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  • [MUSIC PLAYING]

  • SPEAKER 1: Hello, everyone.

  • Aswath Damodaran is here and I couldn't

  • be more pleased because I have learned

  • a lot about investment valuation from just reading his blogs.

  • I think he is one person who has single-handedly made

  • investment valuation open source and available to all of us.

  • In addition to his original classroom at NYU,

  • he also has a virtual classroom on YouTube of tens of thousands

  • of students spread all over the world.

  • And one thing I really admire about Aswath

  • is that he does not shy away from discussing current ideas

  • and let them be examined over time in real time.

  • He's also somebody who has been very open and transparent

  • about sharing investment mistakes,

  • which you don't really see in the investment

  • community in general.

  • I think they're the really special thing about professor

  • is that he brings the side of an academic and bridges it

  • all the way to that of a practitioner

  • and does it in a very open, candid way.

  • He's written phenomenal books about investing

  • and today he is here to discuss with us

  • the latest in the edition of books, which

  • is "Narrative and Numbers."

  • So without any further ado, I am very delighted, please

  • join me in welcoming Professor Aswath Damodaran.

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: Thank you.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • So let me start with a story.

  • I came to NYU in 1986, that was when I was hired

  • as an assistant professor.

  • And I was given a class to teach called security analysis, which

  • is an old class with a collection of topics

  • that I chose to replace with a valuation class.

  • I actually didn't tell them I was doing it,

  • I just went into the class and made it a valuation class.

  • And that was 1986.

  • This will be my 31st year teaching valuation, my 53rd

  • semester.

  • And everything I know about valuation

  • I've learned in the course of teaching this class.

  • So one of the lessons I'd like to talk about

  • is something I didn't know when I started teaching this class

  • that I had to teach myself.

  • So I'm going to take you on a personal journey on something

  • I had to learn to do better to actually do valuation.

  • So I'm going to start out with a question

  • that I start off every one of my classes.

  • Let me give you a sense of what my classes look like.

  • I have a typical class of about 300.

  • It's an MBA class, it's about 300 people

  • who walk into the room.

  • And if you're familiar with how MBA programs have evolved,

  • they've become more and more diverse.

  • So I've got not just bankers, but I've got museum directors,

  • I've got ballet dancers and NBA players.

  • In a sense, it's a very diverse classroom.

  • So here's one of the first questions I ask them,

  • and I'm going to start off this session with that question.

  • There's no right answer, don't look at your neighbor.

  • So here's my question.

  • If I asked you to classify yourself as a person,

  • would you more naturally think of yourself

  • as a storyteller or a number cruncher?

  • Think about it for just a moment.

  • What comes more naturally to you, storytelling

  • or number crunching?

  • Howard, I know you've known for a long time,

  • so you probably knew.

  • I'll tell you when I knew.

  • I knew when I was about 13 or 14,

  • right after my first English literature class.

  • And I was asked to read "Moby Dick," and I did.

  • And I was ready for the discussion, ready to talk

  • about whales and captains.

  • So I show up in class ready to talk about whales and captains

  • and there's nary a mention of whales or captains.

  • And about 15 minutes into the session,

  • the instructor says, there was no whale.

  • And so what?

  • I distinctly remember a big black fish going all the way

  • through the book.

  • And then she started talking about hidden meanings

  • in the book and I remember sitting there saying, really?

  • That's what Herman Melville was thinking when he wrote that?

  • And my reaction when I came out of that class

  • was, never again am I going to subject myself

  • to this kind of bullshit.

  • And my life was laid out for me--

  • it was Algebra I, Algebra II, Algebra III,

  • out of high school.

  • And these were the good old days when you could go to college

  • and not have to deal with the crap you have to do today--

  • core curriculum, you know where they

  • make you take classes for two years you never want to take.

  • Those days, you could take numbers class, numbers class,

  • numbers class, numbers degree out there.

  • And then you had a numbers job-- you were a banker, an engineer.

  • And after about four years of entering numbers

  • into spreadsheets, you got incredibly bored so

  • what did you do?

  • Come back to business school, you're in that class.

  • About 180 people in my class are number crunchers,

  • recovering number crunchers.

  • But there were people in that literature class

  • who loved this hidden meaning stuff.

  • I've never understood them.

  • They're the poets.

  • My youngest son is a poet.

  • He showed me his first poem and I

  • don't think he's going to show me too many poems after this

  • because he showed me the poem and I said, [INAUDIBLE],

  • I think there's a problem.

  • Aren't the last words supposed to rhyme?

  • He said, Dad, you're not a poet, that's why you don't get this.

  • I said, you're right.

  • But there were people who loved this hidden meaning stuff.

  • They took Literature I, Literature II, Literature III,

  • became history majors at Yale, went to work,

  • and discovered that even Yale history majors don't

  • get paid very much.

  • So after about three years of poverty-stricken lives,

  • they come back to business school,

  • they're the other 120 people in my class.

  • That's roughly speaking what my class breaks down into,

  • 60% number crunchers, 40% storytellers.

  • And once this classification happens,

  • the number crunchers start to preen.

  • They say, what the hell are you guys doing in this class?

  • This is a numbers class, it's a valuation class.

  • And that's when I let them in on what

  • I think is the biggest hidden secret in valuation.

  • Valuation can never be just about the numbers.

  • If you have just a collection of numbers in a spreadsheet,

  • you just have a collection of numbers in a spreadsheet.

  • To me valuation, is a bridge between stories and numbers.

  • And let me explain what I mean by that.

  • When you show me a valuation, I point to a number

  • and ask you, why is that number what it is, I need your story.

  • And when you tell me a story about a company, about

  • great management, about a brand name

  • and I say, what does that story mean, I need to hear a number.

  • Good valuations bridge that divide.

  • And it is what--

  • I mean, I know this word is going to sound strange

  • in the context of valuation.

  • The story is what gives soul to your valuation.

  • A valuation, that's a spreadsheet.

  • The story is what gives your valuation a soul.

  • And here's where my personal journey begins.

  • I started teaching the valuation class in '86.

  • And when I first started teaching it,

  • I taught it as a number cruncher does, which is what?

  • All numbers all the time.

  • When in doubt, add an equation.

  • You're in further doubt, add two equations.

  • That's how number crunchers think.

  • And about six years into the process,

  • I discovered I had no faith in my own valuations,

  • another word you don't see in the context of valuations,

  • right?

  • And here's what I mean about faith in your own valuations.

  • When you value a company, especially if you're not

  • being paid to do the valuation, why do we value companies?

  • It's not because we're intellectually curious.

  • I don't lie awake and say, I wonder what

  • Facebook is worth right now.

  • If you do, see a psychiatrist.

  • I value companies because I want to act on those valuations

  • in what sense?

  • If I find something to be undervalued,

  • I need to be able to buy that stock, right?

  • And what I discovered about six years into this process was

  • I could value a company, but I wasn't

  • willing to act because I knew it's a collection of numbers.

  • I knew how easily I could make those numbers

  • move if I wanted to, make that revenue growth from--

  • I could hide my biases all over the place

  • and you would never find it.

  • That's when I started thinking about what am I missing?

  • And what I found I was missing was the capacity

  • to tell a story.

  • So what I'd like to do is take you on this journey

  • because if you're a number cruncher,

  • you have some delusions to overcome

  • and if you're a storyteller, you have your own set of delusions.

  • So let me ask this room that question, how many of you

  • are natural number crunchers?

  • So let me list some delusions.

  • Let's see if we share these delusions.

  • The first is the delusion of precision.

  • The way I describe this is when a number cruncher is in doubt,

  • you know what he or she does?

  • Adds decimals.

  • It makes you feel much better, right?

  • Three decimals, maybe make it five--

  • delusion of precision.

  • The second is the delusion that you being objective.

  • Why-- I just use numbers, I'm not being biased.

  • And the third is the delusion of being in control.

  • Just because you have a number for something

  • doesn't mean you control it, but it gives you

  • the delusion of control.

  • Those are the number cruncher's delusions.

  • If you're a storyteller, you have your own set of delusions

  • and here are some of those delusions.

  • The first is you think being creative

  • should bring its own reward.

  • I told you such a great story, it

  • should be worth at least $3 billion, right?

  • You think number crunchers dream in black and white,

  • they're incapable of dreaming in color,

  • they have no imaginations.

  • And you love anecdotal evidence.

  • You're like my mother-in-law, and I don't

  • mean that as a compliment.

  • She comes up with the most outlandish conclusions.

  • You wonder, where did that come from?

  • I'll give you an example.

  • About 10 years ago, she mentions in passing

  • that the best car to drive in a snowstorm is a Volkswagen bug,

  • you know the old ones that you could pick up

  • with two errands and move?

  • I said, how do you come up with this?

  • And she told me--

  • I should never ask her, how do you come up with this

  • because she always tells me.

  • She said 25 years ago she was driving

  • in Lake Tahoe in a Volkswagen bug in a snowstorm.

  • There were two cars in front of her which went off the road

  • and she made it back home.

  • Therefore, a Volkswagen bug is the--

  • sample size of one.

  • Amazing how you can extrapolate from there.

  • So when I look at my 300 students, I tell them,

  • this is what I hope this class will do for you.

  • I turned to the storytellers first and say,

  • by the end of this class, I hope you

  • learn enough number crunching skills

  • to develop some discipline.

  • Because when you tell stories, you sometimes get

  • carried away, right?

  • You wander across that line between fact and fantasy

  • and you're not even sure that you walked across the line.

  • I hope you develop enough number crunching that you know

  • that you're crossing the line.

  • I hope that you become disciplined storytellers.

  • Then I turn to my number crunchers

  • and say, by the end of this class,

  • I hope you trust your imagination.

  • To me, that is the essence of somebody

  • who's good at valuation, disciplined storytellers

  • or imaginative number crunchers.

  • So let me ask you a final question before we move on.

  • Who do you think I have more trouble with,

  • getting storytellers to develop discipline or number crunchers

  • to trust their imagination?

  • It's not even close-- number crunchers.

  • You give me 100 history majors, I

  • can teach them enough valuation in a day

  • that they're going to be OK tomorrow.

  • You give me 100 engineers, I'll give up right away.

  • You guys are beyond redemption because you've

  • spent your entire lifetime bludgeoning your imagination

  • into the ground.

  • You don't trust it anymore.

  • So to me, this is the key to valuation

  • is working on your weak side.

  • I know it's a legend about the left brain and the right brain,

  • but if that legend is true that the left brain controls

  • logic and the right brain, why are you

  • using only half a brain?

  • It's tough enough using your entire brain

  • and doing things right.

  • If you trust only half your brain,

  • you're not using the other half.

  • So what I'd like to do is take you

  • on my journey of how I taught myself storytelling.

