

by our coalition partners.

We've talked a lot about our effort to train and supply

local forces on the ground to take the fight to ISIL.

We've talked a lot about our ongoing diplomatic efforts

to build a broad international coalition.

But another core component of this strategy is

our efforts to shut down ISIL's financing.

This is David's area of responsibility and expertise,

and so he's here to give you some brief remarks

at the top and to answer your questions about it.

So with that, David, why don't you get us started.

Under Secretary Cohen: Thanks, Josh.

Good afternoon, everybody.

So what I thought I would do is briefly recap a speech that

I delivered earlier today describing Treasury's role

in leading the effort to disrupt the financing for ISIL,

which is part of the, as Josh mentioned,

the overall effort to disrupt, degrade

and ultimately defeat ISIL.

So I began by sketching the key source of ISIL's current

revenue, and noted that ISIL presents a somewhat different

terrorist financing challenge for a couple of reasons.

One, it has obviously amassed wealth at a pretty rapid clip.

Much of its funding, unlike sort of al Qaeda and al Qaeda-type

organizations, does not come from external donations but

is gathered -- internally gathered locally in the territory

in Iraq and Syria where it currently operates.

But nonetheless, ISIL's financial foundations can be

attacked through the application of some tried and true

techniques that we've developed over the past 10 years

at the Treasury Department, and with some

modifications on some of these approaches.

So with respect to ISIL's sources of revenue,

obviously ISIL's sale of oil has gotten a lot of attention.

Our best understanding is that ISIL, since about mid-June,

has earned approximately a million dollars

a day through the sale of smuggled oil.

There's been some progress recently in beating back

ISIL's ability to earn money from the sale of smuggled oil,

in particular due to the airstrikes that have been

conducted on some of the ISIL oil refineries.

Second, ISIL has earned about $20 million this year through

kidnapping for ransom, through receiving ransoms

to free innocent civilians, often journalists,

that it has taken hostage.

Third, ISIL earns up to several million dollars

per month through its various extortion networks

and criminal activity in the territory where it operates.

And finally, as I mentioned, external donations are not

right now a significant source of funding for ISIL,

but it does maintain some really significant links to Gulf-based

financiers, as a spate of Treasury designations we did

last night -- last week, rather -- or last month, highlights.

So we are leading a three-pronged effort to combat

ISIL's financial foundation, closely linked up with

the other members in the U.S. government

of the anti-ISIL coalition,

as well as with international counterparts.

So first, we're focused on cutting off

ISIL's funding streams.

With respect to oil, we are looking very carefully at who

the middlemen are who are involved in the sale

of the oil that ISIL is smuggling.

At some point, there is someone in that chain

of transactions who is involved

in the legitimate or quasi-legitimate economy.

They have a bank account.

Their trucks may be insured.

They may have licensing on their facilities.

There is someone who our tools, our designation

tools can influence.

And so we are looking very carefully at identifying who

the people are that are involved in this chain

of transactions that we can apply our tools against.

Secondly, we are working to turn the growing international

norm against paying ransom to terrorist organizations

into a reality.

This year there were two U.N. Security Council

resolutions that very clearly came out and

said that paying a ransom to terrorist organizations

is something that no country, no member state should

be involved in.

This is something that has been longstanding U.S.

policy, longstanding U.K. policy, and something

that we're trying to get our partners around

the world to turn from a norm into a reality.

Third, we are looking at these external funding networks.

Although it is not currently a significant source of revenue,

there is obviously a big pool of money out there

that has historically funded extremist groups.

Very focused on ensuring that this does not become a more

significant means by which ISIL is able to fund itself.

And finally, on the crime and extortion networks,

the best way to address this, again,

is through the military activity and other activity

on the ground to push ISIL out of the territory

where it's currently operating.

But it does sort of play into our second line of activity,

which is to prevent ISIL from gaining access

to the international financial system.

So as it has funds at its disposal,

it's critically important that it does not get access to the

financial system through the bank branches that are

in the territory where it's currently operating.

There are dozens of bank branches in Iraq where ISIL

is currently operating.

We're working closely with the Iraqis and with others around

the world, both in the private financial sector and in the

public sector, to ensure that ISIL is not able to gain

access to the international financial system.

And the third line of effort is to apply sanctions

against the key leaders in ISIL.

It has a relatively sophisticated,

complex organizational structure.

We're going to look to designate the leaders,

designate the people who act in CFO-like capacities,

as well as to designate those outside of Iraq and Syria

who are providing support to ISIL.

