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  • Now we turn, to the hardest

  • philosopher that we're going to read in this course

  • today we turn to Immanuel Kant

  • who offers a different account

  • of why we have a categorical duty

  • to respect the dignity of persons

  • and not to be use

  • people

  • as means

  • merely

  • even for good ends.

  • Kant excelled at the university ofnigsberg

  • at the age of sixteen

  • at the age of thirty one he got his first job

  • as an unsalaried lecturer

  • paid on commission

  • based on the number of students who showed up at his lectures

  • this is a sensible system that Harvard would do well to consider

  • luckily for Kant

  • he was a popular lecturer and also an industrious one and so he eked out a meager living

  • it wasn't until

  • he was fifty seven that he published his first

  • major work

  • but it was worth the wait

  • the book was the critique of pure reason

  • perhaps the most important work in all of modern philosophy

  • and a few years later

  • Kant wrote

  • the groundwork for the metaphysics of morals which we read in this course

  • I want to acknowledge even before we start

  • that Kant is a difficult thinker

  • but it's important to try to figure out

  • what he's saying

  • because what this book is about

  • is well, it's about what the supreme principle of morality this

  • number one, and

  • it's also

  • it gives us an account

  • one of the most powerful accounts we have

  • of what freedom really is

  • so

  • let me start today.

  • Kant rejects utilitarianism

  • he thinks

  • that

  • the individual

  • person

  • all human beings

  • have a certain dignity

  • that commands our respect

  • the reason the individual is sacred or the bearer of rights according to Kant,

  • doesn't stem from the idea that we own ourselves,

  • but instead from the idea

  • that we are all rational beings

  • we're all rational beings which simply means

  • that we are beings who are capable

  • of reason.

  • we're also

  • autonomous beings

  • which is to say

  • that we are beings capable of acting and choosing

  • freely

  • now, this capacity for reason and freedom

  • isn't the only capacity we have.

  • we also have the capacity for pain and pleasure

  • for suffering and satisfaction

  • Kant admits the

  • utilitarians were half a right

  • of course

  • we seek to avoid pain

  • and we like pleasure

  • Kant doesn't deny this

  • what he does deny

  • is Bentham's claim that

  • pain in pleasure

  • are our sovereign masters

  • he thinks that's wrong.

  • Kant thinks

  • that it's are national capacity

  • that makes us distinctive, that makes us special that sets us

  • apart from and above mere animal

  • existence.

  • it makes us something more than just physical

  • creatures with appetites. Now

  • we often think

  • of freedom

  • as simply consisting

  • in doing what we want

  • or in the absence of obstacles to getting what we want

  • that's one way of thinking about freedom.

  • but this isn't Kant's

  • idea of freedom

  • Kant has a more stringent

  • demanding notion

  • of what it means to be free

  • and though stringent and demanding, if you think it through

  • it's actually pretty persuasive

  • Kant’s reason is as follows

  • when we,

  • like animals

  • seek after pleasure

  • or the satisfaction of our desires of the avoidance pain

  • when we do that we aren't really acting freely.

  • why not?

  • we're really acting

  • as the slaves

  • of those appetites

  • and impulses

  • I didn't choose this particular hunger or that particular appetite,

  • and so when I act to satisfy it

  • I'm just acting according to natural

  • necessity

  • and for Kant,

  • freedom is the opposite

  • of necessity

  • there was an advertising slogan

  • for the

  • soft drink Sprite

  • a few years ago

  • the slogan was

  • obey your thirst

  • there

  • there's a Kantian insight

  • buried in that

  • Sprite advertising slogan

  • that in a way is Kant's point

  • when you go for Sprite,

  • or Pepsi

  • you're really

  • you might think that you're choosing freely sprite versus Pepsi

  • but you're actually

  • obeying

  • something, a thirst, or maybe a desire manufactured or massaged by advertising

  • you're obeying a prompting

  • that you yourself

  • haven't chosen

  • or created

  • and here

  • it's worth

  • noticing

  • Kant’s specially demanding

  • idea

  • of freedom

  • what way

  • of acting, how can my will be determined if not by

  • the prompting sub nature or my hunger or my appetite, or my desires?