  • And I'm going to take you through five steps

  • that I go through to get to a valuation.

  • Why five steps?

  • Because I'm a number cruncher, I think linearly.

  • I have to think in steps.

  • If you're not a number cruncher, jumble them all up.

  • It doesn't matter the sequence.

  • So here are the five steps I'm going to take you through.

  • I'm going to start off by telling you

  • a story about a company.

  • And to tell a story about a company,

  • you know what, I need to understand

  • what the company does.

  • If I think Cisco makes vegetable oil,

  • the story I'm going to tell you about Cisco

  • is going to make no sense at all.

  • So that common sense wisdom you're

  • given, you've got to understand a business to value it,

  • that applies in spades.

  • I've got to tell you a story about the company.

  • Second step, I've got to stop and make

  • sure the story I've told is not a fairy tale.

  • I've got to ask three questions-- is it possible, is

  • it plausible, is it probable?

  • Sounds like I'm playing on words, right?

  • Which is the weakest test--

  • possible, plausible, or probable?

  • Possible.

  • Lots of things are possible.

  • A subset of those are plausible.

  • An even smaller subset are probable.

  • For every 100 business stories I hear, maybe 15 are plausible

  • and five are probable.

  • I'll give you a very simple way of thinking about possible,

  • plausible, and probable.

  • Any San Francisco Giants fans here?

  • Nobody?

  • OK.

  • Any Yankee fans here?

  • I'm a Yankee fan.

  • OK, they're 10 and five right now.

  • I'm feeling very good.

  • Is it possible that they could go 157 and five this season?

  • There are 162 games in a baseball season,

  • you don't know.

  • Is it possible?

  • Yes, it's possible.

  • Is it plausible?

  • No.

  • Why not?

  • No team in history has ever won 147 games in a row, ever.

  • It's possible, but not plausible,

  • and it's definitely not probable.

  • Three different levels of tests.

  • Once I've established that my story is possible, plausible,

  • and probable comes what I call the craft part of valuation.

  • And here's what I mean by the craft part.

  • I have to be able to take every part of my story

  • and make it into a number in my valuation.

  • And you say, what if my story can't become a number?

  • I view it as a challenge when somebody says,

  • I have a variable you can't or I have a story you can't--

  • you tell me a story, I'll find the number and a valuation

  • to reflect it.

  • And once I convert my story into numbers,

  • the valuation does itself.

  • By the time you look at the valuation,

  • it's my story that's driven the valuation.

  • so if you point to a number in my valuation,

  • I should be able to back it up with the story.

  • And then comes the most difficult part.

  • So you've told this great story, right?

  • Do you like your story?

  • Yeah, of course.

  • It's your story.

  • You've converted the story into a valuation.

  • Do you like your valuation?

  • Absolutely.

  • And when you present that valuation

  • to other people, what do you want them to tell you?

  • This is amazing.

  • This is exactly the way I'll value the company.

  • So here is my advice to you, don't

  • talk to people who think just like you.

  • Don't hang out with people who think just

  • like you because they're going to say, this is amazing.

  • This is exactly how I'd value the company, too.

  • So here's what I call keeping the feedback loop open.

  • Seek out people who think the least like you.

  • When you present your valuation to them,

  • you know what they're going to say, right?

  • This is horrible, this is a stupid way to value a company.

  • Listen because they might be telling you things that

  • can make your story better.

  • So what I'm going to do is take two companies

  • through this process so you can see this game play out.

  • And the two companies I'm going to use I

  • know you're familiar with.

  • And the reason I'm going to pick familiar companies is here's

  • what I'd like you to do.

  • As I tell my story, I'd like you to think

  • about how wrong my story is.

  • So I want you to think about what

  • you disagree with my story, but don't interrupt me.

  • This is my story, my turn.

  • But after I'm done, I'm going to give you an architecture where

  • you can take your story about these companies

  • and make them with your valuations.

  • To me, that is the essence of investing

  • is you take ownership of your own stories.

  • So here are the two companies I'm going to use.

  • The first is Uber in June of 2014.

  • So why does the timing matter?

  • Because my story for Uber shifts over time.

  • Why does it shift?

  • Because the world shifts around me.

  • So I've actually on my blog valued Uber in June of 2014,

  • September of 2015, September of 2016, and I plan to do it again

  • in a month.

  • And my stories change and I have no shame

  • about admitting the fact that my stories change all the time.

  • The second company I'm going to value

  • is Ferrari in October of 2015, just

  • before their initial public offering.

  • Ferrari has actually been around a long time, since the 1940s.

  • But in the 1960s, Enzo Ferrari got into some trouble

  • and he had to sell off 90% of Ferrari to Fiat Chrysler

  • and for about 50 years, Ferrari stayed

  • as a part of Fiat Chrysler, until 2015 when it was spun off

  • as an independent company.

  • So I'm sure everybody in this room

  • is at least familiar with what Uber does

  • and what Ferrari does.

  • So these are stories that should have a hint of familiarity

  • to you.

  • So let's start the game.

  • The first step in the process before I tell a story is I

  • need to understand the company, understand the business.

  • One of my problems with the way research has evolved,

  • it's become too much around financial statements.

  • When I ask you to do research, what do you do?

  • You collect financial statements.

  • And the other thing that's become a problem

  • is Google search because when I ask you

  • to do research, what do you?

  • You type the name of the company, hundreds of articles

  • pop up.

  • That's not a bad place to start, but it should never

  • be the place you end.

  • You know you learn more about a company?

  • Talk to people.

  • Talk to people who use the product,

  • talk to people who work at the company.

  • You need to understand what the company does,

  • what makes it tick, to be able to value it.

  • So I'm going to tell you when I first heard of Uber

  • and when I say this, you're going to laugh.

  • You'll say, you didn't hear about it until then?

  • I heard about Uber in June of 2014.

  • You're saying, what were you doing, living under a rock?

  • I was actually living underground.

  • Because I live in New York City, I take the subway, I never

  • take the surface roads.

  • Because who wants to deal with the traffic?

  • So I see this new story in the "Wall Street Journal"

  • that says Uber has been priced by a venture capitalist

  • at $17 billion.

  • Notice the word I used.

  • I used the word priced, not the word valued.

  • So let me put this on the table.

  • No venture capitalist in history has ever valued anything,

  • they have priced things.

  • It's a very different game because the way

  • you win as a venture capitalist, you buy at a low price,

  • you flip it to somebody else at a high price.

  • They had priced it at $17 billion.

  • And I said I hadn't heard of Uber,

  • but that was a bit of a lie.

  • I'd seen the word Uber on my credit card statements

  • in the three months leading into June of 2014

  • because it turned out that my son, who was going to college

  • in North Carolina, was using Uber

  • and using my credit card to back it.

  • I don't know how that happened.

  • But I thought he was taking German language classes,

  • to be quite honest.

  • the no umlaut on the U should have kind of given it away.

  • So I called him, but he was still sleeping.

  • It's like 11:30 in the morning, college student hours,

  • which means you go to bed at like 5:00, you wake up at noon.

  • So I called my niece, who worked in Chicago,

  • and she was on her way to work and not in a good mood.

  • So I said, what's this Uber?

  • She said, it's a ride-sharing service.

  • I said, what the heck is a ride-sharing service?

  • She said, I don't have the time to tell you.

  • Why don't you just download the app and find out for yourself?

  • So I hang up the phone, I download the app,

  • and I hit the app.

  • Magical things start to happen on my phone.

  • I see a GPS open up and I see a car trying to get to me.

  • It's New York City--

  • you only try to get to a place, you

  • don't actually get there because it's all one-way streets.

  • And I could see a guy called George

  • sitting in the front seat.

  • This has never happened to me with a yellow cab.

  • The car pulls up, I run out to the car and say, hi, George.

  • He says, where do you want to go?

  • I said, I don't want to go anywhere.

  • Can you drive me around for about 30 or 40 minutes?

  • I have some questions to ask you.

  • [LAUGHTER]

  • He thought I was a serial killer,

  • but then he took one look at me and said, I can take this guy.

  • Get in the backseat.

  • So I get in the back seat I start asking him questions.

  • I said, this is an Uber car you're driving?

  • He said, no.

  • This is my car.

  • I said, are you an Uber employee?

  • He said, I'm an independent contractor.

  • I said, why do you do this?

  • He says, I have a regular job.

  • I don't make enough money and this

  • allows me to make a second income in a car

  • that I already own.

  • I said, why do you need Uber?

  • He said, without Uber, I can't pick up people in the street.

  • It's illegal in New York City to pull up to somebody in the curb

  • and say, do you want a ride?

  • Uber is my matchmaker.

  • So at this stage, I could understand

  • why this guy used Uber, because it allowed him to take

  • a car he already owned--

  • in fact, I asked him, do you pay extra insurance?

  • He said, I don't mention it to the insurance company.

  • What they don't know, they don't know.

  • So basically, he was taking the car,

  • he was using the insurance he already had

  • and making a second income and Uber was the matchmaker

  • that allowed him to do it.

  • So he lets me off in front of my office.

  • I offer to pay him.

  • He should have just take the money.

  • He said, you don't have to pay me.

  • I said, it's free?

  • He said, no, it's not free.

  • When you downloaded the app, did they ask you

  • for a credit card number?

  • I said, yes, and bells go off in my head.

  • They're going to charge you.

  • And I said, how do you get paid?

  • He said, they'll send me 80% of whatever the fare is.

  • I remember asking, why 80%?

  • He said, I don't know.

  • That's what they all do.

  • Now I could understand why Uber did what they did.

  • For essentially being matchmakers,

  • they collected 20% of whatever you pay.

  • I said, this is a great business.

  • Which left me with one missing piece,

  • why do customers like Uber?

  • So this time, I called my son at a civilized hour,

  • like 3:30 in the afternoon, when he was awake.

  • And I decided to put him on the defensive right away.

  • I said, I've been noticing you've been using my credit

  • card to back up your ride-sharing--

  • I made it sound like I knew what Uber was doing all the time.

  • You have your own car, why do you need Uber?

  • He said, Dad, on some nights, I like Uber.

  • Some questions as a parent you don't dig too deeply on.

  • I kind of got it.

  • But this is a kid I can't even visualize

  • him calling a traditional cab.

  • It's not even in his frame of reference

  • to go out on the street and wa-- you know.

  • I said, what do you like about Uber?

  • And he said, I can call the car from my phone.

  • And I said, these cars must cost you a lot more than a cab,

  • right?

  • He said, no, they're cheaper than a cab.

  • I said, you must wait a lot longer, right?

  • He said, no, no, they, come faster than a cab.

  • I said, these cars must be filthy, right?

  • They're cleaner than a cab.

  • I said, let me get this straight--

  • they're cheaper than a cab, they're faster than that cab,

  • they're cleaner than a cab.

