Placeholder Image

Subtitles section Play video

  • It's very nice to be here tonight.

    今晚能來到 TED 實在太棒了!

  • So I've been working on the history of income

    我一直在研究有關

  • and wealth distribution for the past 15 years,

    所得和財富分配的歷史,已經 15 年了,

  • and one of the interesting lessons

    從這些過往的證據裡

  • coming from this historical evidence

    可以發現一個很有意思的道理,

  • is indeed that, in the long run,

    那就是長期來說

  • there is a tendency for the rate of return of capital

    資本報酬率有高於 經濟成長率的趨勢,

  • to exceed the economy's growth rate,

    這種趨勢容易造成財富高度集中,

  • and this tends to lead to high concentration of wealth.

    雖然並不是無止境的財富集中,

  • Not infinite concentration of wealth,

    但是資本報酬率 (r) 與經濟成長率 (g) 差距越大,

  • but the higher the gap between r and g,

    財富不均的程度就會越嚴重,

  • the higher the level of inequality of wealth

    社會裡的不平等也會越嚴重。

  • towards which society tends to converge.

    這就是我今天要談的主要因素,

  • So this is a key force that I'm going to talk about today,

    不過讓我先說明,

  • but let me say right away

    這並不是所得和財富分配變動的

  • that this is not the only important force

    唯一重要因素,

  • in the dynamics of income and wealth distribution,

    還有許多其他因素

  • and there are many other forces that play

    在所得和財富分配的長期變動上

  • an important role in the long-run dynamics

    扮演著重要的角色。

  • of income and wealth distribution.

    而且還有許多資料有待蒐集。

  • Also there is a lot of data

    今天我們比以前懂多一些,

  • that still needs to be collected.

    不過懂的還是太少了,

  • We know a little bit more today

    而且一定還有許多不同的演變過程,

  • than we used to know, but we still know too little,

    像是經濟、社會、政治,

  • and certainly there are many different processes

    需要再多做研究。

  • economic, social, political

    而我今天會鎖定在這個單一因素,

  • that need to be studied more.

    但這並不是說就沒有 其他重要因素了。

  • And so I'm going to focus today on this simple force,

    我接下來要呈現的資料

  • but that doesn't mean that other important forces

    大部分來自可上網取得的資料庫:

  • do not exist.

    「全球高所得資料庫」。

  • So most of the data I'm going to present

    這是現存最大的

  • comes from this database

    所得不均歷史資料庫,

  • that's available online:

    得力於數十個國家

  • the World Top Incomes Database.

    超過三十位學者的貢獻。

  • So this is the largest existing

    就讓我來帶大家看一些

  • historical database on inequality,

    從資料庫裡得出的事實,

  • and this comes from the effort

    然後我們再回來談 r 大於 g。

  • of over 30 scholars from several dozen countries.

    事實一,

  • So let me show you a couple of facts

    美國和歐洲所得不均的排行

  • coming from this database,

    在上個世紀發生了大逆轉。

  • and then we'll return to r bigger than g.

    時間拉回到 1900 年、1910 年,

  • So fact number one is that there has been

    歐洲所得不均的排名確實高於美國,

  • a big reversal in the ordering of income inequality

    而今天美國排名卻遠高於歐洲。

  • between the United States and Europe

    我先聲明,

  • over the past century.

    這裡主要的原因並不是 r 大於 g,

  • So back in 1900, 1910, income inequality was actually

    而是與以往不同的人才供需、

  • much higher in Europe than in the United States,

    教育跟科技間的競賽、

  • whereas today, it is a lot higher in the United States.

    全球化有關,

  • So let me be very clear:

    也許和美國不平等的 技能學習管道大有關係。

  • The main explanation for this is not r bigger than g.

    美國有非常好、頂尖的大學,

  • It has more to do with changing supply and demand

    但基礎教育卻沒有很好。

  • for skill, the race between education and technology,

    因此不平等的技能學習管道

  • globalization, probably more unequal access

    再加上美國高階主管的薪資福利

  • to skills in the U.S.,

    史無前例的大幅提升,

  • where you have very good, very top universities

    很難以教育為基礎來解釋這個問題。

  • but where the bottom part of the educational system

    因此這之中還有許多因素,

  • is not as good,

    但我今天不打算在這上面講太多,

  • so very unequal access to skills,

    因為我要聚焦在財富不均。

  • and also an unprecedented rise

    請看這項

  • of top managerial compensation of the United States,

    關於所得不均的簡易指標。

  • which is difficult to account for just on the basis of education.

    這是所得前 10% 者的所得

  • So there is more going on here,

    佔總所得的比重,

  • but I'm not going to talk too much about this today,

    所以你可以看到在一個世紀以前,

  • because I want to focus on wealth inequality.

