Scientific management - VoiceTube: Learn English through videos!

Subtitles section Play video

Scientific management, also called Taylorism, is a theory of management that analyzes and
synthesizes workflows. Its main objective is improving economic efficiency, especially
labor productivity. It was one of the earliest attempts to apply science to the engineering
of processes and to management. Its development began with Frederick Winslow
Taylor in the 1880s and 1890s within the manufacturing industries. Its peak of influence came in
the 1910s; by the 1920s, it was still influential but had begun an era of competition and syncretism
with opposing or complementary ideas. Although scientific management as a distinct
theory or school of thought was obsolete by the 1930s, most of its themes are still important
parts of industrial engineering and management today. These include analysis; synthesis;
logic; rationality; empiricism; work ethic; efficiency and elimination of waste; standardization
of best practices; disdain for tradition preserved merely for its own sake or to protect the
social status of particular workers with particular skill sets; the transformation of craft production
into mass production; and knowledge transfer between workers and from workers into tools,
processes, and documentation.
Larger theme of economic efficiency Scientific management's application was contingent
on a high level of managerial control over employee work practices. This necessitated
a higher ratio of managerial workers to laborers than previous management methods. The great
difficulty in accurately differentiating any such intelligent, detail-oriented management
from mere misguided micromanagement also caused interpersonal friction between workers and
managers. While the terms "scientific management" and
"Taylorism" are often treated as synonymous, an alternative view considers Taylorism as
the first form of scientific management, which was followed by new iterations; thus in today's
management theory, Taylorism is sometimes called the classical perspective. Taylor's
own early names for his approach included "shop management" and "process management".
When Louis Brandeis popularized the term "scientific management" in 1910, Taylor recognized it
as another good name for the concept, and he used it himself in his 1911 monograph.
The field comprised the work of Taylor; his disciples; other engineers and managers; and
other theorists, such as Max Weber. It is compared and contrasted with other efforts,
including those of Henri Fayol and those of Frank Gilbreth, Sr. and Lillian Moller Gilbreth.
Taylorism proper, in its strict sense, became obsolete by the 1930s, and by the 1960s the
term "scientific management" had fallen out of favor for describing current management
theories. However, many aspects of scientific management have never stopped being part of
later management efforts called by other names. There is no simple dividing line demarcating
the time when management as a modern profession diverged from Taylorism proper. It was a gradual
process that began as soon as Taylor published, and each subsequent decade brought further
evolution. Scientific management is a variation on the
theme of economic efficiency; it is a late 19th and early 20th century instance of the
larger recurring theme in human life of increasing efficiency, decreasing waste, and using empirical
methods to decide what matters, rather than uncritically accepting pre-existing ideas
of what matters. Thus it is a chapter in a larger narrative that includes many ideas,
from the folk wisdom of thrift to a profusion of applied-science successors, including time
and motion study, the Efficiency Movement, Fordism, operations management, operations
research, industrial engineering, manufacturing engineering, logistics, business process management,
business process reengineering, lean manufacturing, and Six Sigma. There is a fluid continuum
linking scientific management by that name with the later fields, and there is often
no mutual exclusiveness when discussing the details of any one of these topics.
In management literature today, the greatest use of the term "scientific management" is
with reference to the work of Taylor and his disciples in contrast to newer, improved iterations
of efficiency-seeking methods. In political and sociological terms, Taylorism can be seen
as the division of labor pushed to its logical extreme, with a consequent de-skilling of
the worker and dehumanisation of the workers and the workplace. Taylorism is often mentioned
along with Fordism, because it was closely associated with mass production methods in
factories, which was its earliest application. Today, task-oriented optimization of work
tasks is nearly ubiquitous in industry. Soldiering
Taylor observed that some workers were more talented than others, and that even smart
ones were often unmotivated. He observed that most workers who are forced to perform repetitive
tasks tend to work at the slowest rate that goes unpunished. This slow rate of work has
been observed in many industries in many countries and has been called by various terms, including
"soldiering",, "dogging it", "goldbricking", "hanging it out", and "ca canae". Managers
may call it by those names or "loafing" or "malingering"; workers may call it "getting
through the day" or "preventing management from abusing us". Taylor used the term "soldiering"
and observed that, when paid the same amount, workers will tend to do the amount of work
that the slowest among them does. This reflects the idea that workers have a
vested interest in their own well-being, and do not benefit from working above the defined
rate of work when it will not increase their remuneration. He therefore proposed that the
work practice that had been developed in most work environments was crafted, intentionally
or unintentionally, to be very inefficient in its execution. He posited that time and
motion studies combined with rational analysis and synthesis could uncover one best method
for performing any particular task, and that prevailing methods were seldom equal to these
best methods. Crucially, Taylor himself prominently acknowledged that if each employee's compensation
was linked to their output, their productivity would go up. Thus his compensation plans usually
included piece rates. He rejected the notion, which was universal in his day and still held
today, that the trades, including manufacturing, were resistant to analysis and could only
be performed by craft production methods. In the course of his empirical studies, Taylor
examined various kinds of manual labor. For example, most bulk materials handling was
manual at the time; material handling equipment as we know it today was mostly not developed
yet. He looked at shoveling in the unloading of railroad cars full of ore; lifting and
carrying in the moving of iron pigs at steel mills; the manual inspection of bearing balls;
and others. He discovered many concepts that were not widely accepted at the time. For
example, by observing workers, he decided that labor should include rest breaks so that
the worker has time to recover from fatigue, either physical or mental. Workers were taught
to take more rests during work, and as a result production "paradoxically" increased.