  • Kant's answer:

  • to act freely

  • is to act

  • autonomously

  • and to act autonomously

  • is to act according to a law that I give myself

  • not according

  • to the physical laws of nature

  • or to the laws of cause and effect

  • which include my desire,

  • to eat or to drink

  • or to choose this

  • food in a restaurant over that

  • now what is the opposite

  • what is the opposite

  • of autonomy

  • for Kant he invest a special term

  • to describe

  • the opposite of autonomy

  • heteronomy

  • is the opposite of autonomy

  • when I act

  • heteronomously

  • I'm acting

  • according to an inclination

  • or a desire

  • that I haven't chosen for myself

  • so freedom is autonomy

  • is this specially stringent

  • idea

  • that Kant insists on.

  • now why is autonomy

  • the opposite of the acting heteronomously or according to the dictates of nature

  • Kant’s point is that

  • nature is governed by laws

  • laws of cause and effect for example

  • suppose you drop a billiard ball

  • it falls to the ground

  • we wouldn't say the billiard ball is acting freely

  • why not?

  • it's acting according to the law of nature

  • according to the laws

  • of cause and effect

  • the law of gravity

  • and just as he has an unusually

  • demanding and stringent

  • conception of freedom,

  • freedom as autonomy,

  • he also

  • has a demanding conception

  • of morality

  • to act freely

  • is not to choose the best means to a given end

  • it's to choose the end itself for its own sake

  • and that's something

  • that human beings can do

  • and that billiard balls can’t

  • insofar as we act on

  • inclination or pursue pleasure

  • we fact as means

  • to the realization of ends

  • given outside us

  • we are instruments

  • rather than authors

  • of the purposes

  • we pursue

  • that's

  • the heteronomous determination of the will

  • on the other hand

  • insofar as we act autonomously

  • according to law we give ourselves

  • we do something for its own sake

  • as an end in itself

  • when we act autonomously

  • we cease to be instruments to purposes

  • given outside us

  • we become

  • what we can come to think of ourselves

  • as ends in ourselves.

  • this capacity to act freely

  • Kant tells us

  • is what gives human life its special

  • dignity.

  • respecting human dignity

  • means regarding persons

  • not just as means

  • but also as ends in them

  • and this is why

  • it's wrong to use people

  • for the sake of other people's

  • well being or happiness

  • this is the real reason Kant says

  • that utilitarianism goes wrong

  • this is the reason it's important to respect the dignity of persons

  • and to uphold their rights.

  • so even if there are cases

  • remember John Stuart Mill said well in the long run if we uphold Justice and respect

  • the dignity of persons

  • we will maximize human happiness.

  • What would Kant's answer be to that?

  • what would his answer be?

  • even if that were true

  • even if the calculus worked out that way

  • even if you shouldn't throw the Christians to the lions because in the long run

  • fear will spread, the overall utility will decline, the utilitarian

  • would be upholding Justice and rights and respect for persons

  • for the wrong reason

  • for a purely contingent reason

  • for an instrumental reason

  • it would still be using people even where the calculus works out

  • for the best in the long run, it would still using people

  • as means

  • rather than

  • respecting them as ends in themselves.

  • so that's Kant's idea of freedom as autonomy

  • and you can begin to see how it's connected

  • to his idea of morality

  • but we still have to answer one more question

  • what gives an act it's moral worth

  • in the first place

  • if it can't be directed

  • at utility or satisfying wants or desires,

  • what do you think gives an action it's moral worth?

  • this leads us from Kant’s

  • demanding idea of freedom

  • to his demanding idea

  • of morality.

  • What does Kant say?

  • what makes and action

  • morally worthy

  • consists not in the consequences or in the results that flow from it

  • what makes an action morally worthy has to do with

  • the motive

  • with the quality of the will

  • with the intention

  • for which the act is down

  • what matters

  • is the motive

  • and the motive must be of a certain kind.

