and the cost of fear

以及恐懼的代價，

and the age of fear from which we are now emerging.

還有正在浮現的恐懼時代。

I would like you to feel comfortable with my doing that

如果我告訴你們我對恐懼 和焦慮有所瞭解的話。

by letting you know that I know something about fear and anxiety.

希望這可以讓你們感到舒服些

I'm a Jewish guy from New Jersey.

我是個來自紐澤西的猶太人。

(Laughter)

(笑聲)

I could worry before I could walk.

在我學會走路之前就學會憂慮了。

(Laughter)

(笑聲)

Please, applaud that.

請為此給點掌聲。

(Applause)

(掌聲)

Thank you.

謝謝。

But I also grew up in a time where there was something to fear.

但是我的確在一個令人憂慮的時代長大。

We were brought out in the hall when I was a little kid

在我還是個小孩時， 我們就被帶到門廊，

and taught how to put our coats over our heads

大人教導我們如何把外套套在頭上，

to protect us from global thermonuclear war.

以保護自己在全球熱核 戰爭中免受侵害。

Now even my seven-year-old brain knew that wasn't going to work.

現在想想，即使我七歲的腦袋， 都知道那沒用。

But I also knew

但我同時也知道，

that global thermonuclear war was something to be concerned with.

全球熱核戰爭確實是需要擔憂的事情。

And yet, despite the fact that we lived for 50 years

但是，儘管我們有50年的時間

with the threat of such a war,

都活在這個戰爭的威脅裡，

the response of our government and of our society

我們的政府和社會對此的回應

was to do wonderful things.

卻是做出一些很棒的事。

We created the space program in response to that.

作為回應，我們建立了太空計畫

We built our highway system in response to that.

作為回應，作為回應， 我們我們建造了公路系統

We created the Internet in response to that.

網際網路作為回應，我們創造了網際網路

So sometimes fear can produce a constructive response.

所以恐懼有時能促使 一些建設性的回應。

But sometimes it can produce an un-constructive response.

但有時也會產生無用的的回應。

On September 11, 2001,

2001年9月11日，

19 guys took over four airplanes

19個人劫持了四架飛機，

and flew them into a couple of buildings.

將他們開向幾棟大樓。

They exacted a horrible toll.

他們帶來了恐怖的傷亡。

It is not for us to minimize what that toll was.

這傷亡並非我們所能減少的。

But the response that we had was clearly disproportionate --

但我們的回應卻很明顯地 與此不成比例 --

disproportionate to the point of verging on the unhinged.

不成比例到幾乎要精神分裂。

We rearranged the national security apparatus of the United States

我們重整美國國家安全的機關

and of many governments

和許多相關的政府單位

to address a threat that, at the time that those attacks took place,

來對付像當時這樣的恐怖攻擊，

was quite limited.

這樣有限的威脅。

In fact, according to our intelligence services,

事實上，根據我們的情報局，

on September 11, 2001,

在2001年9月11日，

there were 100 members of core Al-Qaeda.

蓋達組織的核心成員數是100人。

There were just a few thousand terrorists.

恐怖分子的人數也只有幾千人。

They posed an existential threat

而他們對誰有著持續存在的威脅?

to no one.

沒有。

But we rearranged our entire national security apparatus

但我們在二次世界大戰後， 就用最全面徹底的方式

in the most sweeping way since the end of the Second World War.

重整我們整個國家安全機關。

We launched two wars.

我們發動了兩個戰爭。

We spent trillions of dollars.

我們花了好幾兆美金。

We suspended our values.

我們擱置了自己的價值觀。

We violated international law.

我們違反了國際法。

We embraced torture.

我們信奉酷刑這套。

We embraced the idea

我們接受這個想法：

that if these 19 guys could do this, anybody could do it.

如果有19個人做這種事， 全世界的人都有可能做這種事。

And therefore, for the first time in history,

也因為這樣，歷史上頭一遭，

we were seeing everybody as a threat.

我們把每個人都視為威脅。

And what was the result of that?

這麼做的結果是什麼?

Surveillance programs that listened in on the emails and phone calls

監控程式不斷監聽電子郵件和電話，

of entire countries --

針對全世界所有國家 --

hundreds of millions of people --

好幾億人口 --

setting aside whether those countries were our allies,

不顧那些國家是否是我們的同盟國，

setting aside what our interests were.

