We actually had pulled out of the refinery and were called back in to do one last job, which was to demolish an old pumping station, and we were told that it was a water pumping station.

It was not a water line, it was a crude oil line, in fact.

We tried to dismantle the pump, starting with removing the bolts from the flanges, and they were so corroded that we couldn't get them loose by conventional means, so we elected to use an acetylene torch at that point.

As soon as the flange separated and exploded, I was burned over 90 percent of my body.

Thirty years and over 75 surgeries later, Mr. Capano now assists other burned survivors as they recover from their wounds, often suffered on the job.

Don't think that something this tragic couldn't happen to you or somebody you love.

This could happen to anybody.

John Capano's life was changed forever by a hot work accident, welding, cutting, grinding, seemingly a routine operation, until suddenly flammable vapors are ignited by sparks or heat.

We typically hear about hot work accidents weekly.

It's become one of the most significant types of incidents the CSB investigates in terms of deaths, in terms of frequency.

The Chemical Safety Board found that since 1990, welding, cutting and other hot work on or near flammable storage tanks caused fires and explosions that led to over 60 deaths.

In February 2010, the CSB issued a safety bulletin, outlining seven key lessons to prevent hot work accidents.

The bulletin followed a tragic explosion that killed three paper mill workers in Wisconsin in July 2008, together with ten other serious hot work accidents investigated or reviewed by the CSB.

The main message of the CSB safety bulletin is to conduct an effective hazard evaluation and perform gas monitoring before conducting hot work.

Proper use of combustible gas detectors would prevent many of these accidents and save lives.

June 5, 2006, a rural oil production site in central Mississippi, operated by a company called Partridge-Raleigh.

All the workers are contractors employed by Stringer's Oilfield Services, hired to install tanks and piping at the site.

They plan to connect a pipe between two of the site's four tanks.

They empty a large storage tank and then check it for flammable hydrocarbons by a dangerous and unreliable technique, inserting a lit welding torch into the tank.

Seeing no flash, the workers believe it is safe to weld on the tank.

However, crude oil has remained inside one of the other production tanks, warming under the morning sun.

Vapor from this oil flows into an adjacent tank and escapes through an uncapped pipe, just four feet from where workers plan to weld.

Sparks shower down from the welding process, igniting the flammable vapor.

Flames flash back into the storage tank, causing an explosion, which blows off the tank lid and the ladder where three of the workers were standing.

Flames shoot through a pipe into the next tank, causing an even more violent explosion.

Three workers were killed and the fourth was severely injured.

CSB investigators noted that combustible gas detectors were not used at any time prior to or during hot work.

Partridge-Rawley had not established safety requirements for its contractors and the contractor provided no hot work safety training for its employees.

Hot work accidents affect workers not only in the oil and gas industry, but also across other sectors, such as food production, paper and wastewater treatment.

He was feeding you there.

He was giving you a bottle.

And then you were looking at him like, what are you doing?

Clyde and I were married about almost two years together, about seven.

We share a child.

Her name is Aaliyah Jones and she is now gonna be eight and she was three when he passed away.

He was an all-around maintenance man at the Bethune Water Treatment Plant in the city of Daytona Beach.

I just assumed that he had a normal, everyday, you know, 7 to 3, 30, Monday through Friday job.

Safe as my job.

And I would have never dreamed in a million years he would have been killed in a explosion.

Narrator.

January 11, 2006.

Clyde Jones is operating a crane at the wastewater treatment plant, while two other workers in a man-lift basket are removing a steel roof that covers two chemical storage tanks, one empty, the other containing about 3,000 gallons of highly flammable methanol.

But no combustible gas testing is required or performed.

The workers use an oxyacetylene torch to cut the roof into sections.

Beneath them, methanol vapor vents from the top of the tank as the morning sun warms the liquid inside.

Sparks from the torch shower down onto the tank, igniting the methanol vapor.

The fire flashes into a corroded and ineffective flame arrestor and continues into the tank.

Flames spread instantly, igniting the methanol inside.

Burning methanol spews out from broken pipes, engulfing the two workers in the man-lift basket.

One survives, one does not.