    歐洲的比例是在 45% 至 50% 之間,

  • So let me just show you a very simple indicator

    美國稍微高過 40%,

  • about the income inequality part.

    所以歐洲的所得較不平均。

  • So this is the share of total income

    到了二十世紀上半葉,

  • going to the top 10 percent.

    比重大大下滑,

  • So you can see that one century ago,

    接著近數十年來,

  • it was between 45 and 50 percent in Europe

    你可以發現美國所得不均的現象 變得比歐洲更嚴重,

  • and a little bit above 40 percent in the U.S.,

    這正是我剛說的第一個事實。

  • so there was more inequality in Europe.

    第二項事實跟財富不均更有關係,

  • Then there was a sharp decline

    核心的事實就是

  • during the first half of the 20th century,

    財富不均一直遠高於所得不均。

  • and in the recent decade, you can see that

    雖然近幾十年來財富不均日益嚴重,

  • the U.S. has become more unequal than Europe,

    但是比起上一個世紀,

  • and this is the first fact I just talked about.

    現在已經沒那麼極端了。

  • Now, the second fact is more about wealth inequality,

    然而現在與所得有關的財富總量

  • and here the central fact is that wealth inequality

    已從一次世界大戰、大蕭條、

  • is always a lot higher than income inequality,

    第二次世界大戰的重創中

  • and also that wealth inequality,

    恢復正常了。

  • although it has also increased in recent decades,

    請各位看這兩張圖表,

  • is still less extreme today

    解釋了事實二和事實三。

  • than what it was a century ago,

    首先,如果你注意看財富不均的程度,

  • although the total quantity of wealth

    這是財富前 10% 者持有財富

  • relative to income has now recovered

    佔總財富的比重,

  • from the very large shocks

    你可以發現

  • caused by World War I, the Great Depression,

    美國與歐洲之間有相同的逆轉,

  • World War II.

    就跟過去所得不均的逆轉一樣。

  • So let me show you two graphs

    所以百年前歐洲財富集中的情形

  • illustrating fact number two and fact number three.

    高過於美國,

  • So first, if you look at the level of wealth inequality,

    現在就顛倒過來了。

  • this is the share of total wealth

    另外你也可以看出兩件事情,

  • going to the top 10 percent of wealth holders,

    第一、財富不均的程度

  • so you can see the same kind of reversal

    普遍高於所得不均。

  • between the U.S. and Europe that we had before

    記得所得不均的情況,

  • for income inequality.

    前 10% 者擁有的所得

  • So wealth concentration was higher

    是總所得的 30% 至 50%,

  • in Europe than in the U.S. a century ago,

    然而他們擁有的財富比例

  • and now it is the opposite.

    卻一直在 60% 至 90% 之間。

  • But you can also show two things:

    這就是事實一,

  • First, the general level of wealth inequality

    對之後要說的很重要。

  • is always higher than income inequality.

    財富一直都

  • So remember, for income inequality,

    遠比所得更為集中。

  • the share going to the top 10 percent

    事實二、

  • was between 30 and 50 percent of total income,

    近幾十年來財富不均惡化的情況

  • whereas for wealth, the share is always

    還不致於像 1910 年那樣嚴重。

  • between 60 and 90 percent.

    與過去不同的是,

  • Okay, so that's fact number one,

    現在的貧富差距依然很大,

  • and that's very important for what follows.

    前10% 的富人擁有 60% 至 70% 的總財富,

  • Wealth concentration is always

    但好消息是

  • a lot higher than income concentration.

    情況的確已經比上個世紀好多了,

  • Fact number two is that the rise

    當時 90% 的總財富 落入了前 10% 富人的口袋裡。

  • in wealth inequality in recent decades

    那麼今天你們看到的是

  • is still not enough to get us back to 1910.

    我稱為中間 40% 的人,

  • So the big difference today,

    不是前 10 %,

  • wealth inequality is still very large,

    也不是墊底的 50%,

  • with 60, 70 percent of total wealth for the top 10,

    他們可以說是財富的中產階級,

  • but the good news is that it's actually

    擁有總財富、國家財富的 20% 至 30%;

  • better than one century ago,

    然而上個世紀他們卻是窮人,

  • where you had 90 percent in Europe going to the top 10.

    因為那時候基本上沒有 財富的中產階級。

  • So today what you have

    所以這是很重大的改變,

  • is what I call the middle 40 percent,

    而且看到財富不均沒有完全恢復到

  • the people who are not in the top 10

    第一次世界大戰之前的程度也很有趣,

  • and who are not in the bottom 50,

    即便財富總量已經是恢復了。

  • and what you can view as the wealth middle class

    沒問題吧?