Unless people manage themselves, somebody has to take care of administration, and thus
there is a division of work between workers and administrators. One of the tasks of administration
is to select the right person for the right job:
the labor should include rest breaks so that the worker has time to recover from fatigue.
Now one of the very first requirements for a man who is fit to handle pig iron as a regular
occupation is that he shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic that he more nearly resembles
in his mental make-up the ox than any other type. The man who is mentally alert and intelligent
is for this very reason entirely unsuited to what would, for him, be the grinding monotony
of work of this character. Therefore the workman who is best suited to handling pig iron is
unable to understand the real science of doing this class of work.
Relationship to mechanization and automation Scientific management evolved in an era when
mechanization and automation existed but had hardly gotten started, historically speaking,
and were still embryonic. Two important corollaries flow from this fact: The ideas and methods
of scientific management were exactly what was needed to be added to the American system
of manufacturing to extend the transformation from craft work to mechanization and automation;
but also, Taylor himself could not have known this, and his goals did not include the extensive
removal of humans from the production process. During his lifetime, the very idea would have
seemed like science fiction, because not only did the technological bridge to such a world
not yet look plausible, but most people had not even considered that it could happen.
Before digital computers existed, such ideas were not just outlandish but also mostly unheard
of. Nevertheless, Taylor was laying the groundwork
for automation and offshoring, because he was analyzing processes into discrete, unambiguous
pieces, which is exactly what computers and unskilled people need to follow algorithms
designed by others and to make valid decisions within their execution. It is often said that
computers are "smart" in terms of mathematic computation ability, but "dumb" because they
must be told exactly what to calculate, when, and how, and they can never understand why.
With historical hindsight it is possible to see that Taylor was essentially inventing
something like the highest-level computer programming for industrial process control
and numerical control in the absence of any machines that could carry it out. But Taylor
could not see it that way at the time; in his world, it was humans that would be the
agents to execute the program. However, one of the common threads between his world and
ours is that the agents of execution need not be "smart" to execute their tasks. In
the case of computers, they are not able to be "smart"; in the case of human workers under
scientific management, they were often able but were not allowed. Once the time-and-motion
men had completed their studies of a particular task, the workers had very little opportunity
for further thinking, experimenting, or suggestion-making. They were expected to "play dumb" most of
the time. In between craft production and full automation
lies a natural middle ground of an engineered system of extensive mechanization and partial
automation mixed with semiskilled and unskilled workers in carefully designed algorithmic
workflows. Building and improving such systems requires knowledge transfer, which may seem
simple on the surface but requires substantial engineering to succeed. Although Taylor's
original inspiration for scientific management was simply to replace inferior work methods
with smarter ones, the same process engineering that he pioneered also tends to build the
skill into the equipment and processes, removing most need for skill in the workers. This engineering
was the essence not only of scientific management but also of most industrial engineering since
then. It is also the essence of offshoring. The common theme in all these cases is that
businesses engineer their way out of their need for large concentrations of skilled workers,
and the high-wage environments that sustain them.
Effects on labor relations in market economies Taylor's view of workers
Taylor's view of workers was complex, having both insightful and obtuse elements. Taylorism
took some steps toward addressing their needs, but Taylor nevertheless had a condescending
view of less intelligent workers, whom he sometimes compared to draft animals. And perhaps
Taylor was so immersed in the vast work immediately in front of him that he failed to strategize
about the next steps. Many other thinkers soon stepped forward to
offer better ideas on the roles that humans would play in mature industrial systems. James
Hartness, a fellow ASME member, published The Human Factor in Works Management in 1912.