  • That's when I knew cab service was destined for doom.

  • We can dance around as much as you want.

  • The final question I had to clean up for myself was,

  • why couldn't I do this in my basement?

  • I could be a matchmaker just like Uber.

  • And there were three answers I came up with in June of 2014.

  • The first was $3 billion.

  • That's how much they raised from the VC.

  • I didn't have $3 billion.

  • That puts me at a disadvantage.

  • The second is this is a game with a networking benefit,

  • you see what I mean?

  • As you sign up more drivers, it becomes--

  • a new driver wants to join, he's going

  • to go where the rest of the drivers

  • are because the bigger that space, the more likely

  • it is you'll get customers.

  • And the third is it is a company that is using data in ways

  • that hadn't been used before.

  • Like what?

  • The surge pricing, for instance.

  • So when I talk about understanding your company,

  • I'm essentially talking about learning more about what

  • your company does-- why do people like it's products,

  • why do they work for it--

  • and getting a sense of what the business model is.

  • So to complete the story, after I did this research-- if you

  • can call it that-- on Uber, I drew a picture

  • and I try to do this with almost every company I value,

  • a picture of what the company does, what it produces,

  • who buys from the company, why they do it.

  • In the case of Uber, what completes the story is

  • they have a business model--

  • and I could see this in June of 2014--

  • that is easily scalable.

  • You know what I mean by easily scalable?

  • For Uber to go to a new city, all they need to do

  • is hire one person, put them in a motel room

  • and say, sign up as many drivers as you can.

  • There's no infrastructure investment.

  • They don't buy the cars, which means they are going to--

  • it comes with pluses and minuses.

  • It means they can grow much faster, that's a plus.

  • What's a minus?

  • It means that other people can use the same--

  • so it's a business that's going to grow fast,

  • but it's going to be difficult to defend and make money on.

  • I had a sense, at least, in June of 2014 of what Uber did.

  • Let's turn to Ferrari.

  • Technically speaking, it's a car company, right?

  • That's the bad news.

  • Why is it the bad news?

  • Because this is not a great business to be in.

  • It's one of the 10 worst businesses in the world

  • to be in.

  • That sounds like a categorical statement,

  • but every year I actually rank the 10 worst businesses.

  • Online advertising has not made it there, so don't worry.

  • Your businesses are safe.

  • The automobile business is an awful business.

  • Let me start laying out the basis for that statement.

  • In the 10 years leading up into 2015,

  • which is when Ferrari went public,

  • the revenue growth at automobile companies on an annual basis

  • globally was only about 5.6%.

  • That's it.

  • That's pretty anemic growth.

  • And half that growth comes from?

  • I tell my MBAs, when somebody asks you a question you don't

  • know the answer to, say China.

  • [LAUGHTER]

  • It's amazing how often that is a good answer.

  • Whatever the question, China works.

  • Why are interest rates low?

  • China.

  • Why are interest rates high?

  • China.

  • Why is inflation going up?

  • China.

  • It's like six degrees of separation from Kevin Bacon.

  • Every question, China is within six degrees of hey,

  • that's the right answer.

  • So 5.6% growth, half of it comes from China.

  • You're saying, so what?

  • If China slows down, the 5.6% is going to become 4%.

  • Operating margins are abysmal.

  • The average operating margin--

  • so this is not net profit margin,

  • this is higher up in the income statement-- is 4.4%.

  • And 1/3 of all automobile companies lose money.

  • So you've got low revenue growth,

  • you've got abysmal margins, let's nail the coffin shut.

  • Normally, when you have low revenue growth,

  • one of the few bonuses you get is

  • you don't have to reinvest very much.

  • But in the case of automobile companies,

  • that is not true because they've had

  • to reinvest not in assembly lines, but in R&D.

  • Do you know why they have to invest in R&D?

  • The modern car is more computer than car,

  • so they had to invest in R&D to catch up.

  • This is your definition of a bad business-- low revenue

  • growth, abysmal margins, lots of reinvestment.

  • The way this manifests itself is in nine of the last 10 years

  • leading into 2015, automobile companies

  • earned a return on capital less than the cost of capital.

  • That's the bad news for Ferrari, they're in a bad business.

  • The good news for Ferrari is they're

  • not another car company, right?

  • In fact, I'm not even sure if it's a car.

  • It's a very impractical car.

  • There's one guy in my town owns a Ferrari,

  • I've never seen him drive it.

  • It's kept in an extra armored garage with two security

  • guards in front.

  • You could break into his house multiple times,

  • but his car is protected.

  • Rumor is once every year, he takes the car out of the garage

  • and drives it around town, back into the garage,

  • locks it up for the next year.

  • And who can blame the guy?

  • What are you going to do in your Ferrari, go grocery shopping?

  • Can you imagine parking your car, walking into the grocery?

  • AUDIENCE: A lot of them, the insurance

  • covers only the weekends.

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: There you go.

  • And even the weekends, you probably

  • have to have two guards running next to your car

  • to make sure nobody is scratching your car

  • as you're driving it.

  • You can't go grocery--

  • how about carpool in a Ferrari?

  • You've got four kids to pick up, one seat.

  • What are you going to do, stack them up?

  • So why would people spend all this money

  • to buy a car you can't drive anywhere?

  • Because you're part of a very exclusive club.

  • How exclusive?

  • Let me give you a picture.

  • In all of 2014, the year leading into the IPO,

  • Ferrari sold 7,255 cars globally.

  • In the entire year, 7,255.

  • Think about that.

  • That's how many cars Volkswagen probably rejects

  • on its assembly line every day.

  • 7,255 the whole year, that's bad news.

  • The good news is their operating margin is 18.2%.

  • Remind me again what it was or the rest of the automobile

  • business.

  • 4.4%.

  • So why is their margin so high?

  • One answer is because they've priced the car so high.

  • The other is they spend almost nothing

  • on traditional advertising.

  • Have you ever seen a Ferrari ad on TV?

  • Come on in, 10% off.

  • It's not the kind of person they want coming in.

  • In fact, I'm not even sure how you buy a Ferrari.

  • You walk in, the dealer probably says,

  • do you have any references?

  • To what?

  • Billionaires you know.

  • You know no billionaires?

  • Get out of here.

  • It's an exclusive club, they can't let the riffraff walk off

  • the street and buy a Ferrari.

  • So it's doesn't sell very many cars, high margins.

  • And here is the final advantage.

  • Normally, when you sell these high priced luxury goods

  • like Tiffany and Guccis, in good times you sell a lot--

  • you're affected by the economy, because people

  • are reaching to buy your stuff.

  • That's not been true at Ferrari.

  • They've sold about 7,200 cars in the 10 years leading into 2014,

  • including 2009.

  • Know why I picked 2009?

  • The year after the crisis you'd expect sales to drop off.

  • Nothing happened at Ferrari.

  • Why not?

  • The people who buy Ferraris are so

  • rich that if you ask them, what's the economy doing,

  • their response is, what's an economy?

  • Because to them the essence of a bad year

  • is I'm worth only $4.5 billion instead of $7.5 billion-- not

  • exactly cutting corners or cutting costs.

  • So the final bonus you're getting

  • is you actually get pretty stable revenues even though you

  • have this luxury product because you've kept it so exclusive.

  • Those things are all going to play out when I tell you

  • my story for Ferrari.

  • So let me talk about business stories.

  • What exactly is a business story, how should you tell it?

  • If any of you are entrepreneurs, want to be entrepreneurs,

  • dream of being entrepreneurs, take

  • this for whatever it's worth.

  • If you're telling a business story, keep it simple.

  • As opposed to what?

  • Don't make yourself so George RR Martin

  • and tell me a "Game of Thrones" story.

  • I still remember trying to read the first "Game of Thrones"

  • book.

  • About halfway through, I gave up.

  • There are like hundreds of characters.

  • They die.

  • They come back to life.

  • There are like six empires.

  • I said, I'm too old for this.

  • You tell a "Game of Thrones"-- you

  • don't have seven seasons and 70 episodes

  • to tell your business story, you probably have five minutes.

  • Keep it simple and keep it focused.

  • What's the end game for every business?

  • You have to show me a pathway to making money.

  • Pathway doesn't have to be next year,

  • it might be seven years from now.

  • So don't keep talking about how many users you have.

  • That's nice.

  • Tell me how you plan to convert these users into profits.

  • That might come way down the road,

  • but without thinking about it, it's

  • not going to magically happen.

  • So I'm going to try to follow those rules

  • in trying to come up with stories for Uber and Ferrari.

  • So in June of 2014, here was the story I told for Uber.

  • And every word in the story is going to have consequence,

  • so kind of hang in there.

  • I described Uber as an urban car service company.

  • So already, I'm trying to tell you

  • where I think Uber is going to succeed, right?

  • Urban means cities and big towns,

  • car services is the basic business.

  • Remember I said I wanted you to think about where

  • you disagree with my story?

  • So given where Uber is now, start

  • thinking about that's wrong.

  • That's fine, but this is my story in June of 2014,

  • an urban car service company that's

  • going to attract new users into the car service business.

  • Like whom?

  • Like my son, people who normally never take a cab who have now

  • tried to take this car service.

  • With local networking benefits, I've

  • already talked about what networking benefits are.

  • As you become the largest ride-sharing company

  • in New York, there's a tipping point

  • where you're essentially going to end up

  • dominating the market.

  • You think, what's the local doing there?

  • Let's say Uber becomes the largest car service

  • company in New York and I fly to Chicago.

  • I don't care about the largest car service

  • company in New York, I now care about the largest car service

  • company in Chicago.

  • So in my story, here is what's going to happen.

  • Uber can end up dominating New York,

  • Lyft can end up dominating Chicago,

  • Didi Chuxing can end up dominating Beijing,

  • and Ola can end up dominating Mumbai.

  • You think, so what?

  • When I start assigning market share of the market,

  • this story is going to come into play

  • as to what kind of market share you're going to see.

  • And finally, I'm going to assume that Uber

  • is going to be able to continue to do what

  • it does now, which is what?

  • Not own the cars, not hire the drivers,

  • which means that they can scale up really fast.

  • And they're going to be able to keep that 80-20 mix.

  • That's completely arbitrary.

  • Why not 85-15, 90-10, 95-5?

  • They're going to keep that mix.

  • So that was my Uber story in June of 2014.

  • Here's my Ferrari story in October of 2015,

  • at the time of their IPO.

  • I assumed that it would stay in an exclusive club.

  • It doesn't have to, right?

  • It could pull what I call a Maserati.

  • Maserati in 2008 looked a lot like Ferrari,

  • it sold about 7,000 cars, had high margins.

  • But in 2009, Maserati decided that they

  • wanted it to grow faster.