  • that owns 20 to 30 percent

    這是相較於所得的財富總值,

  • of total wealth, national wealth,

    你可以看到特別是歐洲,

  • whereas they used to be poor, a century ago,

    我們幾乎是回到了 第一次世界大戰之前的程度。

  • when there was basically no wealth middle class.

    這件事其實有兩個不一樣的面向,

  • So this is an important change,

    一個是關於我們累積的財富總量,

  • and it's interesting to see that wealth inequality

    當然累積一大堆財富

  • has not fully recovered to pre-World War I levels,

    這件事本身沒有不好,

  • although the total quantity of wealth has recovered.

    特別是假如財富更分散,

  • Okay? So this is the total value

    又比較不那麼集中的時候。

  • of wealth relative to income,

    那麼我們真正關心的是什麼?

  • and you can see that in particular in Europe,

    是財富不均的長期演變,

  • we are almost back to the pre-World War I level.

    還有未來會發生什麼事。

  • So there are really two

    我們要如何解釋 第一次世界大戰以前,

  • different parts of the story here.

    財富差距如此大,

  • One has to do with

    而且是大到前所未有的程度,

  • the total quantity of wealth that we accumulate,

    那麼我們該如何看待未來呢?

  • and there is nothing bad per se, of course,

    那麼讓我來做一些說明,

  • in accumulating a lot of wealth,

    以及預測未來。

  • and in particular if it is more diffuse

    我先聲明,

  • and less concentrated.

    解釋財富為什麼比所得

  • So what we really want to focus on

    還要更集中的最佳經濟模型

  • is the long-run evolution of wealth inequality,

    大概是一種動態、世代的經濟模型,

  • and what's going to happen in the future.

    其中每個人都長期

  • How can we account for the fact that

    為了各種理由來累積財富。

  • until World War I, wealth inequality was so high

    假使人們累積財富

  • and, if anything, was rising to even higher levels,

    只是為了因應生命週期,

  • and how can we think about the future?

    為了在他們老的時候

  • So let me come to some of the explanations

    還有能力花錢消費,

  • and speculations about the future.

    那麼財富不均的情形

  • Let me first say that

    應該和所得不均的情形

  • probably the best model to explain

    相差不遠。

  • why wealth is so much

    可是你很難說明

  • more concentrated than income

    為什麼財富不均要比所得不均更嚴重,

  • is a dynamic, dynastic model

    只憑生命週期理論,

  • where individuals have a long horizon

    所以你需要一個情境,

  • and accumulate wealth for all sorts of reasons.

    在其中的人們會為了 其他理由累積財富。

  • If people were accumulating wealth

    一般來說,他們想把財富

  • only for life cycle reasons,

    交給下一代、他們的小孩,

  • you know, to be able to consume

    或者有時候他們累積財富

  • when they are old,

    是為了特權──伴隨財富而來的權力。

  • then the level of wealth inequality

    所以累積財富一定有除了

  • should be more or less in line

    生命週期以外的理由,

  • with the level of income inequality.

    來解釋我們在資料裡發現的情況。

  • But it will be very difficult to explain

    在這種累積財富

  • why you have so much more wealth inequality

    是為了累積世代財富的變動模式之中,

  • than income inequality

    會有各種毫無規則且加倍的衝擊。

  • with a pure life cycle model,

    舉例來說:

  • so you need a story

    有些家庭有非常多的小孩,

  • where people also care

    因此財富就會分散,

  • about wealth accumulation for other reasons.

    有些家庭的小孩則較少。

  • So typically, they want to transmit

    你也會對資產報酬率感到吃驚,

  • wealth to the next generation, to their children,

    有的家庭有大筆資本利得,

  • or sometimes they want to accumulate wealth

    有的卻投資失利。

  • because of the prestige, the power that goes with wealth.

    因此財富累積的過程

  • So there must be other reasons

    總是會有一些流動,

  • for accumulating wealth than just life cycle

    有些人會往上升、 有些人則會往下掉。

  • to explain what we see in the data.

    重點是任何在這種模型下,

  • Now, in a large class of dynamic models

    有這種特定的變動衝擊,

  • of wealth accumulation

    財富不均的水平

  • with such dynastic motive for accumulating wealth,

    會成為急遽升高的 r 減 g 函數。

  • you will have all sorts of random,

    財富報酬率與經濟成長率之間的差異

  • multiplicative shocks.

    為什麼重要,

  • So for instance, some families

    想當然是因為只要 r 減 g 的數值越大,

  • have a very large number of children,

    最初財富不均的情況就會被擴大得更快。

  • so the wealth will be divided.

    舉個簡單的例子:

  • Some families have fewer children.

