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The question today is not:
譯者: Vicky Chen 審譯者: Ann Lee
Why did we invade Afghanistan?
今天的問題不是:
The question is:
我們為什麼侵略阿富汗?
why are we still in Afghanistan
而是
one decade later?
我們為什麼還待在那裡?
Why are we spending
十年之後?
$135 billion?
我們為什麼要花
Why have we got 130,000 troops on the ground?
135億美元
Why were more people killed
我們為什麼要有13萬軍隊部屬在戰爭現場
last month
為什麼有更多人死去
than in any preceding month
上個月
of this conflict?
比之前任何一個月都多
How has this happened?
因為這個戰爭?
The last 20 years
為什麼會這樣?
has been the age of intervention,
最後20年
and Afghanistan is simply one act
是干預的年代
in a five-act tragedy.
而阿富汗只是其中一個行動
We came out of the end of the Cold War
在一個接連5個行動的悲劇
in despair.
我們絕望地從冷戰末期
We faced Rwanda;
走出
we faced Bosnia,
我們面對過盧安達(種族)大屠殺
and then we rediscovered our confidence.
我們面對波士尼亞(瑟布雷尼卡)屠殺事件
In the third act, we went into Bosnia and Kosovo
然後我們重拾信心
and we seemed to succeed.
在第三個行動中,我們進入波士尼亞和科索沃
In the fourth act, with our hubris,
最終我們似乎成功了
our overconfidence developing,
在第四個行動中,我們以驕傲的心態,
we invaded Iraq and Afghanistan,
變得越來越過度自信
and in the fifth act,
我們侵略了伊拉克和阿富汗
we plunged into a humiliating mess.
在第五個行動中
So the question is: What are we doing?
我們慘陷令人不堪的泥诏
Why are we still stuck in Afghanistan?
所以,我們在幹嘛?
And the answer, of course,
為什麼我們還陷在阿富汗?
that we keep being given
當然這個答案
is as follows:
提供我們的一直是
we're told that we went into Afghanistan
如下
because of 9/11,
我們被告知去阿富汗
and that we remain there
是因為911恐怖攻擊
because the Taliban poses an existential threat
而我們之所以還待在這裡
to global security.
是因為塔利班的存在
In the words of President Obama,
對全球安全帶來了威脅
"If the Taliban take over again,
歐巴馬總統多次談到
they will invite back Al-Qaeda,
如果塔利班捲土重來
who will try to kill as many of our people
他們將會迎回蓋達組織
as they possibly can."
這組織將盡他們所能
The story that we're told
試著殺死我們的人民
is that there was a "light footprint" initially --
我們被告知的說法
in other words, that we ended up in a situation
是我們最初只是輕輕地踏上那土地
where we didn't have enough troops,
換句話說,我們的結局反而造成了
we didn't have enough resources,
我們並沒有足夠的軍力
that Afghans were frustrated --
我們沒有足夠的資源
they felt there wasn't enough progress
使阿富汗人民很沮喪
and economic development and security,
他們感覺不到足夠的進展
and therefore the Taliban came back --
經濟發展和安全
that we responded in 2005 and 2006
因此塔利班才會回來
with troop deployments,
2005年和2006年之間
but we still didn't put enough troops on the ground.
我們部屬了軍隊
And that it wasn't until 2009,
但數量依然不足夠
when President Obama signed off on a surge,
一直到2009年
that we finally had,
當歐巴馬總統在波濤洶湧的情勢下批准後
in the words of Secretary Clinton,
我們才終於有了
"the strategy, the leadership and the resources."
套句美國國務卿希拉克林頓的話
So, as the president now reassures us,
策略,領導精神和資源
we are on track to achieve our goals.
所以,當總統又再次向我們保證
All of this is wrong.
我們正走在實現目標的正軌上時
Every one of those statements is wrong.
這些都是錯的
Afghanistan does not
那些陳素也都是錯的
pose an existential threat
阿富汗並不是
to global security.
對全球安全來說
It is extremely unlikely
並不是個威脅
the Taliban would ever be able to take over the country --
根本不可能
extremely unlikely they'd be able to seize Kabul.
塔利班能夠再次接管這個國家
They simply don't have a conventional military option.