Frank Gilbreth and Lillian Moller Gilbreth offered alternatives to Taylorism. The human
relations school of management evolved in the 1930s. Some scholars, such as Harry Braverman,
insisted that human relations did not replace Taylorism but rather that both approaches
were complementary—Taylorism determining the actual organisation of the work process,
and human relations helping to adapt the workers to the new procedures. Today's efficiency-seeking
methods, such as lean manufacturing, include respect for workers and fulfillment of their
needs as inherent parts of the theory. Clearly a syncretism has occurred since Taylor's day,
although its implementation has been uneven, as lean management in capable hands has produced
good results for both managers and workers, but in incompetent hands has damaged enterprises.
Implementations of scientific management usually failed to account for several inherent challenges:
Individuals are different from each other: the most efficient way of working for one
person may be inefficient for another. The economic interests of workers and management
are rarely identical, so that both the measurement processes and the retraining required by Taylor's
methods are frequently resented and sometimes sabotaged by the workforce.
Taylor himself, in fact, recognized these challenges and had some good ideas for meeting
them. Nevertheless, his own implementations of his system were never really very successful.
<citation needed> They plugged along rockily and eventually were overturned, usually after
Taylor had left. And countless managers who later aped or worshipped Taylor did even worse
jobs of implementation. Typically they were less analytically talented managers who had
latched onto scientific management as the latest fad for cutting the unit cost of production.
Like bad managers even today, these were the people who used the big words without any
deep understanding of what they meant. Taylor knew that scientific management could not
work unless the workers benefited from the profit increases that it generated. Taylor
had developed a method for generating the increases, for the dual purposes of owner/manager
profit and worker profit, realizing that the methods relied on both of those results in
order to work correctly. But many owners and managers seized upon the methods thinking
that the profits could be reserved solely or mostly for themselves and the system could
endure indefinitely merely through force of authority.
Workers are necessarily human: they have personal needs and interpersonal friction, and they
face very real difficulties introduced when jobs become so efficient that they have no
time to relax, and so rigid that they have no permission to innovate.
Early decades: making jobs unpleasant Under Taylorism, workers' work effort increased
in intensity. Workers became dissatisfied with the work environment and became angry.
During one of Taylor's own implementations, a strike at the Watertown Arsenal led to an
investigation of Taylor's methods by a U.S. House of Representatives committee, which
reported in 1912. The conclusion was that scientific management did provide some useful
techniques and offered valuable organizational suggestions, but it gave production managers
a dangerously high level of uncontrolled power. After an attitude survey of the workers revealed
a high level of resentment and hostility towards scientific management, the Senate banned Taylor's
methods at the arsenal. Taylorism lowered worker morale and exacerbated
existing conflicts between labor and management. As a consequence, it inadvertently strengthened
labor unions and their bargaining power in labor disputes,) thereby neutralizing most
or all of the benefit of any productivity gains that Taylorism had achieved. Thus its
net benefit to owners and management ended up being small or negative. It would take
new efforts, borrowing some ideas from Taylorism but mixing them with others, to produce more
successful formulas. Later decades: making jobs disappear
To whatever extent scientific management caused the strengthening of labor unions by giving
workers more to complain about than bad or greedy managers already gave them, it also
led to other pressures tending toward worker unhappiness: the erosion of employment in
developed economies via both offshoring and automation. Both were made possible by the
deskilling of jobs, which was made possible by the knowledge transfer that scientific
management achieved. Knowledge was transferred both to cheaper workers and from workers into
tools. Jobs that once would have required craft work first transformed to semiskilled
work, then unskilled. At this point the labor had been commoditized, and thus the competition
between workers moved closer to pure than it had been, depressing wages and job security.