Flames envelop the cab of the crane where Clyde Jones is sitting.

When Clyde got to Halifax Medical Center, him and I were able to talk for about 10 minutes before they intubated him.

He told me that he loved me and to take care of the girls and he knew he was bad.

He just didn't know how bad.

And he asked me if I would promise to stay with him until the end.

And I told him I would.

The day after the explosion at the wastewater treatment plant, Clyde Jones, 40-year-old husband and father, died.

Narrator The accidents at Bethune and Partridge Raleigh demonstrate the need to monitor the atmosphere for dangerous levels of flammable vapor.

But monitoring must be done properly.

Ineffective monitoring techniques can be just as dangerous as no monitoring at all.

July 17, 2001, the Motiva Enterprises Refinery, Delaware City, Delaware.

Several contractors are repairing a catwalk in a sulfuric acid tank farm.

Their task involves cutting near storage tank 393, which contains waste sulfuric acid and flammable hydrocarbons.

But the tank is severely corroded and has holes in its roof and shell.

At about 7.45 a.m., Motiva operators use a combustible gas detector to test the atmosphere around tank 393.

No flammable vapor is detected.

They never test the atmosphere after that.

But as the day goes on, the temperature rises by 14 degrees, warming the contents of the tank and producing vapor that escapes through the holes.

But workers are unaware of the growing danger.

Around 1.30 p.m., a spark from an electric arc cutting system ignites the vapor, causing a powerful explosion.

The tank collapses, releasing 264,000 gallons of highly corrosive sulfuric acid.

The sulfuric acid overwhelms the containment dike and wastewater systems.

Almost 100,000 gallons reach the Delaware River, killing fish and other aquatic life.

A contract employee who had been working on the catwalk died in the accident.

His body never found.

Eight others were injured.

Combustible gas detectors should be routinely used to identify and monitor for flammable atmospheres before and during hot work.

More recent accidents illustrate the same key lesson.

Gas monitoring was performed at ConAgra Foods in Boardman, Oregon on February 16, 2009, but not in the immediate area where welding was planned.

Sparks ignited flammable gas from decaying matter beneath a water clarifier tank, causing an explosion that killed one worker.

And three contract workers were killed at a Tepco fuel terminal, while they used a torch to cut into the roof of a gasoline storage tank.

Gas testing occurred at 7 a.m., the start of the work shift, but was not repeated when workers returned from lunch or when they started the hot work.

Continuous monitoring for flammable vapor could have prevented these tragic accidents, which caused deaths, injuries and environmental damage.

Other good safety practices are also important.

Whenever possible, avoid hot work or consider alternative methods, such as cold or hydraulic cutting.

Before any hot work, perform a comprehensive hazard assessment.

Personnel may sometimes be unaware of processes that can release flammable vapors.

In 2008, three workers were killed and one was injured in Tomahawk, Wisconsin, at the Packaging Corporation of America, which manufactures corrugated packaging and container board.

Welding sparks ignited flammable hydrogen gas from an 80-foot tall storage tank.

Unknown to plant employees, microbes were producing the gas from the decomposition of waste fiber inside the tank.

Test the area where hot work is planned and eliminate potential sources of flammables, even in equipment that is not directly involved.

For instance, at Park Ridge Raleigh, emptying and purging the nearby crude oil tank would have eliminated the source of flammables.

Use written permits specifically identifying the work to be conducted and the required precautions.

At the Bethune Wastewater Plant, there was no permit system.

Provide safety supervision for outside contractors conducting hot work.

Two contract workers were killed in LaRue, Ohio, on October 19th, 2008, when an explosion occurred while they were welding above crude oil storage tanks owned by Marr Oil.

The company had no formal program to select or oversee contractors.

And finally, train personnel on the hazards of hot work.

When there's any hot work involved, there needs to be additional training and safeguards put in place to make sure that the men or women that are doing the job are competent and well-trained to do the job.

Use all your resources.

You know, get as much training and as much information about the job at hand, you know, and go into it with your eyes wide open.

Although the hazards of hot work are well known, frequent deaths and serious injuries continue to occur.

The CSB believes that following the key lessons outlined here can help prevent future hot work-related accidents.