    假設 r 是 5% 而 g 是 1%,

  • You also have shocks to rates of return.

    財富持有人只需要再投資

  • Some families make huge capital gains.

    資本所得的五分之一,

  • Some made bad investments.

    他們財富增加的速度

  • So you will always have some mobility

    就會跟經濟成長一樣快。

  • in the wealth process.

    因此創造和保有大筆財富就更容易,

  • Some people will move up, some people will move down.

    因為你可以消費五分之四,

  • The important point is that,

    假設零稅率,

  • in any such model,

    你就可以再投資五分之一。

  • for a given variance of such shocks,

    當然有些家庭會消費多一些、

  • the equilibrium level of wealth inequality

    有的則消費較少,

  • will be a steeply rising function of r minus g.

    分配上就會有一些變動,

  • And intuitively, the reason why the difference

    但是總的來看, 他們只要再投資五分之一,

  • between the rate of return to wealth

    這樣就能維持財富高度不均。

  • and the growth rate is important

    現在你應該不會驚訝於

  • is that initial wealth inequalities

    r 永遠可以大於 g 這句話了,

  • will be amplified at a faster pace

    因為事實上,

  • with a bigger r minus g.

    這種情況在人類史上很常見。

  • So take a simple example,

    這種情況大家都能看得一清二楚,

  • with r equals five percent and g equals one percent,

    理由很簡單,

  • wealth holders only need to reinvest

    因為史上大多數時候 經濟成長率幾乎是 0%。

  • one fifth of their capital income to ensure

    經濟成長率也許是 0.1%、0.2% 或 0.3%,

  • that their wealth rises as fast

    但人口和人均產出的成長率非常慢,

  • as the size of the economy.

    那時候資本報酬率

  • So this makes it easier

    當然不會是 0%。

  • to build and perpetuate large fortunes

    以土地來說,

  • because you can consume four fifths,

    在工業化以前的社會,

  • assuming zero tax,

    土地是典型的資產,

  • and you can just reinvest one fifth.

    報酬率通常是 5%。

  • So of course some families will consume more than that,

    任何讀過珍奧斯汀作品的人都知道。

  • some will consume less, so there will be

    假如你想要得到一千英磅的年所得,

  • some mobility in the distribution,

    你應該要有價值兩萬英鎊的資本,

  • but on average, they only need to reinvest one fifth,

    兩萬的 5% 就是一千。

  • so this allows high wealth inequalities to be sustained.

    這就是以前社會的基礎,

  • Now, you should not be surprised

    因為 r 大於 g

  • by the statement that r can be bigger than g forever,

    就會讓財富以及資產的持有者可以

  • because, in fact, this is what happened

    靠著資本所得過生活,

  • during most of the history of mankind.

    還能在生活中做些別的事,

  • And this was in a way very obvious to everybody

    而不是只關心能不能填飽肚子。

  • for a simple reason, which is that growth

    我的歷史研究

  • was close to zero percent

    有一個重要的結論是

  • during most of the history of mankind.

    現代工業的發展並未如我們期待

  • Growth was maybe 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 percent,

    改變這個簡單的事實太多。

  • but very slow growth of population

    當然經濟成長率

  • and output per capita,

    隨著工業革命後增加,

  • whereas the rate of return on capital

    通常是多出零到 1% 或 2%,

  • of course was not zero percent.

    不過同一時間

  • It was, for land assets, which was

    資本報酬率也增加了,

  • the traditional form

    所以貧富差距沒多少改變。

  • of assets in preindustrial societies,

    二十世紀

  • it was typically five percent.

    是由許多事件交織成的特殊時代。

  • Any reader of Jane Austen would know that.

    首先是非常低的報酬率,

  • If you want an annual income of 1,000 pounds,

    肇因於 1914 年和 1945 年 戰爭造成的衝擊、

  • you should have a capital value

    財富破壞、通貨膨脹、

  • of 20,000 pounds so that

    以及大蕭條期間的破產,

  • five percent of 20,000 is 1,000.

    以上原因讓個人的財富報酬率

  • And in a way, this was

    在 1914 到 1945 年時

  • the very foundation of society,

    下降到異常低的程度。

  • because r bigger than g

    接著在戰後期間

  • was what allowed holders of wealth and assets

    出現異常高的經濟成長率,

  • to live off their capital income

    部分歸功於重建。

  • and to do something else in life

    在德國、法國和日本,

  • than just to care about their own survival.

    在 1950 到 1980 年之間,

  • Now, one important conclusion

    出現過 5% 的經濟成長率,

  • of my historical research is that

    大部分歸功於重建,

  • modern industrial growth did not change

    也歸功於大量的人口成長,

  • this basic fact as much as one might have expected.