不顧國家利益在哪裡。

I would argue that 15 years later,

我認為在未來的15年，

since today there are more terrorists,

從今天開始世上會有更多恐怖份子，

more terrorist attacks, more terrorist casualties --

更多恐怖攻擊行動、更多不幸傷亡

this by the count of the U.S. State Department --

--來自美國國務院的統計--

since today the region from which those attacks emanate

今天之後恐怖攻擊發送的區域

is more unstable than at any time in its history,

會比歷史上任何時刻更不規則，

since the Flood, perhaps,

恐怕在這波恐怖浪潮之後，

we have not succeeded in our response.

我們還沒有成功做出過回應。

Now you have to ask, where did we go wrong?

現在你們得問，我們哪裡做錯了?

What did we do? What was the mistake that was made?

我們做了什麼? 犯了什麼錯?

And you might say, well look, Washington is a dysfunctional place.

然後你可能會說，看吧， 華府就是個功能失調的地方。

There are political food fights.

存在許多政治鬥爭。

We've turned our discourse into a cage match.

我們把許多對談變成鐵籠格鬥。

And that's true.

這是事實。

But there are bigger problems, believe it or not, than that dysfunction,

但不管你信不信， 還有比這種功失調更大的問題，

even though I would argue

儘管我主張

that dysfunction that makes it impossible to get anything done

這種讓世上最富裕、最強盛國家

in the richest and most powerful country in the world

無法完成任何事情的功能失調，

is far more dangerous than anything that a group like ISIS could do,

遠比任何像ISIS這樣的組織 所做的事更加危險，

because it stops us in our tracks and it keeps us from progress.

因為這讓我們脫離軌道、無法進步。

But there are other problems.

但還有其他問題。

And the other problems

而這些問題

came from the fact that in Washington and in many capitals right now,

來自華府與許多重要城市，

we're in a creativity crisis.

現在面臨的創意危機。

In Washington, in think tanks,

在華府的智囊團裡，

where people are supposed to be thinking of new ideas,

原本人們應該不斷想出新主意，

you don't get bold new ideas,

但現在你不會看到任何大膽的新主意，

because if you offer up a bold new idea,

因為每當你提出大膽的新主意，

not only are you attacked on Twitter,

不只會在推特上遭到抨擊，

but you will not get confirmed in a government job.

還可能無法繼續在政府體系工作。

Because we are reactive to the heightened venom of the political debate,

因為我們需要顧慮政治鬥爭的遺毒，

you get governments that have an us-versus-them mentality,

我們的政府都有選邊站的心態，

tiny groups of people making decisions.

都是小團體在進行決策。

When you sit in a room with a small group of people making decisions,

當你坐在一個房間裡， 少數一群人做決策，

what do you get?

你會得到什麼?

You get groupthink.

你得到集體思維。

Everybody has the same worldview,

每個人有著一樣的世界觀，

and any view from outside of the group is seen as a threat.

而任何群體外的人的觀點都被視為威脅。

That's a danger.

這是很危險的。

You also have processes that become reactive to news cycles.

你也正在經歷被 新聞連播牽著走的過程。

And so the parts of the U.S. government that do foresight, that look forward,

所以當部分美國政府 在長遠規畫、在向前看、

that do strategy --

在做策略時--

the parts in other governments that do this -- can't do it,

其他政府都可以做的事情-- 將無從施展，

because they're reacting to the news cycle.

因為他們需要顧慮媒體言論。

And so we're not looking ahead.

所以我們並沒有在向前看。

On 9/11, we had a crisis because we were looking the wrong way.

在911，我們的危機來自 過去沒看到正確方向。

Today we have a crisis because, because of 9/11,

今天我們的危機來自， 因為911的緣故，

we are still looking in the wrong direction,

我們還是沒看到正確的方向，

and we know because we see transformational trends on the horizon

而且我們知道因為我們看見 即將來臨的變革趨勢

that are far more important than what we saw on 9/11;

遠比我們在911中看到的更重要；

far more important than the threat posed by these terrorists;

遠比任何恐怖份子的威脅更重要；

far more important even than the instability that we've got

甚至遠比任何動盪--

in some areas of the world that are racked by instability today.

正在世界上某些地方遭受的動盪重要。

In fact, the things that we are seeing in those parts of the world

事實上，這部分我們所見的世事

may be symptoms.

可能只是一些症狀而已。

They may be a reaction to bigger trends.

可能只是反映更龐大的 趨勢的一些症狀。

And if we are treating the symptom and ignoring the bigger trend,

而如果我們只設法治癒這些症狀， 卻忽略更龐大的趨勢，

then we've got far bigger problems to deal with.