  • The way they did this, they introduced a new Maserati,

  • a cheaper--

  • don't get too excited, it's not that cheap--

  • called the Ghibli, going after a bigger market.

  • And it succeeded.

  • In what sense?

  • Their growth jumped to 15% a year.

  • That's the good news.

  • But what do you think happened to their margins?

  • They went down because they had to advertise, expend.

  • So they went from 18% to 14%.

  • And in addition, you are now selling

  • to people who are rich but not super rich.

  • So they actually knew what the economy was doing

  • and stopped buying cars if they felt the economy was not

  • doing that well.

  • So I'm going to assume that Ferrari

  • is going to stay with their exclusive club model

  • and not pull a Maserati.

  • Now comes that test where--

  • one of the biggest things about stories

  • is your biggest test is yourself.

  • You've got to make sure that you ask of your story

  • the question before somebody else asks it.

  • So is it possible, is it plausible, is it probable?

  • The reason you ask that question is probably

  • easy to build into your cash flows, right?

  • There are all these techniques we can use.

  • Plausible I can build into growth, possible

  • I'll just wave my hands and perhaps use some option pricing

  • to kind of bring it in.

  • But to illustrate what I mean by possible,

  • plausible, probable, the best way I can do this

  • is to flip it on its head and talk

  • about implausible stories, implausible stories,

  • and improbable stories.

  • I'll give you one example of an impossible story.

  • Every person in my class has to pick a company to value

  • and they can pick whatever they want.

  • So about two years ago, one of the students in my class

  • picks Netflix to value.

  • This is a company that is a great company value-- exciting,

  • dynamic--

  • but a company where you have to really stretch

  • to get the value up to the price because it's a really richly

  • priced stock.

  • So it's trading at 1.8, comes back

  • with a $500 value per share.

  • I'm flabbergasted.

  • So I look at the numbers and he's

  • projected revenues of $600 billion for Netflix 10 years

  • from now.

  • So I call the kid in-- he wasn't even a kid,

  • he was 29 years old--

  • and I said, do you have Netflix?

  • He said, yes.

  • I said, how much do you pay for a year?

  • He pulled out his calculator, which seemed

  • to be attached to his hip.

  • He hits the numbers, about $100 a year.

  • I said, how many subscribers would you

  • need to get to $600 billion in revenues?

  • He pulls out this calculator again.

  • I said, you don't need a damn calculator.

  • Divide $600 billion by $100, you've

  • got six billion subscribers.

  • He says, I don't see where this is going.

  • I said, just hang in there.

  • I have a couple of more questions for you.

  • I said, what's the population of the world?

  • He says, I don't know.

  • I have to go check Wikipedia.

  • I said, I'll save you the trouble.

  • It's about maybe six billion, six and a half billion.

  • I said, is there something I don't know maybe

  • that you should be telling me?

  • Maybe there's been a law that's been passed

  • that says every man, woman, and child and perhaps

  • pet in every household has to have a Netflix account.

  • He says, don't be absurd.

  • I said, I'm not the one estimating $600 billion

  • in revenues.

  • That's an impossible story.

  • I'll make a statement-- you might not believe this,

  • but as you look at valuations, you try this out.

  • One in four valuations that I see, maybe one in three,

  • from big name appraises and banks

  • are impossible valuations, it just can't happen.

  • Its a fairytale.

  • An implausible valuation can happen,

  • but you have to have a really good explanation for it.

  • I'll give you one example.

  • A student of mine went to work for an NFL team,

  • I won't name the team, and he sent me

  • a valuation of the team, I don't know for what reason.

  • So I looked at the evaluation, he's

  • put in 3% growth and revenue.

  • It looks pretty reasonable until you

  • get to how much money are you putting back into the business.

  • And they own their own stadium and there was nothing

  • going back into the stadium, no investment at all.

  • So I called him and I said, I looked at your valuation.

  • How come you're not putting any money back into the stadium?

  • Don't you have to maintain it?

  • He said, that's easy to explain.

  • Every time we need to get the stadium refurbished, here's

  • what we do.

  • We go to the city and we threaten them.

  • With what?

  • We're moving to Las Vegas.

  • Are you going to fix the stadium?

  • And it works.

  • It's an implausible story, but if you can tell me why.

  • So implausible stories can happen,

  • but I'm going to push you back and if you

  • can give me a really good explanation, OK, that's good.

  • And improbable stories are stories where your assumptions

  • are at war with each other.

  • Let me explain.

  • When I look at a valuation, there

  • are three sides what I call my valuation triangle.

  • There's the growth side, the re-investment side,

  • and the risk side.

  • So help me out here.

  • If I have a company with high growth on one side,

  • what should I expect to see when I look at your reinvestment?

  • High reinvestment and usually high risk. high, high, high.

  • OK.

  • That makes sense.

  • Low, low low makes sense.

  • You have high, low, low, I'm going to push back.

  • And again, you can have a really good explanation

  • as to why your company has high growth and low reinvestment.

  • You're a toll road company, you've

  • spent the last 10 years building your told roads.

  • Now you're getting the growth from those roads.

  • So you get the high growth, but you

  • don't have to reinvest because the reinvestment is all--

  • so if you're an infrastructure, I get it now.

  • My job in valuation is to push you on these assumptions.

  • And if you've thought through it,

  • you can give me a good explanation.

  • But if you say, look, I didn't even notice that,

  • then you have the valuation that's at war with itself.

  • So I took my Uber story and I checked it out.

  • Is it possible?

  • Is it plausible?

  • Is it probable?

  • And guess what, I'm describing them

  • as an urban car service company, which they're already

  • succeeding at.

  • I argued that they're bringing new users in.

  • I could use my son as an example,

  • but then I'm behaving like my mother-in-law.

  • So I'll use the part of the country

  • where ride-sharing has its deepest

  • roots, which is the Bay Area.

  • Do you know that by some estimates,

  • the size of the car service business

  • in this part of the country has tripled

  • since ride-sharing companies came in?

  • You know what that's telling you, right?

  • That there are people now who take Uber who would never

  • have taken a cab, who might have driven their own cars

  • or taken mass transit.

  • It's making inroads.

  • So clearly, that part of the story works, as well.

  • It's plausible.

  • The one part of the story I wasn't

  • willing to go to in June of 2014 was

  • the story of how Uber could replace your second car.

  • It's a story that I'm more willing to buy into today,

  • that if you live in the suburbs like I do.

  • I drive my car to the train station every morning.

  • It's a three-minute drive, I'm too lazy to walk.

  • I park it there all day, I come back in the evening,

  • I get back in the car, I drive it home-- six minutes a day.

  • Weekends I go crazy, like 25 minutes on a weekend.

  • Collectively, I keep a car, I pay insurance.

  • It's insane.

  • But if I lived in the suburbs 10 years ago,

  • my answer would have been, what other choice do I have?

  • It's not like I can call a car service.

  • Uber is in my town now.

  • In fact, in the last few months, I've

  • been noticing a billboard that you can see from your train

  • as you're going through and it's like every station.

  • The billboard says, did you drive to the station today?

  • And right below it says, take Uber.

  • The message is not to me, I'm too old to change.

  • But if you are you're 35, you move to the suburbs,

  • instead of buying that second car, you might take Uber.

  • This is really good news for Uber,

  • it's really bad news for whom?

  • Automotive cars.

  • We talk a lot about the disruptors.

  • The more exciting thing is what happens to the disrupted?

  • And there is, in fact, a price that's

  • going to be paid by those companies.

  • So that's basically your check on your story.

  • Now, I'm going to take a little tangent here.

  • Let's suppose you're tired of working

  • at whatever you're doing.

  • You quit and you become a movie producer.

  • You move to LA.

  • You hang out at the Bel Air, Beverly Hills Hilton,

  • something by the pool.

  • And I'm going to come and pitch a story to you.

  • And as I pitch this story, you tell me

  • whether this story sounds good to you.

  • It's about a 19-year-old who drops out of Stanford.

  • Who does that?

  • What's their acceptance rate, like minus 3%?

  • You got into one of the most selective schools

  • in the country and you drop out?

  • To make it interesting, let's make the 19-year-old a woman.

  • Usually it's a male geek dropping out

  • and starting a tech company.

  • This is a 19-year-old woman who drops out of Stanford

  • and starts a business-- but not a tech business,

  • but a blood testing business.

  • This is something we all have experience with in our lives,

  • right?

  • We hate the way it's structured right now with the labs that

  • take forever to run your tests and charge you $1,500 to take

  • two buckets of your blood and feed it to Dracula,

  • I don't know what.

  • So she's created a business where

  • she needs only two drops of your blood in a nanotainer.

  • That sounds pretty fancy to begin with.

  • And 32 tests are going to be run in 45 minutes

  • and emailed to you and it will cost you $50.

  • Do you want this story to be true?

  • I do.

  • These are what I call runaway stories, stories

  • that sound so good you're afraid to ask the question.

  • You know, the question that's going to show

  • that the story doesn't work.

  • I wish I had made up this story because it's not

  • a made-up story.

  • The 19-year-old who dropped out of Stanford

  • was called Elizabeth Holmes.

  • The company she created was Theranos.

  • And in the middle of 2015, venture capitalists

  • had priced Theranos-- again, that word comes out--

  • at $9 billion.

  • Some of the biggest names were on that list.

  • And it's not just the VCs who got excited.

  • It was the Cleveland Clinic, Walgreens.

  • If you'd asked me in the middle of 2015, what

  • do you think about Theranos, my reaction,

  • there must be some substance here,

  • you have all these big names.

  • But let me ask you a question.

  • You're investing in a blood testing company.

  • What's the first question you're going

  • to ask before you put your money into the company?

  • Does it work, right?

  • And you'd assume that somebody in here

  • would have asked that question.

  • But that turned out to be not true.

  • In October of 2015, a "Wall Street Journal" reporter

  • decided to ask the question.

  • And this is a question, the answers

  • are actually out there in the public domain

  • because you have to file with the FDA.

  • He went to the FDA and said, have they

  • been approved for 32 tests?

  • The FDA said, no.

  • They've been approved for one of the 32.

  • He said, why?

  • Because the other 31, the results are too noisy.

  • Noisy blood tests-- it's not a feature you

  • want in a blood test, right?

  • Maybe you have leukemia, maybe you don't.

  • But don't worry about it, we'll get back to you later, right?

  • It's not exactly something you go looking for.

  • And of course, the story unraveled after that.

  • And the final pieces of the story

  • are playing out with Elizabeth Holmes being banned

  • from the blood testing business for the next two years

  • and Theranos kind of unfolding.

  • Runaway stories are stories where

  • you want the story to be true so much that you're

  • afraid to ask the question because you're afraid what

  • the answer might be.

  • I would love to tell you that if I'd

  • been an investor in Theranos, I would have asked that question.