他們更不可能能夠佔領喀布爾
And even if they were able to do so, even if I'm wrong,
她們就是沒有一個傳統的軍隊選擇
it's extremely unlikely
即使她們能夠這樣做,即使我錯了
the Taliban would invite back Al-Qaeda.
依然不太可能
From the Taliban's point of view,
塔利班會迎回蓋達組織
that was their number one mistake last time.
從塔利班的角度來看,
If they hadn't invited back Al-Qaeda,
上次是他們犯過最大的錯誤
they would still be in power today.
如果他們沒有贏回蓋達組織
And even if I'm wrong about those two things,
他們今天就應該還會掌權
even if they were able to take back the country,
即使我對這兩件事的看法都錯了
even if they were to invite back Al-Qaeda,
即使她們可以奪回國家
it's extremely unlikely
即使他們會迎回蓋達組織
that Al-Qaeda would significantly enhance
還是非常不可能
its ability to harm the United States
蓋達組織會顯著地強大
or harm Europe.
傷害美國的能力
Because this isn't the 1990s anymore.
或傷害英國
If the Al-Qaeda base
因為現在已經不是1990年代了
was to be established near Ghazni,
如果蓋達組織基地
we would hit them very hard,
會蓋在加茲尼附近
and it would be very, very difficult
我們會猛烈攻擊他們
for the Taliban to protect them.
那將會非常困難
Furthermore, it's simply not true
要保護他們的話
that what went wrong in Afghanistan
那完全不是事實
is the light footprint.
在阿富汗造成的錯誤
In my experience, in fact,
只是輕微的影響
the light footprint was extremely helpful.
事實上,就我經驗談
And these troops that we brought in --
這個輕微影響其實很有幫助
it's a great picture of David Beckham
而那些我們帶進去的軍隊
there on the sub-machine gun --
這是一張貝克漢的照片
made the situation worse, not better.
拿著衝鋒槍
When I walked across Afghanistan
這使情況更糟,沒有更好
in the winter of 2001-2002,
當我行走阿富汗時
what I saw was scenes like this.
在2001和2002年間的冬天
A girl, if you're lucky,
我看到的是像這樣的場景
in the corner of a dark room --
如果你夠幸運,一個女孩
lucky to be able to look at the Koran.
在昏暗房間的角落裡
But in those early days
幸運地能夠看著可蘭經
when we're told we didn't have enough troops and enough resources,
但是在早些日子那時
we made a lot of progress in Afghanistan.
我們被告知沒有足夠的軍隊和資源
Within a few months,
我們其實在阿富汗有很大的進展
there were two and a half million more girls in school.
在幾個月內
In Sangin where I was sick in 2002,
學校裡有超過250萬的女孩們就讀
the nearest health clinic
2002年時我在Sangin病倒了
was within three days walk.
最近的衛生診所
Today, there are 14 health clinics
還要走三天的路
in that area alone.
今天,有14個衛生珍所
There was amazing improvements.
單單在那個區域
We went from almost no Afghans
那時其實有驚人的改善
having mobile telephones during the Taliban
我們從幾乎沒有阿富汗人
to a situation where, almost overnight,
在塔利班時期擁有電話
three million Afghans had mobile telephones.
進展到一個現象,幾乎一夜之間
And we had progress in the free media.
三百萬阿富汗人擁有手機
We had progress in elections --
我們在媒體自由上也有進展
all of this with the so-called light footprint.
我們在選舉上也有進展
But when we began to bring more money,
這些都是所謂的輕輕踏過
when we began to invest more resources,
但是當我們開始帶來更多金錢
things got worse, not better. How?
開始投資更多資源時
Well first see, if you put 125 billion dollars a year
事情沒變好卻更糟。 怎麼這樣?
into a country like Afghanistan
嗯 首先 如果你一年投入125億元
where the entire revenue of the Afghan state
在像阿富汗這樣的國家上
is one billion dollars a year,
整個國家財政收入
you drown everything.
一年才一億元
It's not simply corruption and waste
那就是像石沉大海
that you create;
你造成的不只是
you essentially replace the priorities of the Afghan government,
貪汙和浪費
the elected Afghan government,
你根本上替換了阿富汗政府的執政重點
with the micromanaging tendencies
那個被選出來的政府
of foreigners on short tours
而傾向由短期旅居的外國人
with their own priorities.