Jobs could be offshored or they could be rendered nonexistent through automation. Either way,
the net result from the perspective of developed-economy workers was that jobs started to pay less,
then disappear. The power of labor unions in the mid-twentieth century only led to a
push on the part of management to accelerate the process of automation, hastening the onset
of the later stages just described. A central assumption of Taylorism was that
"the worker was taken for granted as a cog in the machinery." The chain of connections
between his work and automation is visible in historical hindsight, which sees that Taylorism
made jobs unpleasant, and its logical successors then made them less remunerative and less
secure; then scarcer; and finally nonexistent. Successors such as 'corporate reengineering'
or 'business process reengineering' brought into sight the distant goal of the eventual
elimination of industry's need for unskilled, and later, perhaps even most skilled human
workers in any form, all stemming from the roots laid by Taylorism's recipe for deconstructing
a process. As the resultant commodification of work advances, no skilled profession, even
medicine, has proven to be immune from the efforts of Taylorism's successors, the 'reengineers',
whose mandate often comes from skewed motives among people referred to as 'bean counters'
and 'PHBs'. Effects on disruptive innovation
One of the traits of the era of applied science is that technology continually evolves. There
is always a balance to be struck between scientific management's goal of formalizing the details
of a process and the risk of fossilizing one moment's technological state into cultural
inertia that stifles disruptive innovation. To give one example, would John Parsons have
been able to incubate the earliest development of numerical control if he were a worker in
a red-tape-laden organization being told from above that the best way to mill a part had
already been perfected, and therefore he had no business experimenting with his own preferred
methods? Implementations of scientific management worked
within the implicit context of a particular technological moment and thus did not account
for the possibility of putting the "continuous" in "continuous improvement process". The notion
of a "one best way" failed to add the coda, "[… within the context of our current environment]";
it treated the context as constant rather than as variable. Later methods such as lean
manufacturing corrected this oversight by including ongoing innovation as part of their
process and by recognizing the iterative nature of development.
Relationship to Fordism It is quite natural to jump to the post hoc
conclusion that Fordism borrowed ideas from Taylorism and expanded from there. In fact
it appears that Taylor himself did that when he visited the Ford Motor Company's Michigan
plants not too long before he died. But it seems that the methods at Ford were in fact
independently reinvented based on logic, and that any influence from Taylorism either was
nil or at least was far enough removed to be very indirect. Charles E. Sorensen disclaimed
any connection at all. There was a climate at Ford at the time that the world's "experts"
were worthless, because if Ford had listened to them, its great successes would not exist.
Henry Ford felt that he had succeeded in spite of, not because of, experts, who had tried
to stop him in various ways. Therefore Sorensen spoke very dismissively of Taylor, and the
mention was only to lump him into the unneeded-so-called-expert category. Sorensen did speak very highly of
Walter Flanders and credits him with being the first driving force behind the efficient
floorplan layout at Ford. Sorensen says that Flanders knew absolutely nothing about Taylor.
It is possible that Flanders had been exposed to the spirit of Taylorism elsewhere, although
not to its name, and had been influenced by it, but he did not cite it explicitly as he
simply allowed logic to guide his production development. Regardless, the Ford team apparently
did independently invent modern mass production techniques in the period of 1905-1915, and
they themselves were not aware of any borrowing from Taylorism. Perhaps it is only possible
with hindsight to see the overall cultural zeitgeist that connected the budding Fordism
to the rest of the efficiency movement during the decade of 1905-1915. This is not unlike
other invention storylines, where it was more than just Watt who was working toward a practical
steam engine; more than just Fulton who was working on steam boats; more than just Edison
who was working on electrical technology; and even regarding Henry Ford himself, more
than just he who was working toward a truly practical automobile in the 1890s. The same
can be said about the development of the engineering of processes between the 1890s and the 1920s,
although the Ford team were not at all conscious of this at the time. They perceived themselves
to be working in a vacuum in that respect, but historians can argue with them about the
extent to which that was really true. Taylor was an early pioneer in the field of process
analysis and synthesis. But he did not have the field to himself for long. The world was
ready for such development by the late 19th and early 20th centuries. And in fact many
people started to work on it, sometimes independently, sometimes with direct or indirect influence
on each other.
"One of the hardest-to-down myths about the evolution of mass production at Ford is one
which credits much of the accomplishment to 'scientific management.' No one at Ford—not
Mr. Ford, Couzens, Flanders, Wills, Pete Martin, nor I—was acquainted with the theories of
the 'father of scientific management,' Frederick W. Taylor. Years later I ran across a quotation
from a two-volume book about Taylor by Frank Barkley Copley, who reports a visit Taylor
made to Detroit late in 1914, nearly a year after the moving assembly line had been installed
at our Highland Park plant. Taylor expressed surprise to find that Detroit industrialists
'had undertaken to install the principles of scientific management without the aid of
experts.' To my mind this unconscious admission by an expert is expert testimony on the futility
of too great reliance on experts and should forever dispose of the legend that Taylor's
ideas had any influence at Ford."