    也就是嬰兒潮世代。

  • Of course, the growth rate

    顯然那無法持續太久,

  • following the Industrial Revolution

    或者至少未來

  • rose, typically from zero to one to two percent,

    人口成長應該會下降,

  • but at the same time, the rate of return

    我們有的最佳預測是

  • to capital also rose

    長期經濟成長率

  • so that the gap between the two

    將會是 1% 至 2%,

  • did not really change.

    而不是 4% 至 5%。

  • So during the 20th century,

    如果你看到這邊,

  • you had a very unique combination of events.

    這是全球國內生產毛額、

  • First, a very low rate of return

    資本報酬率、

  • due to the 1914 and 1945 war shocks,

    也就是平均資產報酬率的最佳預測。

  • destruction of wealth, inflation,

    你能看到人類史上

  • bankruptcy during the Great Depression,

    大多數時間的

  • and all of this reduced

    經濟成長率非常低,

  • the private rate of return to wealth

    遠低於資本報酬率,

  • to unusually low levels

    後來在 20 世紀期間,

  • between 1914 and 1945.

    真的就是人口成長,

  • And then, in the postwar period,

    戰後的人口成長率非常高,

  • you had unusually high growth rate,

    而重建的過程

  • partly due to the reconstruction.

    讓經濟成長率

  • You know, in Germany, in France, in Japan,

    與資產報酬率間的差距縮小了。

  • you had five percent growth rate

    我用的是聯合國的未來人口預測,

  • between 1950 and 1980

    當然這些數字還不確定。

  • largely due to reconstruction,

    也許是我們開始準備

  • and also due to very large demographic growth,

    要在未來生很多的小孩,

  • the Baby Boom Cohort effect.

    而經濟成長率就會更高一些,

  • Now, apparently that's not going to last for very long,

    但是從現在開始,

  • or at least the population growth

    這些就是我們現有的最佳預測,

  • is supposed to decline in the future,

    這將使得全球的經濟成長下滑、

  • and the best projections we have is that

    還有與資產報酬率之間的

  • the long-run growth is going to be closer

    差距將會擴大。

  • to one to two percent

    另一件 20 世紀發生的特殊事件,

  • rather than four to five percent.

    如同我剛才提到的,

  • So if you look at this,

    就是財產破壞、資本稅,

  • these are the best estimates we have

    這邊是稅前的報酬率;

  • of world GDP growth

    而這是稅後、財產破壞後的報酬率,

  • and rate of return on capital,

    這是課稅後、財產破壞後的平均報酬率,

  • average rates of return on capital,

    就是稅金和財產破壞

  • so you can see that during most

    讓平均報酬率 長時間低於經濟成長率。

  • of the history of mankind,

    但是如果沒有財產破壞和資本稅,

  • the growth rate was very small,

    這些就不可能發生。

  • much lower than the rate of return,

    所以讓我這麼說吧,

  • and then during the 20th century,

    資本報酬率以及經濟成長率之間的平衡

  • it is really the population growth,

    取決於許多難以預料的各種因素,

  • very high in the postwar period,

    像是科技和資本密集技術的發展。

  • and the reconstruction process

    在目前的經濟裡,

  • that brought growth

    資本最密集的行業是

  • to a smaller gap with the rate of return.

    地產業、房屋業、能源業,

  • Here I use the United Nations population projections,

    不過未來有可能

  • so of course they are uncertain.

    在部分部門中 我們會用上一大堆機器人,

  • It could be that we all start

    這些行業就會佔有

  • having a lot of children in the future,

    比今天更高的總資本量比例。

  • and the growth rates are going to be higher,

    但那還遙不可及,

  • but from now on,

    從現在來說不動產業、能源業

  • these are the best projections we have,

    發生的變化,

  • and this will make global growth

    對資本總量還有所佔比例

  • decline and the gap between

    更加重要。

  • the rate of return go up.

    另一個重要的課題是

  • Now, the other unusual event

    投資組合管理的規模效果,

  • during the 20th century

    結合金融的複雜性

  • was, as I said,

    與財政法令鬆綁,

  • destruction, taxation of capital,

    使得大型的投資組合

  • so this is the pre-tax rate of return.

    更容易得到較高的報酬率,

  • This is the after-tax rate of return,

    這對億萬富翁、大型資本捐贈來說

  • and after destruction,

    似乎格外有效。

  • and this is what brought

    給你看個例子,

  • the average rate of return

    這是富比士的億萬富翁排名,

  • after tax, after destruction,

    1987 年到 2013 年期間的資料,

  • below the growth rate during a long time period.