隨著他們的喜好
And the same is true for the troops.
管東管西
When I walked across Afghanistan,
對軍隊來說也是這樣
I stayed with people like this.
當我行走阿富汗時
This is Commandant Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj.
我借住在這樣的人家裡
Commandant Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj was a great host.
這位是指揮官 Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj
He was very generous,
他是一位很讚的東家
like many of the Afghans I stayed with.
非常大方
But he was also considerably more conservative,
就像我借住過的很多阿富汗人一樣
considerably more anti-foreign,
但他相對來說也比較保守
considerably more Islamist
比較仇外
than we'd like to acknowledge.
比較伊斯蘭基本教義派
This man, for example, Mullah Mustafa,
比起我們認為的
tried to shoot me.
譬如說 這個人Mullah Mustafa
And the reason I'm looking a little bit perplexed in this photograph
想要射殺我
is I was somewhat frightened,
我之所以在照片裡看來有點迷茫
and I was too afraid on this occasion
是因為我有點被嚇到
to ask him, having run for an hour through the desert
而且我在這樣的場合下太害怕
and taken refuge in this house,
問他 在我在沙漠中跑了一小時後
why he had turned up and wanted to have his photograph taken with me.
終於在這屋裡可以避難後
But 18 months later, I asked him
為什麼他突然要和我合照
why he had tried to shoot me.
但18個月後,我問他
And Mullah Mustafa -- he's the man with the pen and paper --
為什麼他要射殺我
explained that the man sitting immediately to the left as you look at the photograph,
Mullah Mustafa 拿著筆和紙的那個人
Nadir Shah
解釋坐在照片左邊的那個人
had bet him that he couldn't hit me.
Nadir Shah
Now this is not to say
和他打賭他不敢打我
Afghanistan is a place full of people like Mullah Mustafa.
我的意思不是說
It's not; it's a wonderful place
在阿富汗都是像Nadir Shah這樣的人
full of incredible energy and intelligence.
不是 它是一個好地方
But it is a place
充滿著難以置信的能量和智慧
where the putting-in of the troops
但是這個地方
has increased the violence rather than decreased it.
部屬軍隊
2005, Anthony Fitzherbert,
只會增加暴力而不是減少
an agricultural engineer,
2005年時 Anthony Fitzherbert
could travel through Helmand,
一個農業工程師
could stay in Nad Ali, Sangin and Ghoresh,
可以旅經爾曼德
which are now the names of villages where fighting is taking place.
可以待在奈德阿里Sangin 和Ghoresh
Today, he could never do that.
但現在那些村莊戰爭正在進行
So the idea that we deployed the troops
現在他再也不能這樣做了
to respond to the Taliban insurgency
所以我們想部屬軍隊
is mistaken.
來回應塔利班的暴亂
Rather than preceding the insurgency,
是錯的
the Taliban followed the troop deployment,
不但沒有早於暴亂發生之前
and as far as I'm concerned,
塔利班還接著軍隊部屬後而來
the troop deployment caused their return.
就我所知
Now is this a new idea?
軍對部屬導致他們重返
No, there have been any number of people
難道這是個新的想法嗎?
saying this over the last seven years.
不,在過去七年裡
I ran a center at Harvard
很多人一直提出這個想法
from 2008 to 2010,
我在哈佛主持一個中心
and there were people like Michael Semple there
從2008到2010年間
who speak Afghan languages fluently,
那裡有像Michael Semple
who've traveled to almost every district in the country.
會一口流利阿富汗語的人
Andrew Wilder, for example,
幾乎去過整個國家的每一區
born on the Pakistan-Iranian border,
比如說Andrew Wilder
served his whole life
他出生在巴基斯坦和伊朗的邊界
in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
把他的一生都奉獻
Paul Fishstein who began working there in 1978 --
於巴基斯坦和阿富汗
worked for Save the Children,
像從1978年就在那裡工作的Paul Fishstein
ran the Afghan research and evaluation unit.
是為了拯救孩童
These are people
他主持阿富汗研究和評估單位
who were able to say consistently
這些人
that the increase in development aid
可以肯定一貫地說
was making Afghanistan less secure, not more secure --
發展援助的增加
that the counter-insurgency strategy
讓阿富汗更不安全而不是更安全
was not working and would not work.
