Well, whynowisbecausewelivein a worldwhereafterCOVID, theriskofstagflationaryshocksthatleadtohigherinflationandlowereconomicgrowtharebecomingmoresevere.
Andthesetypesofstagflationaryproblemsaregoingtobemoreseriousduring a Trumpadministration.
In 2022, bondyieldswentfrom 1% to 3.5%, and 10-yearTreasurylostmorethan S&P.
S&P fell 15%, while 10-yearTreasurylostpriceby 20%.
In a worldinwhichaverageinflationmightbe 5% ratherthan 2%, bondyieldsmaybecloserto 7%, 8% ratherthanthecurrent 4+.
Andtherefore, for $20 trillionofTreasuries, thatthetraditionalsafeasset, wesubject a massivepricerisk, 30%, 40% losses.
That's thekindofworldwe'rethinking.
Nothighinflation, nothyperinflation, buteven a riseininflationfrom 2% to 5%, 6% has a massivedamagingeffectforthetraditionallong-durationfixedincomeasset.
I thoughtaninterestingdetailwasthatthisETFwaslaunchedthroughGoldmanSachsETFAcceleratorprogram.
It's notquite a whitelabel, butforthoselisteningwhomaybearen't familiarwiththeconcept, basicallyGoldmanSachshelpedyoudothebackofficestuff, as I believeit, orunderstandit, togetthisETFtothemasses.
Soin 2018, whenwecameoffthebackendofworkingthroughthealternativeTreasuryinstrumentideathroughtheTrumpadministrationandthenationalsecuritythinktankwewereworkingthrough, theGoldmanSachsteamtookituponthemselvestohelpusdevisethisprogramas a moreresilient U.S.
They'rereallyfocusedonnationalsecurity, they'refocusedonresiliency, they'vegot a verystrongrelationshipwithWashington, andthey'vegot a fantasticteamattheETFAccelerator.
Andwethinkthatthere's moreworktobedoneunderneaththeilliquidportionofthisETFat a timeand a placewhenthescaleallowsit.
Sotheplatformisverystrong, butalsotheconnectivitytotheotherpartsofGoldmanandtheirnaturalinclinationtobemorefocusedonnationalsecurityandresiliencyandeconomicsecuritymattersmadethem a naturalchoice.
No, it's a substituteforthebondportion, becauseas I pointedout, thetraditionaldefensiveassetislong-termtreasury, doesn't workin a worldinwhichinflationisgoingtobegraduallyhigher, bondisgoingtobehigher, pricesaregoingtobelowerforthosebondsat a timewheretherecouldbecorrectioninequitymarkets.
Andtherefore, youhavetofind a hedgeagainst a worldinwhichbondyieldsonthelongsidemaybemuchhigherthan 4% andmaygotowards 6%, 7%, even 8% in a scenariowhereinflationgoesfrom 2% through 3%, 4%, 5%.
Sothat's thekindofconcerns I haveandthekindoftailrisk.
But, I mean, theargumentcanbemadethatyoutake a lookatgoldandit's notexactly a reliablehedgeofinflation.
I mean, itgoesbackandforthoverthepastfouryears.
I knowwe'reclosetorecordhighsrightnow.
Butwhenitcomesto a stablestoreofvalue, areyousurethatyoufounditingold?
Well, goldhasthebenefitthathas a varietyofhedgingcharacteristics.
Usually, wheninflationishigher, itdoeswell.
Whenthereis a riskofdebasementofsharecurrency, itdoeswell.
In a worldinwhichcentralbanksaremovingawayfromthedollarassetbecauseofthedollarization, becausewe'veweaponizedthedollarfornationalsecurityandforeignpolicyreasons, goldgoeshigher.