  • But I don't know.

  • Can you imagine being in that room

  • with Elizabeth Holmes saying do your blood tests work?

  • You'd have felt like the hunter who shot Bambi's mother.

  • Have you ever felt--

  • I felt badly for that guy in the movie.

  • Somebody shot that-- you have no idea what I'm talking about,

  • right?

  • This is what happens when you don't watch enough Disney

  • movies.

  • Go watch "Bambi."

  • So you're afraid that the answer is going to ruin the story

  • and you don't ever ask the question.

  • I mean, you'd be amazed at how many business stories take off

  • and keep going because people don't

  • want to ask that question.

  • Let me do one other tangent.

  • Sometimes I look at banking valuations just for fun,

  • just to see inconsistencies pop up.

  • And this is the valuation of Tesla, another one

  • of my favorite companies.

  • This is a valuation where the analyst had projected out

  • growth for Tesla where the number of cars that Tesla would

  • produce would go from 25,000 in the most recent 12 months--

  • this was in 2013--

  • to 1.1 million in 10 years.

  • Is that possible?

  • Sure.

  • Is it plausible?

  • Yeah, I can tell you really--

  • because let's face it, this is a big business.

  • So I was OK with that part of the story.

  • He then projected on margins of about 7%, again plausible.

  • So up to now, we're on plausible story.

  • Now, what's the capacity of that Fremont Plant that Tesla has,

  • 150,000, maybe 250,000 cars?

  • So I went looking for the third piece of the puzzle,

  • are you putting in money to build more plants?

  • And in this particular valuation,

  • it looked like the analyst was putting nothing back

  • into new plants.

  • In fact, I called the analyst and I pushed him on it

  • and he admitted finally that it had slipped his mind.

  • I made a suggestion to him.

  • I said, you know what?

  • The only way you're going to be able to get away

  • with this is you need to watch "Willy Wonka's Chocolate

  • Factory."

  • Have you ever seen that movie, the old version?

  • I was a very strange younger person,

  • now I'm a very strange older person.

  • I remember coming out of that movie with a big question.

  • The question was, Willy Wonka chocolates

  • are all over the world, but there's only one factory--

  • six floors, inefficiently laid out

  • with chocolate rivers running through it and stuff.

  • And I said, how do they produce all these chocolates

  • from this one factory?

  • And the answer, of course, is in the movie.

  • It was the Oompa-Loompas.

  • Remember them, magical creatures that dance around

  • and chocolates come flying out?

  • I said, here's what you need to do.

  • Put out a press release that Tesla's

  • fired all of its regular workers in its Fremont plant

  • and replaced them with them Oompa-Loompas.

  • I call these Oompa-Loompa valuations,

  • where you have this growth and nothing set aside

  • to create the growth.

  • It's not going to happen.

  • So I have my story, I'm going to convert it into numbers.

  • So let's start at the top.

  • I describe Uber as an urban car service company.

  • The total market that I used for my valuation

  • was the urban car service market, which is $100 billion

  • in June of 2014.

  • I assumed that Uber would pull in new users into that market.

  • So here's what I did.

  • Instead of letting that market grow

  • at 2%, which is what it had been growing going into,

  • I let it grow at 6%.

  • I assume that Uber will have in my story local networking

  • benefits.

  • The market share I gave Uber reflected

  • that part of the story.

  • It was a 10% market share, huge relative to the typical car

  • service company then but not a 40% or 50%

  • market share, which would come about if you have

  • global networking benefits.

  • I assumed they'd be able to maintain that 80-20 mix.

  • You're getting 20% for doing nothing,

  • your margins are going to be immense in steady state.

  • I gave them an operating margin of 40% in steady state.

  • And finally, I also assumed that they would never buy the cars,

  • they would never hire the drivers,

  • which means that they can grow relatively easily.

  • So the way I reflected that is for every dollar they invested,

  • they got $5 of revenues.

  • To give you a contrast, for a typical US

  • company, every dollar you invest brings $2 in revenues.

  • I gave them $5.

  • Every part of my story has become a number.

  • If I take those numbers, the valuation does itself.

  • So when you look at the actual spreadsheet,

  • it looks like a spreadsheet, but if you

  • point to a number in the spreadsheet and say,

  • why is Uber making what it is in year 10,

  • my answer is never going to be, because I used a 10% revenue

  • growth for the first five years and 7% thereafter.

  • Its going to be because they're an urban car service company

  • with local networking benefits.

  • Every number in this valuation will

  • reflect a part of my story.

  • And if you read through the numbers,

  • we come up with a value.

  • The value that I came up with for Uber in June of 2014

  • was $6 billion.

  • What is the story that attracted my attention?

  • The "Wall Street Journal" story that

  • said they were priced at $71 billion, right?

  • So 15 minutes after I post this on my blog,

  • I get a call from a "Wall Street Journal" reporter.

  • She must have been just hanging out looking for this post.

  • She said, I've noticed the valuation you put up of Uber

  • and you came up with $6 billion.

  • I said, yes.

  • she said, you do know that venture capitalists

  • have priced it at $17 billion?

  • I said, yes.

  • She said, how do you explain the $17 billion?

  • I said, I don't have to.

  • I didn't pay it.

  • I've never felt the urge to go around explaining

  • what other people do.

  • So all you can do a valuation is have your story and your value.

  • It's not my job to sell you on that value.

  • I'm not a salesperson, I'm not an equity research analyst.

  • I'm not asking you to sell short on Uber,

  • I'm not saying don't buy Uber.

  • I'm saying I wouldn't buy Uber.

  • And I'm entitled to make my choices.

  • So my story has become a valuation.

  • I did the same thing with Ferrari

  • and here's how my exclusive club story rolled out.

  • Because it's an exclusive club, I

  • had to give them low revenue growth, only 4% a year.

  • Could they grow faster?

  • Absolutely.

  • But I can't let them grow faster in my story.

  • The bad news is revenue growth is going to stay low.

  • The good news is I'm going to continue

  • to give them these hefty margins, 18% margins.

  • And I'm going to give them a low cost to capital

  • because they're selling to people

  • who are so rich that they don't feel

  • the effects of the economy.

  • The value that I came up with for Ferrari

  • was 6.3 billion euros.

  • It actually went public at about 7.5 billion,

  • it danced around six billion.

  • It's kind of settled in now.

  • But this was my story playing out as a valuation.

  • Last piece and then we'll kind of open to questions.

  • As I said, you finish a valuation,

  • you feel pretty good about your valuation

  • because it's your story of value.

  • And as I said, the best thing to do

  • is actually put it in places where

  • people who don't agree with you will read it.

  • And I got incredibly lucky with my Uber post

  • because it got picked up in four very different places.

  • The first was a site called 538.

  • Are you familiar with 538?

  • It's where numbers geeks go to hang out

  • because they apply statistics and numbers to everything.

  • It's like money ball and everything.

  • The second place it got picked up was the Forbes blog.

  • Who reads the Forbes blog?

  • People who are geriatric investors who are basically old

  • time value investors.

  • The third place it got picked up was Tech Crunch.

  • You know who reads Tech Crunch.

  • And finally, the final place it got picked up

  • was this blog called the Ride-Sharing Guy.

  • It's a guy who actually writes for Uber and Lyft drivers.

  • There are actually enough of them

  • that he can write a blog just for them.

  • I got four very different sets of reactions to my blog post.

  • The people in 538 nitpicked.

  • They said, why did you use a 10% chance of failure?

  • Why not a 9.96%?

  • This is how numbers geeks think.

  • So I said, why don't you take the spreadsheet--

  • because I put the spreadsheet-- and change the 10% to 9.97%

  • and see what happens.

  • Five minutes later, I get an email,

  • now I see why you used 10%.

  • So all that nitpicking with really no big picture.

  • The Forbes blog people loved it.

  • They said, this is the way they should

  • be valuing companies, those crazy Silicon Valley people.

  • I ignored the Forbes blog.

  • No point going there and getting patted on the back saying,

  • this is amazing.

  • The Tech Crunch people absolutely hated it.

  • They said, how dare you value one of ours with your d.c.f.

  • We don't do that in Silicon Valley.

  • I got this wave of abuse.

  • And in addition to the wave of abuse,

  • I got some things about this business I wouldn't have known.

  • I'm not a tech person, I don't want to be a tech person.

  • I'm not a ride-sharing expert.

  • Remember, I hadn't even heard of ride-sharing

  • until June of 2014.

  • So there were things about the business

  • that I would never have known if I hadn't read those posts.

  • And finally, from the Ride-Sharing Guy,

  • I had some very interesting things about the 80-20 mix.

  • They said, this is unusual.

  • Uber doesn't get to keep 20% because they kick it back.

  • They pay us $1,500 to switch from Lyft.

  • And I would never have found this

  • out by talking to Uber's top management, right?

  • Because they want to preserve the illusion

  • for the investors of its 20%.

  • In fact, that's what they said even in the most

  • recent announcement.

  • They said, we're still keeping 20%.

  • Then how the heck are you losing $4 billion on a $6 billion

  • revenue?

  • The numbers don't gel, right?

  • And it all came to fruition while I

  • was sitting waiting for a flight to Munich

  • and I get an email from Bill Gurley.

  • I knew who he was.

  • And the email says, I read your post on Uber

  • and I did not like it and I've written my own post

  • to counter your post, a blog post to blog post warfare, very

  • new age.

  • He said, I've said some mean things about you.

  • I just want to let you know.

  • I close the email.

  • I have an hour and a half left for my flight,

  • so guess where I go next.

  • I go Above the Crowd, which is Bill's blog,

  • and right there on the top, it says,

  • "Damodaran Misses by a Mile."

  • Get it, Uber driving, misses by a mile.

  • And he took issue with every part of my story.

  • He said, Uber is not just a car service company,

  • it's a logistics company.

  • Words have consequences, right?

  • Because all of a sudden, what have you done?

  • You've expanded your business to be car service, it's moving,

  • it's delivery.

  • He said, it's not just urban, it's going to be everywhere.

  • He gave examples of suburban services

  • that they were going to offer.

  • And he talked about how they were

  • going to connect with airlines and credit card companies

  • so that when you flew to Jakarta on United, before they drag you

  • off the plane you'd get a little Uber thing at the bottom

  • where you could click the Uber and say,

  • when I land in Jakarta, I get-- so basically, you

  • want to connect with airlines and have your credit

  • card already on there so your local networking

  • benefits become global benefits.

  • I was fascinated by the story.

  • In fact, right after I read the story, I took his story

  • and put it into numbers.

  • And it's easy to do.

  • The $100 billion becomes a $300 billion

  • total market if you make it a logistics market.

  • The 10% market share becomes a 40% market

  • share, the $6 billion value becomes a $53 billion value.