而且反暴動策略
And yet, nobody listened to them.
不但過去無效也不可能有效
Instead,
但是卻沒人聽得進去
there was a litany of astonishing optimism.
反之
Beginning in 2004,
卻有一連串驚人的樂觀主義出現
every general came in saying,
從膽2004開始
"I've inherited a dismal situation,
每個將軍都說
but finally I have the right resources and the correct strategy,
我承接著了一個慘淡的局勢
which will deliver,"
但終於有了對的資源和正確的策略
in General Barno's word in 2004,
將帶來
the "decisive year."
套一句Barno將軍在2004年的話
Well guess what? It didn't.
決定性的一 年
But it wasn't sufficient to prevent General Abuzaid saying
你猜怎麼著? 那並沒有發生。
that he had the strategy and the resources
但這並足夠阻止General Abuzaid說
to deliver, in 2005,
他有策略和資源
the "decisive year."
在2005年帶來
Or General David Richards to come in 2006
決定性的一年
and say he had the strategy and the resources
或在2006年 阻止General David Richards
to deliver the "crunch year."
說他有策略和資源
Or in 2007,
帶來緊縮的一年
the Norwegian deputy foreign minister, Espen Eide,
或是2007時
to say that that would deliver the "decisive year."
挪威外交部長代表Espen Eide
Or in 2008, Major General Champoux
說的即將帶來決定性的一年
to come in and say he would deliver the "decisive year."
或是2008年時 少將 Champoux
Or in 2009, my great friend,
說他會帶來決定性的一年
General Stanley McChrystal,
或2009年 我的好朋友
who said that he was "knee-deep in the decisive year."
Stanley McChrystal將軍
Or in 2010,
他身處決定性的一年裡
the U.K. foreign secretary, David Miliband,
或2010年
who said that at last we would deliver the "decisive year."
英國外交部長David Miliband
And you'll be delighted to hear in 2011, today,
說我們終於將帶來決定性的一年
that Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister,
你會很開心聽到2011年的今天
assures us that we are in the "decisive year."
德國的外交部長 Guido Westerwelle
(Applause)
向我們保證今年是決定性的一年
How do we allow
(掌聲)
any of this to happen?
我們怎能容許
Well the answer, of course, is,
這些發生
if you spend 125 billion or 130 billion
答案當然是
dollars a year in a country,
如果你每年花125億或130億美元
you co-opt almost everybody.
在一個國家上
Even the aid agencies,
你幾乎吸收了每個人
who begin to receive an enormous amount of money
甚至援助機構
from the U.S. and the European governments
他們開始收到一大筆錢
to build schools and clinics,
來自美國和英國政府
are somewhat disinclined
用來蓋學校和診所
to challenge the idea
他們不太願意
that Afghanistan is an existential threat
挑戰這個阿富汗是
to global security.
是對全球安全的一個存在威脅
They're worried, in other words,
的想法
that if anybody believes that it wasn't such a threat --
換句話說 他們擔心
Oxfam, Save the Children
如果有人相信其實阿富汗不具有如此威脅性
wouldn't get the money
樂施會,拯救孩童
to build their hospitals and schools.
就不能得到錢
It's also very difficult to confront a general
來建造醫院和學校
with medals on his chest.
要對抗一個胸上有獎牌的上將
It's very difficult for a politician,
也是非常難的
because you're afraid that many lives have been lost in vain.
對一個政治人物來說非常困難
You feel deep, deep guilt.
因為你害怕太多生命已經徒勞犧牲
You exaggerate your fears,
你感到愧疚萬分
and you're terrified about the humiliation
你誇大了恐懼
of defeat.
而且你被失敗的羞辱嚇死了
What is the solution to this?
嚇死了
Well the solution to this
這個解決方法是什麼呢?
is we need to find a way
解決方法就是
that people like Michael Semple, or those other people,
我們需要找到一個方法
who are telling the truth, who know the country,
讓像Michael Semple的人或其它那些人
who've spent 30 years on the ground --
那些說真話,了解這個國家
and most importantly of all,
那些花了30年在現場
the missing component of this --
最重要的是
Afghans themselves,
這件事情少了的部分
who understand what is going on.