  • so the moral worth of an action depends on the motive for which it's done

  • and the important thing

  • is that

  • the person do the right thing

  • for the right reason

  • a goodwill isn't good

  • because of what it affects or accomplishes, Kant writes,

  • it's good in itself

  • even if by its utmost effort to goodwill accomplishes nothing

  • it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake

  • as something which has its full value in itself

  • and so for any action

  • to be morally good

  • it's not enough that it should

  • conform

  • to the moral law

  • it must also be done for the sake of the moral law.

  • the idea is

  • that the motive confers

  • the moral worth

  • on an action

  • and the only kind of motive

  • that can confirm moral

  • worth on an action

  • is the motive of duty

  • well what's the opposite

  • of doing something out of a sense of duty because it's right,

  • well for Kant the opposite

  • would be all of those motives having to do with our inclinations

  • and inclinations

  • refer to all of our

  • desires, all of our contingently given

  • wants

  • preferences

  • impulses

  • and the like

  • only actions done for the sake of the moral law

  • for the sake of duty

  • only these actions have moral worth

  • now I want to

  • see what you think about this idea

  • but first let's consider a few examples

  • Kant begins with an example

  • of a shopkeeper

  • he wants to bring out the intuition

  • and make plausible the idea

  • that what confers moral worth on an action is that it be done because it's right

  • he says suppose there's a shopkeeper

  • and an inexperienced customer comes in

  • the shopkeeper knows

  • that he could give the customer the wrong change could shortchange the customer

  • and get away with it

  • at least that customer wouldn't know

  • but the shopkeeper nonetheless says well if I shortchange this customer

  • word may get out

  • my reputation would be damaged and I would lose business

  • so I won't shortchange this customer

  • the shop keeper

  • does nothing wrong he gives a correct change

  • but does this action have moral worth?

  • Kant says no.

  • it doesn't have moral worth

  • because the shopkeeper only did the right thing

  • for the wrong reason

  • out of self-interest

  • that's a pretty straightforward

  • case. then he takes another case

  • the case of suicide.

  • he says we have a duty to preserve ourselves

  • now, for most people

  • who love life,

  • we have multiple reasons

  • for not taking our own lives

  • so the only way we can really tell

  • the only way we can isolate the operative motive

  • for someone who doesn't take his or her life

  • is to think

  • to imagine someone who's miserable

  • and

  • who despite

  • having an absolutely miserable life

  • nonetheless

  • recognizes the duty to preserve one's self

  • and so

  • does not commit suicide.

  • the force of the example

  • is to bring out

  • the motive that matters

  • and the motive that matters for morality is doing the right thing

  • for the sake of duty.

  • let me just

  • give you

  • a couple of other examples

  • the better business bureau

  • what's their slogan, the slogan of

  • the better business bureau?

  • honesty is the best policy

  • it's also the most profitable. this is the better business bureaus

  • full page ad in

  • the new York times

  • honesty

  • it's as important as any other asset

  • because a business the deals in truth, openness and fair value

  • cannot help

  • but do well

  • come join us

  • and profit from it

  • What would Kant say

  • about the moral worth

  • of the honest dealings that members of the

  • better business bureau. What he says

  • that here's a perfect example

  • that if this is the reason

  • that these companies deal honestly with their customers

  • their action lacks moral worth

  • this is Kant’s point

  • or couple of years ago at the university of Maryland there was a problem with cheating

  • and so they

  • initiated

  • an honor system

  • and they created a program with local merchants

  • that if you signed the honor pledge not to cheat

  • you would get discounts often to twenty five percent of local shops

  • now what would you think of someone motivated

  • to uphold an honor code

  • with all the discounts

  • it's the same as

  • Kant’s shopkeeper

  • the point is

  • what matters is the quality of the will the character of the motive

  • and the relevant motive to morality

  • can only be

  • the motive of duty

  • not the motive of inclination.