  • And then I said, you know what?

  • Those ride-sharing drivers told me that 20% is fake,

  • so I replaced the 20% with 10% because if that's

  • the true margin, I should be putting it in.

  • And that reduced the value to about $29 billion.

  • You're saying, does this mean any number goes?

  • No.

  • That's not what I would take out of this.

  • But your story drives your valuations.

  • If you're a start-up entrepreneur,

  • the way you describe your company

  • can make a huge difference in what people walk out

  • of the room willing to pay.

  • So in fact, in December of 2014, I basically

  • took this in a blog post-- and you're welcome to visit this--

  • and I let people pick what they thought

  • about Uber, what kind of company is it, what kind of networking

  • benefits.

  • And at the end of the blog, I essentially

  • put a list of values ranging from less than $1 billion

  • to over $90 billion, depending on your story.

  • And with young companies, that should always be the case.

  • You'll have vast disagreements among people

  • because of your story.

  • And in fact, it's what, two and a half,

  • three years later with Uber and you're still

  • getting a big set of disagreements

  • about what the stories are.

  • There are obviously people who think it's worth $100 billion

  • and there are people that think it's worth nothing.

  • And this is what makes it so fascinating, a story in motion.

  • So as you go through this process, one final point.

  • You finish the story, don't rest too long because the world

  • changes around you.

  • There are macro shifts happening.

  • The French election tomorrow could change your story

  • about not just every French company,

  • but about every global company.

  • You have macro stuff going on, you have micro stuff going on.

  • Every time a company reports earnings

  • or announces an acquisition, it's changing its story

  • and your job, in a sense, is to bring it into your valuation.

  • And your stories can break, they can shift, or they can change.

  • Broken stories are stories where your story just blows apart.

  • An example would be Aereo.

  • Remember the company that said they'd

  • come up with a way of streaming things to your device?

  • You could watch cable channels on your device

  • without paying cable fees.

  • Sounds too good to be true, right?

  • And it turned out that in June of 2014,

  • the Supreme Court found that what they were doing

  • was illegal.

  • Overnight, the company essentially

  • went from being a billion dollar company to nothing.

  • That's a story break.

  • A story shift isn't the same story, but it can be small.

  • I've told the same story about Apple for the last six years,

  • which is it's the most incredible cash

  • machine in history that derives almost all of its value

  • from the smartphone business.

  • And that business is maturing with margins

  • that are going to come under pressure over time.

  • That's the same story I told in 2012.

  • My valuation for Apple hasn't shifted very much,

  • but the price goes up and down.

  • And that's part of investing.

  • And you can have story changes, where a company convinces you

  • that they can do stuff you never thought they could do.

  • My valuation for Facebook has gone from $30 per share

  • when they went public to almost $90 per share

  • because every time they show me they

  • could do things I didn't think they could do,

  • I have to revisit my story and change it.

  • It makes investing in valuation a lot

  • more fun if you think about these valuations

  • not as spreadsheets and numbers, but as stories

  • that evolve over time.

  • And if you're an entrepreneur, your job

  • is to nurture that story and make it bigger over time.

  • And if you're an investor, it's to be

  • skeptical about that story and push back.

  • And if you're an outsider, to just observe

  • what's happening in the stories and attach

  • a number to those stories.

  • That's it.

  • If there are any questions you have, I'd be glad to answer.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • AUDIENCE: I have a question about the online advertising

  • business.

  • Is in the top 10 worst businesses?

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: No.

  • No, it's not.

  • It's actually-- you know it's a profitable business.

  • The only thing is there are only two giants in the room

  • sucking up all the profits--

  • one is you, the other is Facebook.

  • For the rest of the world, it's become a bad business.

  • And you're responsible for-- and that's

  • your job is to make it a good business for you

  • and a bad business for the rest of the world.

  • And you've succeeded beyond your wildest imaginations.

  • And I think that's what the--

  • last year if you look at the growth in this business,

  • I think 60% of the growth came from just Facebook and Google.

  • So it is a profitable business, but it's a very skewed profit.

  • The two companies at the top get almost all of the profits,

  • the rest don't even get the droppings off the table.

  • They're like Twitter, they basically have revenues

  • but they can't show profits.

  • AUDIENCE: What about the partners

  • that we have in the ecosystem-- the agencies, the marketers?

  • Where do you see them moving as you

  • said the industry seems to consolidate

  • around Google and Facebook?

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: I think they're more commoditized.

  • They're not going to make the margins that they do.

  • They will be profitable, but you're not

  • going to let them become too profitable because if they

  • make excess profits, you know what your job is, right?

  • It's to mop it up and take it back into the parent company.

  • So you're like a parent spaceship

  • that essentially is watching all these other little ships.

  • You look too prosperous, we're going to-- so again, there's

  • nothing amoral.

  • That's the nature of business is if you're creating the value,

  • you want to claim that value.

  • So I think your ecosystem will survive,

  • but there will never be the prosperous mother ship

  • that you have as a company because that's what's

  • creating all those revenues.

  • AUDIENCE: Measurement it's a big part of that business,

  • so teaching brands that online advertising is valuable,

  • how do we do a better job of using the kinds of narratives

  • that you talked about today?

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: I think that ultimately, it's

  • the richness of the data that lets you convince them.

  • Because right now you can show people

  • that they're clicking on--

  • I think it's easier for you than it is for Facebook,

  • for instance, because you have a search engine that people

  • go through.

  • It's much more direct to say, this

  • is how you landed on a site is through us.

  • I think that increasingly, you're

  • going to start seeing people ask questions about,

  • oh, people are clicking on it but are they

  • actually buying stuff on it?

  • And as the data gets richer, you'll

  • be able to answer the question.

  • And sometimes you might not like the answers

  • you have to give your--

  • so it's not always going to be good news.

  • So you will have to learn from what works

  • and what doesn't to kind of adapt, modify, which

  • you probably already are doing.

  • AUDIENCE: My question is in doing number

  • crunching or forming the narrative,

  • I guess in these two examples it felt

  • like the background was assuming competent companies

  • and management.

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: Oh, I've told some horror stories, too.

  • AUDIENCE: OK.

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: So read my story about Valeant.

  • AUDIENCE: Yeah.

  • So how do you account for Uber has

  • a misogynist toxic culture or United's assaulting

  • their passenger?

  • How do you account for lack of conversion

  • that a company just can't achieve their--

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: That's actually a very good point.

  • Uber has this combination of being aggressive--

  • they've always been an aggressive company that's

  • broken every rule in the book and they've succeeded with it.

  • But in a sense, it's also their biggest weakness.

  • In fact, the best way to see this play out

  • is I have a story about Lyft in the book.

  • And if you think about Lyft, I describe

  • Lyft like you know how in bike racing if you're a racer,

  • you actually want to hang out behind the lead racer

  • because he or she picks up the wind resistance?

  • Lyft is like the rider who hangs out behind Uber.

  • So Uber is the one who does the wind resistance,

  • goes after the regulators.

  • Lyft says, we're the good guys, we're the good guys,

  • we're the good guys.

  • It's actually an interesting different story, right?

  • It's a much less ambitious story.

  • It's a story where you keep your head down and say,

  • we're the good guys.

  • And they're going to do things very conspicuously to show

  • that they're the good guys.

  • You saw that in the last few weeks, right?

  • You're the bad guys, we're the good guys.

  • It's actually interesting, but the good guys don't always

  • win in these stories.

  • That's, I think, the other thing is sometimes

  • this aggressive toxic culture might actually

  • be what ends up winning.

  • So unlike novels, where you can make the good guys win,

  • sometimes the bad guys win in these stories

  • and it becomes part of the value of the business.

  • So in that sense, justice doesn't always prevail

  • and morality doesn't always win out.

  • It is investing, right?

  • But I do tell stories about--

  • I mean, I don't enjoy them as much-- about companies

  • that are horror stories.

  • I mean, I've been telling the story about Valeant

  • for the last two years of a company that

  • fell from grace, right?

  • It's a reverse Cinderella story.

  • It starts off with this--

  • you start off in the castle, you end up cleaning the chimneys.

  • And I think it's fascinating sometimes watching

  • horror stories unfold because you

  • can see the behavioral and the psychological issues that

  • play into these valuations.

  • SPEAKER 1: So one of the questions

  • was regarding a company which in your blog posts

  • you call the "Field of Dreams" company.

  • The question is, growing revenues,

  • the earnings are maybe shown, not shown,

  • but the cash flows are there.

  • And a lot of that is still driven

  • by changes in working capital.

  • So for those of you who don't know, I'm talking about Amazon.

  • The question is, how do you look at a company like that

  • and what do you think about it?

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: You know I call it the "Field of Dreams"

  • company, right?

  • Seen "Field of Dreams?"

  • Kevin Costner builds this baseball field

  • in the middle of nowhere and people

  • ask him, what are you, crazy?

  • Why are you building a baseball field in the middle of nowhere?

  • And remember what he said, if I build it, they will come.

  • That to me is--

  • when I think about Amazon, that is the message

  • that Jeff Bezos has been sending right from day one.

  • If you get a chance, go check out the letter

  • that Jeff wrote about Amazon in 1997.

  • You know where I found it?

  • I found it in Google search, so you can find it, too.

  • It's actually an incredible letter

  • because it lays out what he was going to do at Amazon.

  • He said, at Amazon we're going to go for revenues first

  • and then after we've built the revenues,

  • they will come, the profits.

  • That's the story told in '97 and he's

  • told the same story for 20 years.

  • And he's acted consistently with that story.

  • You know what I mean by acted consistently?

  • How many people here have Amazon Prime?

  • What do you pay for it?

  • $99.

  • Do you know what it costs Amazon to service every Prime member?

  • About $400.

  • That's crazy, why would you do that?

  • If you build it, they will come.

  • What is he building with Amazon Prime?

  • He's building this block of consumers

  • who are addicted to Amazon, for lack

  • of a better word, Who don't even know what a retail store looks

  • like anymore.

  • And one of these days, he's coming for you.

  • So don't be surprised if a third nine pops up

  • after the first two nines and you have nothing you can do,

  • because where are you going to go?

  • Everything else will be out of business by then.

  • So the conspiratorial view about Amazon

  • is he's building a business where ultimately, he's

  • going to get you.

  • And that explains the $700, $800, $900 per share.

  • The problem there is it is a business where

  • keeping newcomers out, new ways of doing business,

  • is going to be tough to do.

  • So the challenge here is what if that doesn't happen?

  • Well, you could end up growing revenues

  • and never being able to deliver the profits.

  • So it's, again, a fascinating case study of how

  • if you can tell a consistent story.

  • Because people often say, markets are short-term.

  • You heard that probably in Silicon Valley.