So with that, why don't I take a few questions?

Mr. Earnest: Olivier, you want to start us off?

The Press: Please.

Thanks, David.

Do you have a sense of ISIL's overall net worth?

I realize that these analogies are not perfect,

but do you have a sense of where they are in overall net worth?

And could you maybe give us just where they rank either in income

or in overall wealth against other notable extremist groups?

Under Secretary Cohen: There's no question that ISIL

is among the best-financed terrorist organizations --

leaving aside state-sponsored terrorist organizations --

that we've confronted.

I can't give you a precise figure on what

its current net worth is.

But I think an important point, though,

is to not confuse funding with financial strength.

ISIL has massed millions of dollars in funding,

but a terrorist organization's financial strength turns

on its ability to continue to tap into funding streams,

its ability to use the funds that it has,

and also its expenses, ISIL, in its ambition to control large

swaths of territory -- cities, towns and millions of millions

of people -- has a significant expense side

of its balance sheet.

And as we work to cut off its access to revenue,

ISIL's ability to deliver even a modicum of services to the

people that it's attempting to subjugate will be stressed.

And so its ability to continue to hold that territory against

a population that in the past has shown a willingness

to push back against al Qaeda-types is going

to be stressed.

The Press: And one more.

You said that external donations are not right

now a significant source of revenue.

Again, I'm sorry, can you put a dollar amount

on what that means?

How much smaller is it than a million dollars a day from

smuggling oil, or $20 million this year from ransom?

Under Secretary Cohen: It is smaller.

In September, we announced designations that included

sanctions against a Gulf-based facilitator -- actually,

a Syria-based facilitator who received $2 million from

Gulf-based donors.

So I don't mean to suggest that this is an insignificant source

of financing, it's just in comparison to their other

revenue streams right now, it's not as important to them.

The Press: Which countries are most lenient

toward paying ransoms?

And how do you approach this problem?

Under Secretary Cohen: Look, we approach this problem by lots

of quiet diplomacy, working with the countries,

and making the point -- which I think is both logical and,

frankly, has borne out -- which is that the payment of ransoms

just encourages further hostage-taking.

And so we all have an obligation to protect our citizens.

And the best way to protect our citizens is to take away

the incentive in the first place for terrorist

organizations to take hostages.

The U.S. policy against paying ransoms has been longstanding,

and it applies across the board to any hostage-taker.

But in the context of a terrorist organization that

is taking hostages, this policy has even more force,

because we know that the funding that comes from the ransoms

is used by these terrorist organizations to fund

all of their violent activities.

And so the best way to translate what is this emerging

international norm into practice is really to make the case

to our partners around the world that payment

of ransoms ultimately redounds to the detriment

of all of our citizens.

The Press: Is it mostly European nations that are

lenient towards paying, or is it Gulf States?

Or who exactly?

Under Secretary Cohen: Look, I'm not going to identify

any particular countries that are involved here.

There are, as evidenced by the fact that ISIL has received

$20 million or so this year in ransom payments,

there are still ransoms being paid.

And I think it's incumbent on everybody and the anti-ISIL

coalition and more broadly to adhere

to the Security Council resolutions

and to not pay ransoms.

The Press: What would be an example of the external funding

sources that you talked about a minute ago?

An example or two?

Under Secretary Cohen: Well, an example are these donor

networks in the Gulf where money is collected.

There are bundlers, essentially, who collect funds and move

the funds out of the Gulf into Iraq and Syria.

I mean, one of the things we're concerned about -- and again,

we have recently designated some individuals who are involved

in this activity -- is the use of social media

to solicit funds, and the ability, frankly, to move

beyond sort of person-to-person fundraising and to use

social media as a way to raise funds, bundle those funds,

and move them out of the Gulf into Syria and Iraq.

And so that's something that we're very focused on.

The Press: You mentioned going after the middlemen when

it comes to dealing with the oil revenue generated by ISIS.

Do you know who is buying that oil ultimately?

Are there nations buying it?

Under Secretary Cohen: I don't think it's --

that's what we're looking into.

And our intelligence community and our partners are highly

focused on identifying exactly who it is in these smuggling

networks that are involved.

These smuggling networks didn't just pop up overnight.

These are historic, longstanding smuggling networks that

have been the way by which all sorts of commodities,

including oil, have been traded over the years.

But what's different now, frankly,

is that the oil that had previously moved through these