  • and when I act out of duty

  • and when I resist

  • as my motive for acting inclinations or self-interest

  • even sympathy and altruism,

  • only then

  • am I acting

  • freely.

  • only then and I acting

  • autonomously, only then is my will not

  • determined

  • or governed

  • by external considerations.

  • that's the link

  • between Kant’s idea of freedom

  • and of morality. now I want to pause here

  • the see

  • if all of this is clear

  • or if you have some questions

  • or puzzles

  • they can be questions of clarification

  • or

  • they can be challenges

  • if you want to challenge this idea

  • that only

  • the motive of duty confers moral worth on the action action

  • what do you think

  • I actually have two questions of clarification

  • the first is there seems to be an aspect of this that makes it sort of

  • self-defeating in that

  • once youre conscious of

  • what morality is you can sort of alter your motive to achieve that end of morality

  • give me an example

  • what do you have in mind

  • the shopkeeper example

  • if he

  • decides that he wants to give the person of money is to do the right thing

  • and he decides that’s his motive to do so

  • because he was the moral then isn't that sort of defeating

  • trying to

  • isn't that sort of defeating the purity of his action if

  • morality is determined by his motive

  • is his motive is to act morally

  • so you're imagining a case

  • not of the purely selfish calculating shopkeeper

  • but of one who says

  • well he may consider

  • shortchanging the customer

  • but then he says

  • not, while my reputation might suffer if word gets out,

  • but instead he says

  • actually I would like to be the kind of

  • honest person

  • who gives the right change to customers

  • simply because it's the right thing to do

  • or simply because I want to be moral

  • because I want to be moral

  • I want to be a good person

  • and so I'm going to conform all of my actions to what morality requires

  • it's a subtle point, it's a good question

  • Kant does acknowledge

  • you're pressing Kant on an important

  • point here,

  • Kant does say there has to be some

  • incentive

  • to obey the moral law

  • it can't be a self-interested incentive

  • that would defeat it

  • by definition

  • so he speaks of

  • a different kind of incentive from an inclination he speaks of reverence for the moral law

  • so if that shopkeeper says

  • I want to develop a

  • reverence for the moral law

  • and so I'm going to act, so I'm going to do the right thing

  • then I think he's there, he's there as far as Kant’s

  • concerned

  • because he's formed his motive

  • his will

  • is conforming to

  • the moral law

  • once he sees the importance of it

  • so it would count

  • it would count

  • and secondly very quickly

  • what stops morality from becoming completely objective in this point?

  • what stops morality from becoming completely

  • subjective, yea, like

  • how can

  • if there's, if morality is completely determined by your morals then how can

  • you apply this or how can it be enforced?

  • that's also a great question, what's your name?

  • my name's Ahmady. Ahmady?

  • all right

  • if acting morally means

  • acting according

  • to a moral law out of duty

  • and if it's also

  • to act freely in the sense of autonomously

  • it must mean

  • that I'm acting according to a law that I give myself that's what it means to act autonomously

  • Ahmady is right about that

  • but that does raise a really interesting question

  • if acting autonomously means acting according to a law I give myself

  • that's how I escape

  • the chain of cause and effect and the laws of nature

  • what's to guarantee

  • that the law I give myself

  • when I'm acting out of duty is the same

  • as the law that Ahmady is giving himself

  • and that each of you

  • gives yourselves

  • well here's the question

  • how many moral laws

  • from Kant’s point of view are there in this room

  • are there a thousands or is there one

  • he thinks there's one

  • which in a way does go back to this question all right what is the moral law, what does it

  • tell us

  • so what guarantees, it sounds like it

  • to act autonomously is to act according to one's conscience according to a law

  • one gives oneself

  • but what guarantees

  • that we, if we all exercise our reason we will come up with one and the same moral law?

  • that's what Ahmady wants to know.