    你可以看到財富最多的那群人

  • But without the destruction,

    財富實質上每年都比 通貨膨脹高 6% 至 7%,

  • without the taxation, this would not have happened.

    但是世界上的平均所得、平均財富

  • So let me say that the balance between

    每年卻只增加 2%。

  • returns on capital and growth

    你也會看到同樣的情形

  • depends on many different factors

    出現在大學的大型捐贈,

  • that are very difficult to predict:

    起始的捐贈基金規模越大,

  • technology and the development

    報酬率就越高。

  • of capital-intensive techniques.

    我們可以做什麼呢?

  • So right now, the most capital-intensive sectors

    第一件事我認為我們需要

  • in the economy are the real estate sector, housing,

    財務更加透明。

  • the energy sector, but it could be in the future

    我們對全球的財富流動所知不多,

  • that we have a lot more robots in a number of sectors

    因此我們需要銀行資訊在國際間傳遞,

  • and that this would be a bigger share

    我們需要全球性的金融資產登記制度,

  • of the total capital stock that it is today.

    並且在財富稅上做更多協調,

  • Well, we are very far from this,

    縱使財富稅用較低的稅率,

  • and from now, what's going on

    仍會是提供資訊的方式,

  • in the real estate sector, the energy sector,

    如此一來我們就能

  • is much more important for the total capital stock

    依據發現的問題來調整政策。

  • and capital share.

    在某個程度來說,

  • The other important issue

    對抗避稅天堂、

  • is that there are scale effects in portfolio management,

    自動傳遞資訊

  • together with financial complexity,

    都促使我們朝這個方向前進。

  • financial deregulation,

    現在有其他重新分配財富的方法

  • that make it easier to get higher rates of return

    讓人非常想要採用,

  • for a large portfolio,

    像是通貨膨脹,

  • and this seems to be particularly strong

    比起擬定稅務規則, 印鈔票是簡單多了,

  • for billionaires, large capital endowments.

    所以那非常誘人,

  • Just to give you one example,

    可是有時候你不清楚要怎麼處理錢,

  • this comes from the Forbes billionaire rankings

    這就是問題了。

  • over the 1987-2013 period,

    充公是非常吸引人的方式,

  • and you can see the very top wealth holders

    只要你認為有些人太富有了,

  • have been going up at six, seven percent per year

    你就讓他們的財產充公。

  • in real terms above inflation,

    但是制定讓財富流動的法令

  • whereas average income in the world,

    並不是非常有效的辦法;

  • average wealth in the world,

    而戰爭更是無效的辦法,

  • have increased at only two percent per year.

    所以我比較偏好累進式稅制,

  • And you find the same

    當然了,歷史…(笑聲)

  • for large university endowments

    歷史會找到當下的最佳方法,

  • the bigger the initial endowments,

    那可能會是所有方法的匯總。

  • the bigger the rate of return.

    謝謝!

  • Now, what could be done?

    (掌聲)

  • The first thing is that I think we need

    布魯諾.吉桑尼: 托瑪.皮凱提,謝謝你。

  • more financial transparency.

    托瑪,我想請教你兩、三個問題,

  • We know too little about global wealth dynamics,

    因為你運用資料的方式 讓人印象深刻,這是當然的了,

  • so we need international transmission

    不過基本上你指出的是

  • of bank information.

    財富集中的增長算是

  • We need a global registry of financial assets,

    資本主義的自然趨勢,

  • more coordination on wealth taxation,

    如果我們放任它不管,

  • and even wealth tax with a small tax rate

    也許它會傷害到 資本主義本身的系統,

  • will be a way to produce information

    所以你認為我們需要採取

  • so that then we can adapt our policies

    落實財富重分配的政策,

  • to whatever we observe.

    包含我們剛剛看到的

  • And to some extent, the fight

    累進稅制…等等。

  • against tax havens

    在當前的政治環境裡,

  • and automatic transmission of information

    那些方法的可能性有多高呢?

  • is pushing us in this direction.

    你又認為這些方法

  • Now, there are other ways to redistribute wealth,

    有多少可能性會被採用?

  • which it can be tempting to use.

    托瑪.皮凱提:好的,我認為

  • Inflation:

    如果你回頭看,

  • it's much easier to print money

    所得、財富還有稅制的歷史

  • than to write a tax code, so that's very tempting,

    總令人意外,

  • but sometimes you don't know what you do with the money.

    所以我對那些事先知道

  • This is a problem.

    將來會或不會發生什麼事的人

  • Expropriation is very tempting.

    並沒有留下太深刻的印象。

  • Just when you feel some people get too wealthy,

    我想一個世紀前,

  • you just expropriate them.

    許多人會說,

  • But this is not a very efficient way

    累進式所得稅不可行,

  • to organize a regulation of wealth dynamics.