  • What short-term market would let a company go for 20 years

  • without making a profit and keep pushing up their market cap?

  • To me Amazon is the perfect counter-example

  • of if you can tell a consistent story,

  • markets will cut you a heck of a lot of slack.

  • You know why they don't do it for most companies?

  • Because the story keeps changing every year.

  • The top management is incapable of telling the same story

  • over time and then the market says, we don't trust you.

  • So the other lesson that I think you get out of Amazon

  • is if you're building a business,

  • you're telling a story, don't keep swinging like a weather

  • vane to whatever works.

  • You have to have a consistent story,

  • you have to act consistently with that story.

  • And you'll be surprised at how much slack you

  • get cut because of that.

  • SPEAKER 1: Professor, before we get to a specific question,

  • there's one question that we generally

  • ask of all the guests, and this is mostly

  • not only for this audience, but also

  • for your audience on YouTube.

  • You've written this fantastic book, in addition to others.

  • What are some books that you have found

  • useful that are generally underappreciated?

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: Generally underappreciated.

  • I thought you would ask me what my favorite book was because I

  • was going to revealed my number crunching

  • roots and you that my favorite book is "Moneyball."

  • That tells you where I--

  • and I think it's--

  • but I think in terms of underappreciated books,

  • I think that I learn a lot more about investing

  • in valuation from non-business books

  • than I do from business books.

  • It, again, goes to the storytelling.

  • I need to build my storytelling side.

  • I don't know whether you've ever read,

  • there's a book written by an insider at Pixar.

  • It's a book I absolutely love because it

  • taught me things about storytelling

  • that I did not know, things--

  • because let's face it, if I can tell a story like "Toy Story,"

  • I'm going to be able to sell incredible businesses, right?

  • So I read diverse things.

  • I read fairy tales, I read--

  • I mean, I love serial killer books

  • because they always end badly.

  • But I think in a sense, I get my stuff

  • from all kinds of different places.

  • AUDIENCE: So there are some companies

  • that need external capital at the beginning,

  • like Tesla, right?

  • For those companies, they're actually

  • more valuable if they are priced higher because the capital will

  • be very low, right?

  • If they are priced at $2 trillion,

  • again, issue the stocks very cheaply

  • and they get any money they want.

  • And it also applies to real state investment trusts.

  • How do you put that in your valuation?

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: OK.

  • The first thing to remember is you don't set the price,

  • the market does.

  • So if you can get them to give you a high pricing,

  • it does make your life easier.

  • I mean, you hear this word cash burn thrown around Silicon

  • Valley all the time, right?

  • Cash burn basically means you have negative cash flows

  • up front because you need that cash flow to grow.

  • And you have cash burn, you need capital to cover the cash flow.

  • You can't survive as a company.

  • And if you're priced high, the advantage

  • is you can raise that capital at a very advantageous price.

  • So here is, in fact, what it plays out as.

  • For these companies, there's actually an incentive

  • to tell really, really big stories

  • up front, right, because big stories get the big prices.

  • The pricing allows you then to cover the capital.

  • There will be a letdown at some point

  • because people are going to say, well, that story never

  • was going to work.

  • And then you get all kinds of disappointment kicking in.

  • I might be hitting too close to home,

  • but anybody ever hear of Juicera?

  • I've been reading the story about Juicera

  • and I said, what kind of story would you need to tell me

  • for me to invest in it?

  • How many people would pay $400 for a juicer that's--

  • I mean, it's a very small market.

  • So if you were telling that story

  • and I was assuming a market of 50 million Americans buying,

  • it's a story that doesn't fly.

  • But if you could push the story bigger, you'd push pricing up.

  • It allows you to raise capital to cover your cash burn needs.

  • So that's something to remember.

  • I don't think that's Elon Musk's rationale.

  • I think he just likes telling really big stories

  • and making them bigger over time.

  • But I think for some start-ups, I think part of this is a game.

  • If you can push your pricing up, it actually makes it easier.

  • It greases the skids for you while you have

  • those early years of cash burn.

  • SPEAKER 1: Don't hit me for asking this,

  • I'm just the messenger here.

  • How do you decide when there was something

  • wrong with your estimate of value and the price

  • to value divergence stays on for an extended period?

  • What are some examples that you can share with us?

  • Could you talk a little bit about your investing

  • in Valeant and Twitter and so on.

  • And again, I'm just the messenger.

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: As I said, one of the things

  • I find that gets in the way of good investing

  • is I tell people the three words that you

  • need to be able to say openly in investing is, I was wrong.

  • Because once you say that, it frees you from your own story.

  • Because as long as you're not willing to say that,

  • you're going to find ways to kind of take

  • your old story that it's not wrong, this part of it--

  • it's somebody else's fault. I have absolutely no qualms

  • about accepting the fact that I'm wrong

  • and I'm horribly wrong sometimes and it's not my fault.

  • That's what allows me to get away with it.

  • It's not my fault in the sense there

  • are things happening around that I really can't control.

  • So when I'm wrong, I have to look at what portion of it

  • was my fault and what portion of it is out of my control.

  • With Valle, here's what happened.

  • I bought Valle and Brazil went to hell

  • in a handbasket in the year after I bought Valle.

  • You say, why didn't he predict that?

  • If I had been able to predict it,

  • there were a lot easier ways to make money

  • than to go out and buy--

  • I could have sold short in Brazilian bonds.

  • It was out of mind control.

  • I call this the karmic moment in investing.

  • You've heard of karma, right?

  • Basically, karma means there are some things that

  • are going to happen, nothing that you and I can do

  • can change that.

  • You've got to accept that on Valle I was wrong,

  • but there's nothing I could have done about it.

  • With Valeant I was wrong and it was partly my fault.

  • And here's what I missed in Valeant.

  • For those of you not familiar with Valeant,

  • Valeant built its reputation as an uncommon pharmaceutical

  • company by going out and acquiring other drug companies

  • and doing something that is morally and ethically

  • questionable.

  • They would take underpriced drugs and reprice them.

  • You know what that means, right?

  • So you're a company which is at a--

  • let's say you're heart drug that's been around,

  • it's been patented for eight years.

  • They're charging $50 a dose.

  • It serves only like 7,000 people.

  • And Valeant said, those people will pay $5,000.

  • They need it to live.

  • They raised prices.

  • They did incredibly well for a period.

  • But that story was a story that worked only as long as they

  • stayed under the radar, right?

  • Because this is not exactly a story

  • you're going to tell openly--

  • we buy other companies, we take their drugs,

  • we increase the price 50% or 500% or 5000%.

  • So when Valeant came apart, it was

  • because they got too ambitious.

  • They got too big.

  • They bought Salix, an $18 billion company.

  • When they tried to raise the price of the drugs,

  • people noticed.

  • And the minute that happened, the whole company unraveled.

  • It dropped from $200 down to $32.

  • And I bought it at $32 saying, look,

  • there's still enough value in the company.

  • You know what I missed is this company did so

  • much damage to its reputation.

  • We talk about corporate sustainability.

  • It taught me a lesson about why corporate sustainability

  • has a place in Valeant.

  • They had done so much damage to their reputation

  • that nobody trusted them.

  • Because I assumed that they would become

  • an old fashioned drug company.

  • But to become an old fashioned drug company,

  • what do you have to do?

  • You have to build an R&D department,

  • you've got to hire scientists.

  • Let me ask you a question.

  • You're a scientist, I'm Valeant.

  • I come and say, do you want a job at Valeant?

  • What's your reaction?

  • I've heard about you guys, I'm not coming there.

  • So they're having trouble building their business.

  • They try to sell a portion of the business.

  • I'm Valeant, I try to sell a portion of my business to you.

  • What's your reaction?

  • You guys are liars.

  • I don't trust anything you do.

  • So what I missed in the case of Valeant

  • is the damage that they had done to their reputation that

  • makes it almost impossible for them to be a going concern.

  • That damage cost me, what, 60% of my investment in Valeant.

  • But it's a lesson that I can use when I think

  • about other damaged companies.

  • So would I buy United after the billion dollars?

  • Maybe.

  • Here's why.

  • It's a damaged company, but it's in a business

  • where they're all damaged.

  • There but for the grace of God goes Delta, right?

  • Don't assume that Delta would not have dragged you off.

  • Maybe they'd have dragged you off a little more gently, OK?

  • This is a business-- and that's why I bought Volkswagen after

  • the--

  • because I looked at Volkswagen and said, hey,

  • do you think only Volkswagen does this stuff?

  • They all do it.

  • You've knocked down the value of Volkswagen 24%.

  • So it's a game I've played before.

  • But in the case of Valeant, I got

  • this warning sign of sometimes a company

  • can step across the line so much that coming back over

  • is going to be really tough to do.

  • And the other thing is a mistake will

  • cost you a lot less if you don't have half your money invested

  • in the mistake.

  • So this is actually a pushback against what you sometimes

  • hear from value investors which is don't spread their bets,

  • buy four great companies.

  • I have never believed that advice.

  • That's hubris to think that somehow you've

  • got these four winners forever.

  • So to me, the reason I keep any investment I make at 10%

  • or below my portfolio is because I know I can make mistakes

  • and I have to be aware of that.

  • SPEAKER 1: What does your typical positions always

  • look like?

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: I would say on entry about 5%.

  • If it does well, if will get to 10%; if it does badly,

  • it takes care of itself, it goes away from my portfolio.

  • So Valeant is no longer 5% of my portfolio.

  • So it's really the stocks that do well that I have to nurture.

  • And in fact, with Apple this will

  • played out over a 15-year period because I bought Apple in 1998

  • and I bought it as a charitable contribution.

  • Because I loved Apple so much.

  • It looked like it was going out of business

  • and this was going to be my final contribution,

  • look how much I loved you.

  • Here, take the $14.

  • It turned out to be the best investment I ever made.

  • Sometimes shows you that your best investments don't

  • come from all your intrinsic value stuff,

  • it comes from your charitable contribution.

  • The problem with Apple is did so well

  • that it kept pushing into that 10%.

  • I left about half the profits I'd

  • have made on Apple on the table because I had to keep selling.

  • And I have no regrets for doing it

  • because that's what I need to do to be disciplined.

  • And one of the things I've discovered is if I--

  • the way I do this is I automate it.

  • Do you know what I mean by automate it?

  • I have limit sells on every single investment

  • in my portfolio that I have put in before it happens.

  • Because if I wait for it to happen and then I say,

  • should I sell it now, I find delusional ways of saying,

  • this time is different, this stock

  • is going to keep going up.

  • So sometimes lots of time you've got

  • to realize that you can't trust yourself.

  • You essentially have to automate the process

  • to take it out of your hands.

  • SPEAKER 1: So we were talking about your limit order

  • on Apple before, and I think it would

  • be nice for the audience to maybe share

  • some of that conversation.