  • here's Kant's answer,

  • the reason that leads us

  • to the law we give ourselves

  • as autonomous beings

  • is a reason

  • it's a kind of practical reason

  • that we share as human beings

  • it's not

  • idiosyncratic

  • the reason we need to respect

  • the dignity of persons is that we're all rational beings we all have the capacity for reason

  • and it's the exercise of that capacity for a reason

  • which exist

  • undifferentiated

  • in all of us

  • that makes us worthy of dignity, all of us

  • and

  • since it's the same capacity for reason

  • unqualified by particular

  • autobiographies and circumstances it's the same universal capacity for reason

  • that delivers the moral law

  • it turns out that to act autonomously

  • is to act according to a law

  • we give ourselves exercising our reason

  • but it's the reason we share with everyone

  • as rational beings

  • not the particular reason we have given our upbringing, our particular values our

  • particular interests

  • it's pure practical reason in Kant's terms

  • which legislates apriori

  • regardless of any particular

  • contingent

  • or empirical ends. Well

  • what moral law would that kind of reason

  • deliver?

  • what is its content?

  • to answer that question

  • you have to read the groundwork

  • and we'll continue with that question next time.

  • For Kant,

  • morally speaking suicide is on a par with murder

  • it's on a par with murder because what we violate

  • when we take a life

  • when we take someone's life, our's or somebody else's,

  • we use

  • that person

  • we use a rational being

  • we use humanity as a means

  • and so we fail to respect humanity

  • as an end

  • today we turn back to Kant, but before we do

  • remember this is the week

  • by the end of which

  • all of you

  • will basically get Kant, figure out what he's up to

  • you're laughing

  • no, it will happen

  • Kant's groundwork

  • is about two big questions,

  • first what is the supreme principle of morality

  • second

  • how is freedom

  • possible?

  • two big questions

  • now, one way

  • of making your way through

  • this dense philosophical book

  • is to bear in mind

  • a set of opposition or contrasts or dualisms

  • that are related.

  • today I’d like to talk about them

  • today we're going to answer the question, what according to Kant,

  • is the supreme principle of morality

  • and in answering that question in working our way up to Kant’s answer to that question,

  • it will help to bear in mind

  • three contrasts or dualisms

  • that Kant sets out

  • the first you remember

  • had to do

  • with the motive

  • according to which we act

  • and according to Kant,

  • only one kind of motive

  • is consistent with morality

  • the motive of duty

  • doing the right thing for the right reason

  • what other kinds of motives are there

  • Kant sums them up

  • in the category inclination

  • every time

  • the motive

  • for what we do

  • is to

  • satisfy a desire

  • or a preference that we may have, to pursue some interest

  • we're acting out of inclination

  • now let me pause to see if

  • if in thinking about

  • the question of the motive of duty of good will

  • see if any of you has a question

  • about that much of Kant's claim.

  • or is everybody happy with this distinction

  • what do you think? go ahead.

  • when you make that distinction between duty and inclination is there ever any moral action ever?

  • I mean you could always kind of probably find some kind of

  • some selfish motive, can't you?

  • maybe very often people do have self-interested motives

  • when they act

  • Kant wouldn't dispute that

  • but what Kant is saying

  • is

  • that in so far as we act

  • morally that is in so far as our actions have moral worth

  • what confers moral worth

  • is precisely

  • our capacity to rise above self-interest and prudence and inclination and

  • to act out of duty

  • some years ago I read about

  • a spelling bee

  • and

  • there was a young man

  • who was declared the winner

  • of the spelling bee

  • a kid named Andrew, thirteen years old

  • the winning word, the word that he was able to spell

  • was echolalia

  • does anyone know what echolalia is?

  • it's not some type of flower no,

  • it is the tendency to repeat as an echo, to repeat what you've heard

  • anyhow, he misspelled it actually

  • but the judges misheard him they thought it spelled it correctly and awarded him the

  • championship of the national

  • spelling bee

  • and

  • he

  • went to the judges

  • afterward

  • and said

  • actually

  • I misspelled it

  • I don't deserve the prize

  • and he was regarded as a moral hero

  • and he was

  • written up in the new York times

  • misspeller

  • is the spelling bee hero

  • there's Andrew

  • with is proud mother

  • and but when he was interviewed afterwards

  • listen to this, when he was interviewed afterwards

  • he said quote

  • the judges said I had a lot of integrity

  • but then he added

  • that part of his motive was quote

  • I didn't want to feel like a slime

  • all right what would Kant say?