Influence on planned economies Scientific management was naturally appealing
to managers of planned economies, because central economic planning relies on the idea
that the expenses that go into economic production can be precisely predicted and can be optimized
by design. The opposite theoretical pole would be laissez-faire thinking in which the invisible
hand of free markets is the only possible "designer". In reality most economies today
are somewhere in between. Soviet Union
In the Soviet Union, Taylorism was advocated by Aleksei Gastev and nauchnaia organizatsia
truda. It found support in both Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky. Gastev continued to promote
this system of labor management until his arrest and execution in 1939. Historian Thomas
P. Hughes has detailed the way in which the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s enthusiastically
embraced Fordism and Taylorism, importing American experts in both fields as well as
American engineering firms to build parts of its new industrial infrastructure. The
concepts of the Five Year Plan and the centrally planned economy can be traced directly to
the influence of Taylorism on Soviet thinking. Hughes quotes Joseph Stalin:
American efficiency is that indomitable force which neither knows nor recognises obstacles;
which continues on a task once started until it is finished, even if it is a minor task;
and without which serious constructive work is impossible.... The combination of the Russian
revolutionary sweep with American efficiency is the essence of Leninism.
Hughes offers the equation "Taylorismus + Fordismus = Amerikanismus" to describe the
Soviet view. Sorensen recounted his experience as one of the American consultants bringing
Ford know-how to the USSR during this brief era, before the Cold War made such exchanges
unthinkable. As the Soviet Union developed and grew in power, both sides, the Soviets
and the Americans, chose to ignore or deny the contribution that American ideas and expertise
had made: the Soviets because they wished to portray themselves as creators of their
own destiny and not indebted to a rival, and the Americans because they did not wish to
acknowledge their part in creating a powerful communist rival. Anti-communism had always
enjoyed widespread popularity in America, and anti-capitalism in Russia, but after World
War II, they precluded any admission by either side that technologies or ideas might be either
freely shared or clandestinely stolen. East Germany
The German Federal Archives contain documentation created by the German Democratic Republic
as it sought to increase efficiency in its industrial sectors. In the accompanying photograph,
workers discuss standards that have recently been created specifying how each task should
be done and how long it should take. By the 1950s, Taylor's original form of scientific
management had grown dated, but the goals and themes remained attractive and found new
avatars. The workers in the photograph were engaged in a state-planned instance of process
improvement, but they were essentially pursuing the same goals that were also contemporaneously
pursued in the Free World by people like the developers of the Toyota Production System.
Legacy Scientific management was one of the first
attempts to systematically treat management and process improvement as a scientific problem.
It was probably the first to do so in a "bottom-up" way, which is a concept that remains useful
even today, in concert with other concepts. Two corollaries of this primacy are that scientific
management became famous and it was merely the first iteration of a long-developing way
of thinking, and many iterations have come since. Nevertheless, common elements unite
them. With the advancement of statistical methods, quality assurance and quality control
could begin in the 1920s and 1930s. During the 1940s and 1950s, the body of knowledge
for doing scientific management evolved into operations management, operations research,
and management cybernetics. In the 1980s total quality management became widely popular,
and in the 1990s "re-engineering" went from a simple word to a mystique. Today's Six Sigma
and lean manufacturing could be seen as new kinds of scientific management, although their
evolutionary distance from the original is so great that the comparison might be misleading.
In particular, Shigeo Shingo, one of the originators of the Toyota Production System, believed
that this system and Japanese management culture in general should be seen as a kind of scientific
management. Peter Drucker saw Frederick Taylor as the
creator of knowledge management, because the aim of scientific management was to produce
knowledge about how to improve work processes. Although the typical application of scientific
management was manufacturing, Taylor himself advocated scientific management for all sorts
of work, including the management of universities and government. For example, Taylor believed
scientific management could be extended to "the work of our salesmen". Shortly after
his death, his acolyte Harlow S. Person began to lecture corporate audiences on the possibility
of using Taylorism for "sales engineering" This was a watershed insight in the history
of corporate marketing. Today's militaries employ all of the major
goals and tactics of scientific management, if not under that name. Of the key points,
all but wage incentives for increased output are used by modern military organizations.
Wage incentives rather appear in the form of skill bonuses for enlistments.
Scientific management has had an important influence in sports, where stop watches and
motion studies rule the day.. Modern human resources can be seen to have
begun in the scientific management era, most notably in the writings of Katherine M. H.