阿富汗人他們自己
We need to somehow get their message
他們才了解正在發生什麼
to the policymakers.
我們必須想辦法讓他們的訊息
And this is very difficult to do
傳給立法者知道
because of our structures.
因為我們的結構
The first thing we need to change
這很難辦到
is the structures of our government.
首要改變的是
Very, very sadly,
我們政府的結構
our foreign services, the United Nations,
令人很難過的是
the military in these countries
我們的外國服務,聯合國
have very little idea of what's going on.
這些國家的軍隊
The average British soldier is on a tour of only six months;
不甚了解發生了甚麼事
Italian soldiers, on tours of four months;
英國軍人平均巡迴阿富汗六個月
the American military, on tours of 12 months.
義大利軍人四個月
Diplomats are locked in embassy compounds.
美國軍人12個月
When they go out, they travel in these curious armored vehicles
外交官被關在大使館圍牆裡
with these somewhat threatening security teams
就算他們出去,也是躲在奇怪的裝甲車裡
who ready 24 hours in advance
帶著這些有些嚇人的安防隊伍
who say you can only stay on the ground for an hour.
每天24小時前就準備好
In the British embassy in Afghanistan
說你只能現場待一小時
in 2008,
阿富汗的英國大使館裡
an embassy of 350 people,
2008年時
there were only three people who could speak Dari,
在350個人的大使管理
the main language of Afghanistan, at a decent level.
只有3個人可以說像樣程度的Dari語
And there was not a single Pashto speaker.
阿富汗的主要語言
In the Afghan section in London
沒有一個說Pashto語的人
responsible for governing Afghan policy on the ground,
在倫敦的阿富汗區
I was told last year
負責治理阿富汗現場的政策
that there was not a single staff member
去年我被告知
of the foreign office in that section
在那一個外交辦公室的組別裡
who had ever served
沒有任何一個組員
on a posting in Afghanistan.
曾經用阿富汗語
So we need to change that institutional culture.
張貼過任何消息
And I could make the same points about the United States
所以我們必須改變那個體制文化
and the United Nations.
對美國和聯合國來說
Secondly, we need to aim off of the optimism of the generals.
我講得也是有道理的
We need to make sure that we're a little bit suspicious,
第二,我們必須把目標從那些上將的樂觀主義上轉移
that we understand that optimism
我們必須確定我們有些多疑
is in the DNA of the military,
我們知道樂觀
that we don't respond to it
是軍人基因中與生俱來的
with quite as much alacrity.
我們不能太敏捷
And thirdly, we need to have some humility.
地回應它
We need to begin from the position
第三,我們必須謙虛一點
that our knowledge, our power,
我們必須從了解到
our legitimacy
我們的知識,力量
is limited.
和合法性
This doesn't mean
是有限的定位出發
that intervention around the world is a disaster.
這並不是指
It isn't.
干預國際事務是個災難
Bosnia and Kosovo
不是
were signal successes,
波士尼亞和科索沃
great successes.
是成功的信號
Today when you go to Bosnia
偉大的成功
it is almost impossible to believe
如果你現在去波士尼亞
that what we saw in the early 1990s happened.
你幾乎不會相信
It's almost impossible to believe the progress we've made
我們在1990年代看到
since 1994.
以及自從1994年來我們促進的發展
Refugee return,
發生過
which the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
難民回來了
thought would be extremely unlikely,
這是聯合國難民屬
has largely happened.
覺得極不可能發生的
A million properties have been returned.
竟然大大的發生了
Borders between the Bosniak territory
一百萬個檔案資料已經被送回
and the Bosnian-Serb territory have calmed down.
在波士尼亞領土附近的邊界
The national army has shrunk.
以及波士尼亞和賽爾維亞邊界的情勢已經安定下來
The crime rates in Bosnia today
播士尼亞國軍已經縮減
are lower than they are in Sweden.
現在波士尼亞的犯罪率
This has been done
比瑞典還低
by an incredible, principled effort
這全靠
by the international community,
驚人 有紀律的努力
and, of course, above all,
以及國際社會
by Bosnians themselves.
當然最重要的是
But you need to look at context.