  • I guess it would depend on whether or not

  • that was a marginal reason or the predominant reason in whether not and why he decided

  • to confess that he didn't actually spell the word correctly

  • good and what's your name. Vasco.

  • that's very interesting is there anyone else

  • who has a view about this?

  • does this show that Kant’s

  • principle is too stringent too demanding

  • what would Kant say

  • about this? yes

  • I think that Kant actually says that

  • it is the pure motivation that comes out of duty that gives the action moral worth, so it's like

  • for example in this case

  • he might have more than one motive, he might have a motive of not feeling like a slime

  • and he might have to move of

  • doing the right thing

  • in and of itself out of duty and so while there's more than one motivation going on there

  • does not mean that action is devoid of moral worth just because he has one other motive

  • so because the motive which involves duty is what gives it moral worth. goo, and what's your name? Judith

  • well Judith I think that your account actually is true to Kant

  • it's fine to have sentiments and feelings

  • that support doing the right thing

  • provided

  • they don't provide

  • the reason for acting

  • so I think Judith has actually a pretty good defense of Kant

  • on this question

  • of the motive of duty, thank you

  • now

  • let's go back to the

  • three contrasts

  • it's clear at least what Kant means when he says

  • that

  • for an action to have moral worth it must be done for the sake of duty

  • not out of inclination

  • but as we began to see last time

  • there's a connection

  • between

  • Kant’s stringent notion of morality

  • and especially demanding understanding

  • of freedom

  • and that leads us to the second contrast

  • the link between

  • morality

  • and freedom

  • a second contrast describes

  • two different

  • ways that my will can be determined

  • autonomously

  • and heteronomously

  • according to Kant

  • I'm only free

  • when my will is determined

  • autonomously

  • which means what?

  • according to a law that I give myself

  • we must be capable, if we're capable of freedom as autonomously, we must be capable of acting

  • accordingly 0:37:26.0laws that's given or imposed on us

  • but according to a law we give ourselves

  • but where could such a law

  • come from?

  • a law that we give ourselves?

  • reason, if reason

  • determines my will

  • then

  • the real becomes to power to choose

  • independent

  • of the dictates

  • of nature or inclination

  • or circumstance

  • so

  • connected with Kant’s

  • demanding notions of morality and freedom

  • is especially demanding notion

  • of reason

  • well how can reason

  • determine the

  • will

  • there are two ways and this leads to the third contracts

  • Kant says

  • there are two different commands of reason

  • in a command of reason

  • Kant calls an imperative

  • an imperative is simply an ought

  • one kind of imperative, perhaps the most familiar kind, is a hypothetical imperative.

  • hypothetical imperatives

  • use instrumental reason

  • if you

  • want x then do y

  • it's means ends reason.

  • if you want a good business reputation

  • then

  • don't shortchange your customers

  • word may get out. that's

  • a hypothetical imperative.

  • if the action would be good

  • solely as a means to something else Kant writes, the imperative is hypothetical

  • if the action is represented as good in itself

  • and therefore as necessary

  • for a will which of itself accords with reason

  • then the imperative

  • categorical.

  • that's the difference

  • between

  • a categorical imperative and a hypothetical one

  • a categorical imperative commands

  • categorically

  • which just means without reference to or dependents on

  • any further purpose

  • and so you see the connection

  • among these three parallel

  • contrasts

  • to be free in the sense of autonomous

  • requires

  • that I act

  • not out of a hypothetical

  • imperative

  • but out of the categorical

  • imperative

  • so you see by these three contrasts Kant

  • reasons his way

  • brings us up to you

  • he's derivation

  • of the categorical imperative

  • well this leaves us

  • one big question

  • what is the categorical imperative?

  • what is the supreme principle of morality

  • what does it command of us?