就會有遠比現在更大的問題要處理。

And so what are those trends?

所以，那些趨勢是什麼?

Well, to a group like you,

對於像你們這樣的群眾來說，

the trends are apparent.

這些趨勢很明顯。

We are living at a moment in which the very fabric of human society

我們活在一個人類社會的結構

is being rewoven.

正在被重新編織的時刻

If you saw the cover of The Economist a couple of days ago --

如果你有看到前幾天 《經濟學人》的封面，

it said that 80 percent of the people on the planet,

上面說地球上將有高達80%的人口

by the year 2020, would have a smartphone.

在2020年時擁有智慧型手機。

They would have a small computer connected to the Internet in their pocket.

將會有個連結網路的 小電腦在他們口袋裡

In most of Africa, the cell phone penetration rate is 80 percent.

在非洲大部分地區， 手機的滲透率是80%。

We passed the point last October

去年10月開始，

when there were more mobile cellular devices, SIM cards,

世界上個人行動裝置、SIM卡的數量

out in the world than there were people.

已經超過世界人口數了。

We are within years of a profound moment in our history,

我們活在對歷史影響最深遠的時代裡，

when effectively every single human being on the planet

在這個時代裡，世界上每一個人

is going to be part of a man-made system for the first time,

實際上都是一個人造系統的一部份， 有史以來第一次。

able to touch anyone else --

我們可以接觸任何人 --

touch them for good, touch them for ill.

為好事接觸他們，或為壞事接觸他們。

And the changes associated with that are changing the very nature

隨著這些改變而來的是它正在改變

of every aspect of governance and life on the planet

地球上任何政府與任何生命的 每一個面相的本質，

in ways that our leaders ought to be thinking about,

這是我們的領導人在思考當前威脅時

when they're thinking about these immediate threats.

應該思考的事情。

On the security side,

至於安全這方面，

we've come out of a Cold War in which it was too costly to fight a nuclear war,

我們已經從冷戰裡出來 -- 因為核戰代價太高，

and so we didn't,

所以我們沒這麼做--

to a period that I call Cool War, cyber war,

進入一個我稱為『涼戰』 的時期，也就是網路戰爭，

where the costs of conflict are actually so low, that we may never stop.

因為衝突成本很低， 所以可能永遠不會停止。

We may enter a period of constant warfare,

我們可能進入了一個持續交戰的時期，

and we know this because we've been in it for several years.

我們知道這點因為我們曾有多年經驗。

And yet, we don't have the basic doctrines to guide us in this regard.

但這次並沒有任何教條可以指點我們。

We don't have the basic ideas formulated.

我們並沒有規劃出任何基本概念。

If someone attacks us with a cyber attack,

如果有人對我們發動網路攻擊，

do have the ability to respond with a kinetic attack?

我們是否有能力做出有力的回應?

We don't know.

我們不知道。

If somebody launches a cyber attack, how do we deter them?

如果有人發動網路攻擊， 我們如何嚇阻他們?

When China launched a series of cyber attacks,

當中國發動一連串網路攻擊時，

what did the U.S. government do?

美國政府做了什麼?

It said, we're going to indict a few of these Chinese guys,

他們只說，我們要對 幾個中國人提出訴訟，

who are never coming to America.

而這些人根本沒來過美國。

They're never going to be anywhere near a law enforcement officer

他們甚至永遠不會到任何 接近執法人員的地方，

who's going to take them into custody.

接近那些有可能拘留他們的人。

It's a gesture -- it's not a deterrent.

這只是作勢而已--毫無威攝作用。

Special forces operators out there in the field today

今天前線的特種部隊人員

discover that small groups of insurgents with cell phones

發現少部分的叛亂團體用手機

have access to satellite imagery that once only superpowers had.

就可以取得衛星影像， 這曾經是世界強權才拿得到的東西。

In fact, if you've got a cell phone,

事實上，只要你有手機，

you've got access to power that a superpower didn't have,

就能取得過去世界強權 無法擁有的力量。

and would have highly classified 10 years ago.

獲得10年前還是高度機密的東西。

In my cell phone, I have an app that tells me

在我的手機裡，有個程式可以告訴我

where every plane in the world is, and its altitude, and its speed,

地球上任何一架飛機在哪裡， 還有它的高度、它的速度，

and what kind of aircraft it is,

還有它是哪種飛機，

and where it's going and where it's landing.