    但後來卻實現了。

  • So war is an even less efficient way,

    甚至是在五年前,

  • so I tend to prefer progressive taxation,

    很多人會說瑞士的銀行保密

  • but of course, history — (Laughter) —

    會永遠罩著我們,

  • history will invent its own best ways,

    因為瑞士對其他國家來說太強勢了。

  • and it will probably involve

    後來突然間美國對瑞士 提出一些制裁,---

  • a combination of all of these.

    要求大幅改變,

  • Thank you.

    現在我們的財務會漸漸變得更透明。

  • (Applause)

    所以我認為要在政治上

  • Bruno Giussani: Thomas Piketty. Thank you.

    做更多協調不是太難的事。

  • Thomas, I want to ask you two or three questions,

    不久後會有一項協定

  • because it's impressive how you're in command of your data, of course,

    由全球半數 GDP 的國家共同協議,

  • but basically what you suggest is

    包含美國和歐盟,

  • growing wealth concentration is kind of

    如果佔全球半數 GDP 的國家

  • a natural tendency of capitalism,

    還不足以改善財務透明、

  • and if we leave it to its own devices,

    對跨國公司的獲利課點稅,

  • it may threaten the system itself,

    那需要多少才夠呢?

  • so you're suggesting that we need to act

    所以我認為並沒有技術上的困難,

  • to implement policies that redistribute wealth,

    我認為我們可以改善,

  • including the ones we just saw:

    只要我們有更務實的方法 來解決這些問題,

  • progressive taxation, etc.

    並且有恰當的制裁手段

  • In the current political context,

    對付因為財務不透明而獲利的人。

  • how realistic are those?

    吉桑尼:有一項爭議

  • How likely do you think that it is

    和你的觀點相左,

  • that they will be implemented?

    那就是經濟不平等

  • Thomas Piketty: Well, you know, I think

    不只是資本主義的特色, 更是經濟的引擎之一,

  • if you look back through time,

    因此我們採取手段減少不平等現象,

  • the history of income, wealth and taxation

    但同時我們也不經意減少了經濟成長,

  • is full of surprise.

    你怎麼回應這點呢?

  • So I am not terribly impressed

    皮凱提:我認為

  • by those who know in advance

    不平等本身並不是個問題,

  • what will or will not happen.

    我認為不平等某種程度

  • I think one century ago,

    對創新跟成長確實能有幫助,

  • many people would have said

    問題是到什麼程度。

  • that progressive income taxation would never happen

    當不平等變得太嚴重,

  • and then it happened.

    對經濟成長就會沒有幫助,

  • And even five years ago,

    而且它還可能有害,

  • many people would have said that bank secrecy

    因為它會導致永久的高度不平等,

  • will be with us forever in Switzerland,

    以及低流動性。

  • that Switzerland was too powerful

    舉例來說十九世紀,

  • for the rest of the world,

    甚至一直到第一次世界大戰以前

  • and then suddenly it took a few U.S. sanctions

    發生在歐洲各國的那種財富集中,

  • against Swiss banks for a big change to happen,

    我認為對成長是沒有幫助的。

  • and now we are moving toward

    財富集中被悲劇事件和政策改變----

  • more financial transparency.

    一同摧毀了,

  • So I think it's not that difficult

    卻未阻擋經濟成長。

  • to better coordinate politically.

    而且極度不平均可能

  • We are going to have a treaty

    對我們的民主體制有害,

  • with half of the world GDP around the table

    如果它造成取得政治發言權的不平等,

  • with the U.S. and the European Union,

    還有在美國政治裡

  • so if half of the world GDP is not enough

    私人財富的影響力,

  • to make progress on financial transparency

    我認為那是現在該擔心的事了。

  • and minimal tax for multinational corporate profits,

    我們不想要回到那種極端,

  • what does it take?

    像第一次世界大戰前那樣的不均。

  • So I think these are not technical difficulties.

    讓中產階級享有適當比例的國家財富---

  • I think we can make progress

    對經濟成長不是壞事,

  • if we have a more pragmatic approach to these questions

    其實還有助於

  • and we have the proper sanctions

    公平與效率原則。

  • on those who benefit from financial opacity.

    吉桑尼:開頭時我曾說

  • BG: One of the arguments

    你的書不斷被人批評,

  • against your point of view

    有一些是批評你的資料,

  • is that economic inequality

    有些是批評你對資料集的選擇,

  • is not only a feature of capitalism but is actually one of its engines.

    你被指控只篩選某些資料做案例,---

  • So we take measures to lower inequality,

    你要怎麼來回答這個問題呢?

  • and at the same time we lower growth, potentially.