  • Kant gives three versions

  • three formulations

  • of the categorical imperative.

  • I want to mention two

  • and then see what you think of them.

  • the first

  • version the first formula

  • he calls the formula

  • of the universal law

  • act only on that maxim

  • whereby you can at the same time will that it should become

  • a universal

  • law and by maxim

  • what does Kant mean?

  • he means

  • a rule that explains

  • the reason for what you're doing

  • a principle

  • for example

  • promise keeping

  • suppose I need money, I hundred dollars

  • desperately

  • and I know I can't pay it back anytime soon

  • I come to you

  • and make you a promise, a false promise, one I know I can't keep

  • please give me a hundred dollars today

  • lend me the money I will repay you next week

  • is that consistent

  • with the categorical imperative, that false promise Kant says no

  • and the test

  • the way we can

  • determine

  • that the false promise is at odds with categorical

  • imperative is

  • try to universalize it.

  • universalize the maxim upon which you're about to act

  • if everybody made false promises when they needed money

  • then nobody would believe those promises there would be no such thing

  • as a promise

  • and so there would be a contradiction

  • the maxim universalized would undermine itself

  • that's the test

  • that's how we can know

  • that the false promise is wrong

  • well what about

  • the formula of the universal law

  • you find it persuasive?

  • what do you think?

  • I have a question about the difference between categoricalism and a hypothesis

  • that

  • if you're going to act.. Between categorical in hypothetical

  • imperatives? right.

  • if youre going to act

  • with a categorical imperative

  • so that the maxim doesn't undermine itself

  • it sounds like I am going to do X because I want y

  • I'm going to

  • not lie in dire need

  • because I want the world to function in such a way that

  • promises kept. I don't want to liquidate the practice of promises. Right.

  • it sounds like justifying

  • a means by an ends

  • it seems like an instance of consequentialist reasoning you're saying.

  • and what's your name? Tim.

  • well Tim

  • John Stuart Mill agreed with you

  • he made this criticism

  • of Kant

  • he said if

  • I universalize the maximum and find

  • that the whole practice of promise keeping would be destroyed if universalized

  • I must be appealing

  • somehow to consequences

  • if that's the reason

  • not to tell a false promise

  • so

  • John Stuart Mill agreed with that criticism against Kant

  • but John Stuart Mill was wrong

  • you're in good company though

  • you're in good company, Tim

  • Kant is often read

  • as Tim

  • just read him

  • as appealing to consequences

  • the world would be worse off

  • if everybody lied because then nobody could rely on anybody else's word

  • therefore you shouldn't lie

  • that's not what Kant is saying exactly

  • although it's easy

  • to interpret him as saying that

  • I think what he's saying

  • is that this is the test

  • this is the test of whether the maxim

  • corresponds with the categorical imperative

  • it isn't exactly the reason

  • it's not the reason

  • the reason you should universalize

  • to test your maxim

  • is to see whether

  • you are privileging

  • your particular needs and desires

  • over everybody else's

  • it's a way of pointing to this feature to this

  • this feature to this demand of the categorical imperative

  • that the reasons for your actions shouldn't

  • depend

  • or their justification

  • on your interests, your needs, your special circumstances

  • being more important

  • than somebody else's

  • that I think is the moral intuition lying behind the universalization

  • test

  • so let me spell out the second

  • Kant’s second version of the categorical imperative

  • perhaps

  • in a way that's more intuitively accessible

  • than the formula of universal law

  • it's the formula

  • of humanity

  • as an end

  • Kant introduces

  • the second version of the categorical imperative

  • with the following line of argument

  • we can't base the categorical imperative

  • on any particular interests, purposes, or ends

  • because then it would be

  • only relative to the person whose ends they were

  • but suppose

  • there was something

  • whose existence

  • has in itself

  • and absolute value

  • an end in itself

  • then in it

  • and in it alone

  • would there be the ground of a possible a categorical imperative

  • well, what is there

  • that we can think of as having it's end in itself

  • Kant’s answer is this

  • I say that man

  • and in general every rational being

  • exists as an end in himself

  • not nearly as a means for arbitrary use

  • by this or that will

  • and here Kant distinguishes

  • between persons on the one hand

  • and things

  • on the other

  • rational beings are persons

  • the don't just have a relative value

  • for us

  • but if anything has they have an absolute value

  • an intrinsic value

  • that is

  • rational beings have dignity

  • they're worthy of reverence and respect

  • this line of reasoning

  • leads Kant to the second formulation of the categorical imperative which is this