它的目的地是哪，將在哪裡降落。

They have apps that allow them to know

他們擁有手機程式讓他們可以得知

what their adversary is about to do.

他們的對手即將要做什麼

They're using these tools in new ways.

他們正在用新方法運用這些工具。

When a cafe in Sydney was taken over by a terrorist,

當恐怖份子控制雪梨一家咖啡廳時，

he went in with a rifle...

他拿著一把來福槍...

and an iPad.

還有一台iPad。

And the weapon was the iPad.

他的武器就是那台iPad。

Because he captured people, he terrorized them,

因為他幫裡面的人 拍攝照片、脅迫他們，

he pointed the iPad at them,

他拿著iPad指向他們，

and then he took the video and he put it on the Internet,

然後錄影並放到網路上，

and he took over the world's media.

攻佔了全世界的媒體。

But it doesn't just affect the security side.

但它不只在安全方面有所影響。

The relations between great powers --

世界強權之間的關係--

we thought we were past the bipolar era.

我們認為兩大強權對立 的時期已經結束。

We thought we were in a unipolar world,

我們認為現在世上只有一個強權，

where all the big issues were resolved.

尤其在最大的麻煩都解決了之後。

Remember? It was the end of history.

記得嗎? 這是那段歷史的終點。

But we're not.

但我們還沒結束。

We're now seeing that our basic assumptions about the Internet --

我們現在對於網際網路 的基本假設 --

that it was going to connect us, weave society together --

它可以連結我們， 將整個社會織在一起 --

are not necessarily true.

已經不見得是對的了。

In countries like China, you have the Great Firewall of China.

像中國這樣的國家， 他們擁有「防火長城」。

You've got countries saying no, if the Internet happens within our borders

你會看到一些國家，會說我們不允許 網際網路在國界內恣意流竄，

we control it within our borders.

我們要在國界內對其加以控制。

We control the content. We are going to control our security.

我們要控制它的內容。 我們要控制我們的安全。

We are going to manage that Internet.

我們要管好網際網路。

We are going to say what can be on it.

我們要決定自己可以在裡面扮演什麼。

We're going to set a different set of rules.

我們要設定一些不同的規則。

Now you might think, well, that's just China.

現在你可能在想，嗯，那只是中國。

But it's not just China.

但其實不只中國。

It's China, India, Russia.

而是中國、印度、俄羅斯、

It's Saudi Arabia, it's Singapore, it's Brazil.

沙烏地阿拉伯、新加坡、巴西。

After the NSA scandal, the Russians, the Chinese, the Indians, the Brazilians,

在國家安全局的醜聞後， 蘇聯人、中國人、印度人、巴西人，

they said, let's create a new Internet backbone,

他們都說要創造自己的網路架構，

because we can't be dependent on this other one.

因為不能再信賴別人的系統。

And so all of a sudden, what do you have?

所以一瞬之間，你還有什麼?

You have a new bipolar world

你得到一個新的強權對立的世界，

in which cyber-internationalism,

在此網路國際主義，

our belief,

我們的信念，

is challenged by cyber-nationalism,

受到網路民族主義的挑戰，

another belief.

另一種信念。

We are seeing these changes everywhere we look.

我們到處都可以看到這些改變。

We are seeing the advent of mobile money.

我們看到行動貨幣正在來臨。

It's happening in the places you wouldn't expect.

它發生在你沒想到的地方。

It's happening in Kenya and Tanzania,

它發生在肯亞和坦尚尼亞，

where millions of people who haven't had access to financial services

那裡有上百萬人 還沒機會使用金融服務，

now conduct all those services on their phones.

現在卻可以在他們的手機上享用。

There are 2.5 million people who don't have financial service access

所以250萬無法獲得金融服務的人，

that are going to get it soon.

很快就要得到了。

A billion of them are going to have the ability to access it

有10億人很快地將得以透過手機

on their cell phone soon.

取得這項服務。

It's not just going to give them the ability to bank.

這不只讓他們即將有能力開戶存款，

It's going to change what monetary policy is.

也即將改變貨幣政策，

It's going to change what money is.

即將改變貨幣本身。

Education is changing in the same way.

教育也在以相同的方式改變。

Healthcare is changing in the same way.

醫療也在以相同的方式改變。

How government services are delivered is changing in the same way.

政府服務如何履行 也在以相同的方式改變。

And yet, in Washington, we are debating

但是在華府，我們還在爭論

whether to call the terrorist group that has taken over Syria and Iraq