波士尼亞人們自己才能辦到
And this is what we've lost in Afghanistan and Iraq.
但是必須要知道事情前後脈絡
You need to understand that in those places
這是我們在阿富汗和伊拉克所喪失的
what really mattered
你必須知道在那些地方
was, firstly, the role of Tudman and Milosevic
真正重要的
in coming to the agreement,
首先是圖季曼和米洛舍維奇的角色
and then the fact those men went,
能夠達成協議
that the regional situation improved,
以及那些人真的去了
that the European Union could offer Bosnia
區域的情勢改善了
something extraordinary:
歐盟也提供波士尼亞
the chance to be part
很棒的東西
of a new thing, a new club,
那個可以成為
a chance to join something bigger.
一個新東西,一個新社團
And finally, we need to understand that in Bosnia and Kosovo,
可以加入一個更大的團體的機會
a lot of the secret of what we did,
最後,我們必須了解在波士尼亞和科索沃
a lot of the secret of our success,
我們所做得絕大秘密
was our humility --
我們成功的絕大秘密
was the tentative nature of our engagement.
都功歸於我們的謙虛
We criticized people a lot in Bosnia
和我們試驗性的參與天性
for being quite slow to take on war criminals.
我們在波士尼亞批評了很多人
We criticized them
太慢與戰爭罪人對抗
for being quite slow to return refugees.
批評他們
But that slowness, that caution,
太慢送回難民
the fact that President Clinton initially said
但是那個慢速度,那個慎重
that American troops would only be deployed for a year,
柯林頓總統最初說的事實
turned out to be a strength,
美國軍隊只會部屬一年
and it helped us to put our priorities right.
結果變成我們的強處
One of the saddest things
幫助我們放對重點
about our involvement in Afghanistan
在我們涉入阿富汗事件中
is that we've got our priorities out of sync.
最可悲的事情
We're not matching our resources to our priorities.
就是我們的重點沒做到同步
Because if what we're interested in is terrorism,
我們並沒有把資源運用在我們的重點上
Pakistan is far more important than Afghanistan.
因為如果我們關心恐怖主義
If what we're interested in is regional stability,
巴基斯坦比阿富汗重要得多了
Egypt is far more important.
如果我們關心的是區域性的穩定
If what we're worried about is poverty and development,
埃及重要得多了
sub-Saharan Africa is far more important.
如果我們擔心的是貧窮和發展
This doesn't mean that Afghanistan doesn't matter,
次撒哈拉非洲地區重要得多了
but that it's one of 40 countries in the world
這並不是說阿富汗不重要
with which we need to engage.
但只是世界上40個國家中
So if I can finish with a metaphor for intervention,
我們需要參與其中的其中之一
what we need to think of
所以如果用一個比喻來說干預這件事
is something like mountain rescue.
我們需要想到的是
Why mountain rescue?
像山區救援這樣的事情
Because when people talk about intervention,
為什麼呢
they imagine that some scientific theory --
因為當人們談到干預
the Rand Corporation goes around
他們認為某些蘭德公司
counting 43 previous insurgencies
做的科學理論
producing mathematical formula
把之前43起叛亂
saying you need one trained counter-insurgent
算出一個公式
for every 20 members of the population.
告訴你你需要一個訓練好的反叛亂行動
This is the wrong way of looking at it.
給人口中每20個人一個
You need to look at it in the way that you look at mountain rescue.
這是錯誤的看法
When you're doing mountain rescue,
你需要像看山區救援那樣看待它
you don't take a doctorate in mountain rescue,
當你進行山區救援時
you look for somebody who knows the terrain.
你不需要博士學位才行
It's about context.
你要找一個瞭解地勢的人
You understand that you can prepare,
這和背景有關
but the amount of preparation you can do
你知道可以準備
is limited --
但你能做的準備
you can take some water, you can have a map,
有限
you can have a pack.
你可以帶些水,帶個地圖
But what really matters
你可以準備一個包包
is two kinds of problems --
但真的重要的是
problems that occur on the mountain
兩種問題
which you couldn't anticipate,
山裡會發生的問題
such as, for example, ice on a slope,
而你預料不到
but which you can get around,
例如像是坡上的冰
and problems which you couldn't anticipate
但你還可以逃開
and which you can't get around,
以及預料不到
like a sudden blizzard or an avalanche
又逃不開的問題
or a change in the weather.