    皮凱提:我想說我真的很高興

  • What do you answer to that?

    這本書引起討論,

  • TP: Yeah, I think inequality

    因為那也是這本書的目的之一。

  • is not a problem per se.

    我將全部的資料放上網路,

  • I think inequality up to a point

    包括計算的細節,

  • can actually be useful for innovation and growth.

    是因為這樣一來我們可以

  • The problem is, it's a question of degree.

    公開和透明的辯論。

  • When inequality gets too extreme,

    所以我已經一一回應

  • then it becomes useless for growth

    每一個疑慮,

  • and it can even become bad

    讓我這麼說吧, 假使我今天要重寫這本書,

  • because it tends to lead to high perpetuation

    我一定會斷言

  • of inequality over time

    財富不均日益嚴重的情形,

  • and low mobility.

    特別是在美國,

  • And for instance, the kind of wealth concentrations

    已經超過當初我在書中所述。

  • that we had in the 19th century

    最近賽茲和祖克曼在一項研究中

  • and pretty much until World War I

    採用的新資料

  • in every European country

    就是我出書時還沒有的,

  • was, I think, not useful for growth.

    研究顯示美國的財富已更加集中,

  • This was destroyed by a combination

    甚至高過於我所寫的。

  • of tragic events and policy changes,

    未來還會有其他的資料,

  • and this did not prevent growth from happening.

    某部分會有不同的走向,

  • And also, extreme inequality can be bad

    你看,我們幾乎是每週 把資料放上網路,

  • for our democratic institutions

    將更新的歷程放上全球高所得資料庫,

  • if it creates very unequal access to political voice,

    而且我們未來也會繼續這樣做,

  • and the influence of private money

    特別是在新興國家,

  • in U.S. politics, I think,

    而我也歡迎所有想要

  • is a matter of concern right now.

    協助收集資料的人。

  • So we don't want to return to that kind of extreme,

    事實上我絕對同意

  • pre-World War I inequality.

    財富變動不夠透明,---

  • Having a decent share of the national wealth

    取得較佳資料的好方法

  • for the middle class is not bad for growth.

    就是要有財富稅,

  • It is actually useful

    一開始採取低稅率,

  • both for equity and efficiency reasons.

    這樣我們都能認同

  • BG: I said at the beginning

    這項重要改革,

  • that your book has been criticized.

    還有從我們觀察到的來調整政策。

  • Some of your data has been criticized.

    所以稅收是重要的資訊來源,

  • Some of your choice of data sets has been criticized.

    而那正是我們現在最需要的。

  • You have been accused of cherry-picking data

    吉桑尼:托瑪.皮凱提, 非常感謝(法語)!謝謝你!

  • to make your case. What do you answer to that?

    皮凱提:謝謝大家!(掌聲)

  • TP: Well, I answer that I am very happy

  • that this book is stimulating debate.

  • This is part of what it is intended for.

  • Look, the reason why I put all the data online

  • with all of the detailed computation

  • is so that we can have an open and transparent

  • debate about this.

  • So I have responded point by point

  • to every concern.

  • Let me say that if I was to rewrite the book today,

  • I would actually conclude

  • that the rise in wealth inequality,

  • particularly in the United States,

  • has been actually higher than what I report in my book.

  • There is a recent study by Saez and Zucman

  • showing, with new data

  • which I didn't have at the time of the book,

  • that wealth concentration in the U.S. has risen

  • even more than what I report.

  • And there will be other data in the future.

  • Some of it will go in different directions.

  • Look, we put online almost every week

  • new, updated series on the World Top Income Database

  • and we will keep doing so in the future,

  • in particular in emerging countries,

  • and I welcome all of those who want to contribute

  • to this data collection process.

  • In fact, I certainly agree

  • that there is not enough

  • transparency about wealth dynamics,

  • and a good way to have better data

  • would be to have a wealth tax

  • with a small tax rate to begin with

  • so that we can all agree

  • about this important evolution

  • and adapt our policies to whatever we observe.

  • So taxation is a source of knowledge,

  • and that's what we need the most right now.

  • BG: Thomas Piketty, merci beaucoup.

  • Thank you. TP: Thank you. (Applause)

It's very nice to be here tonight.

今晚能來到 TED 實在太棒了!

Subtitles and vocabulary

Click the word to look it up Click the word to find further inforamtion about it

B1 TED 財富 不均 所得 成長率 資本

【TED】托馬斯-皮凱蒂:托馬斯-皮凱蒂:二十一世紀資本的新思維》讀後感(一) (【TED】Thomas Piketty: New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century (Thomas Piketty: New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century))

  • 765 48
    王惟惟 posted on 2021/01/14
Video vocabulary