Blackford, who was also a proponent of eugenics. See also
Digital Taylorism Dirty, Dangerous and Demeaning
Hawthorne effect Management science
Modern Times Pandora's Box
The Pajama Game The Secret Life of Machines#Series 3 - The
Secret Life of the Office Stakhanovism
Words per minute is a taylorism measurement of "office" productivity
References
Further reading Aitken, Hugh G.J. [1960], Scientific Management
in Action: Taylorism at Watertown Arsenal, 1908-1915, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University
Press, ISBN 978-0-691-04241-1, LCCN 84026462, OCLC 1468387. First published in 1960 by
Harvard University Press. Republished in 1985 by Princeton University Press, with a new
foreword by Merritt Roe Smith. Beissinger, Mark R., Scientific Management,
Socialist Discipline, and Soviet Power, London, UK: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, ISBN 978-1-85043-108-4.
Braverman, Harry [1974], Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth
Century, New York, NY, USA: Republication by Monthly Review Press, ISBN 0-85345-940-1.
Dawson, Michael, The Consumer Trap: Big Business Marketing in American Life, Urbana, IL, USA:
University of Illinois Press, ISBN 0-252-07264-2. Drury, Horace Bookwalter, Scientific management:
a history and criticism, New York, NY, USA: Columbia University.
Gershon, Richard, Telecommunications Management: Industry Structures and Planning Strategies,
Mahwah, NJ, USA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, ISBN 978-0-8058-3002-6
Hartness, James, The human factor in works management, New York and London: McGraw-Hill, OCLC 1065709. Republished
by Hive Publishing Company as Hive management history series no. 46, ISBN 978-0-87960-047-1.
Head, Simon, The New Ruthless Economy: Work and Power in the Digital Age, Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-517983-5. Head analyzes current implementations of Taylorism
not only on the assembly line, but also in the offices and in medicine.
Hounshell, David A., From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development
of Manufacturing Technology in the United States, Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins
University Press, ISBN 978-0-8018-2975-8, LCCN 83016269
Hughes, Thomas P. [1989], American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm,
1870–1970, Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press, ISBN 978-0-14-009741-2.
Kanigel, Robert, The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency,
New York, NY, USA: Penguin-Viking, ISBN 978-0-670-86402-7. A detailed biography of Taylor and a historian's
look at his ideas. Mitcham, Carl, "Management", Encyclopedia
of science, technology, and ethics 3, Macmillan Reference USA, ISBN 978-0-02-865834-6.
Morf, Martin Eight Scenarios for Work in the Future. in Futurist, v17 n3 pp. 24–29 Jun
1983, reprinted in Cornish, Edward and World Future Society Habitats tomorrow: homes and
communities in an exciting new era : selections from The futurist, pp. 14–19
Mullins, Laurie J., Management and Organisational Behaviour, Financial Times–FT Press–Prentice-Hall–Pearson
Education Ltd, ISBN 978-0-273-68876-1. Noble, David F., Forces of Production: A Social
History of Industrial Automation, New York, New York, USA: Knopf, ISBN 978-0-394-51262-4,
LCCN 83048867. Rosen, Ellen, Improving Public Sector Productivity:
Concepts and Practice, Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage Publications, ISBN 978-0-8039-4573-9
Scheiber, Lukas, Next Taylorsim: A Calculus of Knowledge Work, Frankfurt am Main, BRD: Peter Lang, ISBN 978-3631624050
Sorensen, Charles E.; with Williamson, Samuel T., My Forty Years with Ford, New York, New
York, USA: Norton, LCCN 56010854 . Various republications, including ISBN 9780814332795.
Stalin, J.V., Problems of Leninism: Lectures Delivered at the Sverdlov University, Beijing,
China: Foreign Languages Press. Taylor, Frederick Winslow, Shop Management,
New York, NY, USA: American Society of Mechanical Engineers, OCLC 2365572. "Shop Management"
began as an address by Taylor to a meeting of the ASME, which published it in pamphlet
form. The link here takes the reader to a 1912 republication by Harper & Brothers. Also
available from Project Gutenberg. Taylor, Frederick Winslow, The Principles
of Scientific Management, New York, NY, USA and London, UK: Harper & Brothers, LCCN 11010339,
OCLC 233134. Also available from Project Gutenberg.
External links Special Collections: F.W. Taylor Collection.
Stevens Institute of Technology has an extensive collection at its library.