像突然的暴風雪和雪崩
And the key to this
或是天氣驟變
is a guide who has been on that mountain,
對此的解決之道
in every temperature,
就是一個曾經在山上
at every period --
待過各種氣候
a guide who, above all,
任何時間的嚮導
knows when to turn back,
最重要的是, 一個
who doesn't press on relentlessly
知道什麼時候該回頭
when conditions turn against them.
當情勢轉劣時不會堅持前進
What we look for
的嚮導
in firemen, in climbers, in policemen,
我們從
and what we should look for in intervention,
消防員,登山員和警察
is intelligent risk takers --
以及應該從干預中找的
not people who plunge blind off a cliff,
是聰明的冒險者
not people who jump into a burning room,
不是盲目跳下懸崖的人
but who weigh their risks,
不是跳進火坑的人
weigh their responsibilities.
而是會衡量風險
Because the worst thing we have done in Afghanistan
衡量她們的責任
is this idea
因為我們在阿富汗做過最糟的事
that failure is not an option.
就是抱著
It makes failure invisible,
沒有失敗的選擇的想法
inconceivable and inevitable.
這使失敗隱形了
And if we can resist
無法想像且無可避免
this crazy slogan,
如果我們能抵抗
we shall discover --
這個瘋狂口號
in Egypt, in Syria, in Libya,
我們會發現
and anywhere else we go in the world --
在埃及 敘利亞 利比亞
that if we can often do much less than we pretend,
以及世界上任何其他國家
we can do much more than we fear.
如果我們能卸去偽裝
Thank you very much.
我們就能無畏地做得更多
(Applause)
非常感謝你們
Thank you. Thank you very much.
(掌聲)
Thank you. Thank you very much.
謝謝。謝謝你們。
Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
謝謝,謝謝你們。
(Applause)
謝謝你們謝謝你們謝謝你們
Thank you.
(掌聲)
Thank you. Thank you.
謝謝你們
Thank you.
謝謝你們謝謝你們
(Applause)
謝謝你們
Bruno Giussani: Rory, you mentioned Libya at the end.
(掌聲)
Just briefly, what's your take on the current events there
Bruno Giussani: Rory你最後提到利比亞
and the intervention?
簡短說一下,你對現今在那裏發生的事情的想法
Rory Stewart: Okay, I think Libya poses the classic problem.
還有那邊的干預
The problem in Libya
好 我認為利比亞構成一個經典的問題
is that we are always pushing for the black or white.
利比亞的問題
We imagine there are only two choices:
是我們總是在推動黑人或白人
either full engagement and troop deployment
我們以為只有兩個選擇
or total isolation.
不是全心投入部屬軍隊
And we are always being tempted up to our neck.
就是完全與之隔離
We put our toes in and we go up to our neck.
我們總是對誘惑動心萬分
What we should have done in Libya
我們踏進泥诏然後滿身泥濘出來
is we should have stuck to the U.N. resolution.
我們在利比亞應該做的是
We should have limited ourselves very, very strictly
我們應該謹守聯合國的決議
to the protection of the civilian population in Benghazi.
我們應該嚴格限制自己
We could have done that.
只要保護班加西的平民
We set up a no-fly zone within 48 hours
我們應該早就做得到
because Gaddafi had no planes
我們設立一個48小時內無飛機的區域
within 48 hours.
因為格達費48小時內
Instead of which, we've allowed ourselves to be tempted
沒有飛機
towards regime change.
反之,我們允許自己被誘惑
In doing so, we've destroyed our credibility with the Security Council,
想改變政權
which means it's very difficult
因為這樣,我們已經摧毀安全理事會對我們的信任
to get a resolution on Syria,
這使得
and we're setting ourselves up again for failure.
對敘利亞的決議非常困難
Once more, humility,
而且我們又再次邁向自己設好的失敗
limits, honesty,
我再重申一次 謙虛
realistic expectations
限制 誠實
and we could have achieved something to be proud of.
實際的期望
BG: Rory, thank you very much.
那我們就能做到值得驕傲的事情
RS: Thank you. (BG: Thank you.)
Rory非常謝謝你