  • act in such a way

  • that you always treated humanity

  • whether in your own person

  • or in the person of any other

  • never simply as a means

  • but always

  • at the same time

  • as an end

  • so that's the formula of humanity

  • as an end

  • the idea that human beings as rational beings

  • are ends in themselves

  • not open to use

  • merely as a means

  • when I make a false promise to you

  • I mean using you as a means

  • to my ends

  • to my desire for the hundred dollars

  • and so I'm failing to respect

  • you, I'm failing to respect your dignity

  • I'm manipulating you

  • now consider the example

  • of the duty of against

  • suicide

  • murder

  • and suicide

  • are at odds with the categorical imperative why?

  • if I murdered someone

  • I'm taking their life for some

  • purpose. either because

  • I'm a hired killer

  • or I'm in the throws of some great anger or passion

  • well I have some interest or purpose

  • that is particular

  • for the sake of which I'm using them

  • as a means

  • murder violates

  • the categorical imperative

  • for Kant, morally speaking

  • suicide is on a par with murder

  • it's on a par with murder because what we violate

  • when we take a life

  • when we take someone's life our's or somebody else's

  • we use that person

  • we use a rational being

  • we use humanity as a means

  • and so we fail to respect humanity

  • as an end

  • and that capacity for reasons

  • that humanity

  • that commands respect

  • that is to ground of dignity

  • that humanity

  • that capacity for a reason

  • resides undifferentiated

  • in all of us

  • and so I violate that dignity

  • in my own person if I commit suicide

  • and in murder

  • if I take somebody else's life from a moral point of view

  • they're the same

  • and the reason they're the same

  • has to do

  • with the universal character

  • and ground

  • of the moral law

  • the reason that we have to respect

  • the dignity of other people

  • has not to do

  • with anything

  • in particular about them

  • and so respect, Kantian respect is unlike love in this way

  • it's unlike sympathy

  • it's unlike solidarity or fellow feeling for altruism

  • because love and those other particular virtues are reasons for caring about other people

  • have to do with who they are in particular

  • but respect for Kant

  • respect

  • is respect for

  • humanity which is universal

  • for a rational capacity which is universal

  • and that's why violating it

  • in my own case

  • is as objectionable

  • as violating it

  • in the case of any other

  • questions or rejections?

  • I guess I'm somewhat worried about

  • Kant’s

  • statement that you cannot use a person as a means because every person is an end

  • in and of themselves

  • because it seems that

  • that everyday in order to get something accomplished for that day

  • I must use myself as a means to some end

  • and I must use the people around me as a means to some ends as well

  • for instance suppose

  • that

  • I want to do well in a class and I have to write a paper

  • I have to use myself as a means to write the paper

  • suppose I want to buy something, food.

  • I must go to the store, use the person

  • working behind the counters as a means for me to purchase my food.

  • You're right, that's true

  • what's your name? Patrick

  • Patrick you're not doing anything wrong

  • you're not violating the categorical imperative

  • when you use other people as a means

  • that's not objectionable provided

  • when we deal with other people for the sake of advancing our projects and purposes and

  • interests,

  • which we all do,

  • provided

  • we treat them

  • in a way

  • that is consistent

  • with respect for their

  • dignity

  • and what it means to respect them

  • is given by

  • the categorical imperative.

  • are you persuaded?

  • do you think that Kant has given

  • a compelling account a persuasive account

  • of the supreme principle of morality?

  • re-read the groundwork

  • and we'll try to answer that question next time.

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