  • But I found it very interesting.

  • So you had an estimate of intrinsic value

  • and once it hit, the limit order executed for Apple.

  • My question to you was, if the price then

  • goes below that price, are you going to buy again?

  • In other words, how do you think or quantify

  • the margin of safety and how do you differentiate

  • buying and selling?

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: When I bought Apple, I got lucky.

  • I bought Apple at $94, I put a limit sell at $140,

  • and it executed so Apple is out of my portfolio.

  • I've bought Apple four times and I've

  • sold Apple four times in the last six years.

  • Why?

  • Because my value stayed stable, but here's

  • what happens to Apple.

  • A new iPhone comes out, revenues jump 8%, people start dancing

  • in the streets.

  • It's a growth company again.

  • They push up the price too much and then

  • four quarters later, their revenues

  • drop because the iPhone is aging and people

  • are convinced that this is the end, they sell Apple off.

  • So it's almost like your taking advantage

  • of a manic depressive, which is what the market is-- manic,

  • I sell to it, and it's depressed, I buy from it.

  • My rule of thumb, though, in investing

  • is I want to buy when I feel that a stock is undervalued.

  • And when I value a stock, I come up with a point estimate.

  • But that's, again, hubris, right?

  • Because I made assumptions.

  • The assumptions were revenues will grow 7%.

  • But if you push me, I'd say, well, you know what?

  • They probably can grow 5% to 9%.

  • So over the last few years, I've taken

  • to using Monte Carlo simulations in my valuation,

  • partly because it forces me to be honest about how uncertain I

  • am and then it forces me to be specific about how uncertain I

  • am.

  • And I get a distribution of value,

  • that becomes my basis for deciding when to buy.

  • So I'm not going to buy Apple when it drops to $139.

  • My value is $140.

  • It dropping to $139, I'm still with--

  • if you look at this distribution,

  • I'm so close to my expected value.

  • So by having a distribution, I can look up a trigger point

  • and say--

  • and I have to set the trigger.

  • It has to be at least 80% undervalue

  • to kick in, which would be about $124 to $122 for Apple.

  • That becomes the basis that I think

  • about both buying and selling is in terms of distributions,

  • not in terms of point estimates.

  • SPEAKER 1: So do we have one live question

  • from the audience?

  • Yeah.

  • AUDIENCE: So this actually echoes--

  • I guess you mentioned a Monte Carlo simulation.

  • I actually did a Monte Carlo simulation

  • for my PhD and part of my feeling

  • is just that all of the assimilation--

  • simulations, number crunching, storytelling--

  • all of this is assumptions that goes into it, right?

  • And it echoes the uncertainty, the prediction part

  • you're talking about.

  • At the end of the day, how do I know

  • I made the right assumption?

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: The word you used was know.

  • You never know.

  • And that's something that-- and that's

  • I said one of the biggest problems

  • that number crunchers have is a psychological barrier you've

  • got to overcome, which is we're so used at the end of a math

  • problem to checking the answer and saying,

  • I know I got it right.

  • Look, I can check it.

  • That's why accounting is so much more comfortable

  • to do than valuation, right?

  • Balance sheets have to balance.

  • It balanced, I'm done.

  • The problem in valuation, you get done with a valuation,

  • and you look at it and say, how do I know I'm right?

  • I'll tell you the answer, you don't.

  • And you have to be OK with it.

  • There is no confirmation mechanism that I can offer you.

  • That's why I used the word faith.

  • What's the essence of faith?

  • Why do you go to church every week or temple every week?

  • It's because you have faith that God exists.

  • You say, prove it to me.

  • I can prove it.

  • The same thing applies in investing.

  • If you ask me, prove to me that valuation works.

  • I don't have proof, I have faith.

  • And I can't pass that faith onto you.

  • So when I teach my valuation class,

  • I tell people, at the end of this class

  • you have to decide for yourself whether this works for you.

  • I can teach you how to value a company,

  • but I can't give you faith.

  • That's got to come from within.

  • Maybe you will develop faith, maybe you will not.

  • And if you don't develop faith, it's not the end of the world.

  • You can buy ETFs and index funds and you'll be perfectly happy.

  • And here is my definition of faith,

  • and it's going to sound morbid.

  • I ask people who are active investors,

  • let's say you get to the age of 85, you're on your deathbed--

  • I told you it was a morbid thought--

  • and I come to you with some statistics.

  • I say, look, over the last 60 years,

  • you've been doing valuation and picking stocks

  • and you made 8.13% a year.

  • This is cruel and unusual to somebody on their deathbed.

  • And then I say, you know what, if you

  • had put your money in ETFs and index funds

  • over the last 60 years, you would have made 8.22%.

  • So you've spent 60 years of your life

  • doing two hours of research every night

  • and you've essentially made less money than you could have

  • by just putting your money--

  • would you be OK with it?

  • And if your answer is no, I tell people

  • don't do active investing.

  • I'd be OK with it.

  • You know why?

  • Because I enjoy the process so much

  • that even if at the end of the game you told me,

  • you're not going to make any money off this, I would say,

  • I'm OK.

  • I've had lots of fun doing it.

  • And that's, to me, part of the reason the storytelling

  • works is if I were just crunching through spreadsheets,

  • I would drive myself crazy.

  • Because when you do spreadsheets,

  • you want affirmation--

  • I did all this hard work, I tortured myself.

  • I need to be rewarded.

  • And the market says, no, you don't need to be rewarded.

  • I'm going to take away 20%.

  • And your neighbor, who picks stock

  • based on astrological signs, is making millions.

  • You say, this is so unfair.

  • It's the way the world is.

  • So unfortunately, there is no way to know.

  • But that's the part about faith is it might come, it might not.

  • But it's got to come from within.

  • AUDIENCE: And a small quick follow-up question

  • is, when we look at valuation, how do we learn?

  • For instance, if the numbers come back

  • agreeing with my prediction, does it

  • mean that I did a good job?

  • How can I tell which part is my work, which part is not?

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: Here's what I tell myself.

  • When I pick a stock and it goes up, the first thing I say

  • is, I got lucky.

  • And then I say, OK, maybe I did something on the side

  • because luck is the dominant paradigm in this business.

  • There's so much stuff that's out of your control

  • that you really can't do much about.

  • And it helps you both on the plus and the minus side.

  • That's why I can be sanguine about the stocks that go down

  • is you can't be selective.

  • And this is what behavioral finance

  • finds, when something works you want

  • to claim credit by yourself.

  • When something doesn't, what do you do?

  • You blame the rest of the world.

  • I mean, when I talk about taking ownership of your investments,

  • what I'm talking about is taking ownership

  • of both sides of the investments.

  • So we need to behave exactly the same way

  • when we win as we lose.

  • And that's really tough to do.

  • I have to force myself to try to do it

  • and it doesn't come easily to me.

  • SPEAKER 1: You've written about Facebook, about Amazon,

  • about Apple.

  • Traditional value investing has generally

  • sort of put tech in a certain light because

  • of the risk of, I guess, innovation disruption

  • and whatnot.

  • Do you think over time that has changed and does

  • value investing in technology work well?

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: It should change.

  • And I think part of the problem is

  • we use the word tech to capture this very

  • diverse set of companies now.

  • In the 1980s, if you said tech, I'd have said,

  • young, high growth, risky.

  • Today when you say tech, you're talking about 22%

  • of the market.

  • And you're talking about companies that range

  • the spectrum in life cycle.

  • Intel is tech, but so is Facebook and so is Snap.

  • But what do they share in common?

  • One is a company that's I mean, not quite the walking dead,

  • but if you think about Yahoo, so you

  • can have walking dead tech companies which are essentially

  • looking towards the exit and you can have companies growing.

  • So a couple of years ago, I actually

  • took every tech company in the US and I broke it down by age.

  • It took the founding year and I then looked at the metrics

  • by age.

  • And tech companies age in what I call dog years.

  • Do you know what I mean by dog years?

  • A 20-year-old tech company is like a 140-year-old

  • manufacturing company.

  • Because the old man-- if you look at GM

  • and how long GM and Ford took to go from start-up to mature

  • company, it took them 60 years.

  • They stayed at that cash cow status for about 30

  • and then they went into this long-term decline.

  • A tech company, you look at it, the growth that took 60 years,

  • you do in eight.

  • That's the good news.

  • The bad news is you don't get much of time

  • to enjoy yourself as a cash cow.

  • And then when you start declining,

  • the drop is precipitous.

  • So if you think about life cycles,

  • the life cycle is a much steeper lifestyle.

  • So in tech companies, I think we need

  • to stop talking tech as a collective space

  • and think about some of the best bargains in this market

  • are in the old tech space.

  • I'm talking the Microsofts, the Intels.

  • These are cash cows.

  • Can be disrupted?

  • Sure.

  • So can GM, so can Ford, so can Coca-Cola, so can McDonald's.

  • What makes us think that just because you have a consumer

  • product company, I can't disrupt you?

  • Disruption is part of this process.

  • So to me, ignoring tech because you feel it's too risky

  • means that you're at least 75 years old.

  • Because we have frames of references

  • that come from the 1980s and the '90s

  • that people are still carrying through.

  • I was happy when Warren Buffett finally bought Apple

  • because it's a small step, but for a long time

  • his view was, I don't buy tech companies.

  • In fact, his view was, I don't buy

  • anything I don't understand.

  • And that basically means 80% the world

  • is going to go outside the domain

  • if that's your definition of not being able to invest in things.

  • So I think we need to start breaking tech

  • into old tech, middle aged tech, and young tech.

  • SPEAKER 1: This is a little bit more

  • into accounting because you've written a lot about accounting.

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: I say very nasty things about accounting,

  • so hopefully I don't have to say it [INAUDIBLE].

  • SPEAKER 1: Well, they still invite you

  • to events and to give talks, so I'm hoping all is well.

  • But you've written about reinvestment, growth and return

  • on capital, and how these are connected

  • and you talked about that in your talk as well.

  • The question is about definitions.

  • When you think about return on capital,

  • capital can be defined as equity plus debt minus excess cash.

  • Some people define capital as tangible capital

  • that is used in operating the business.

  • What really drives compounding?

  • Is it the tangible capital and returns

  • on tangible capital or is it how you define it and sort of I

  • guess what I'm asking is what is the difference between the two

  • approaches and how do you make sense of that?

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: The first thing

  • is to stay away from the accounting definition

  • from all of these things.

  • And let me explain what I think about as reinvestment.

  • You want to grow as a company.

  • The question I want to ask you is, what do you

  • have to spend money on to grow?

  • When I ask that of a manufacturing company--

  • what do you have to spend money on, new factories, new plant,

  • new equipment--

  • and old time accounting captures with the capex.

  • You look at a pharmaceutical company,

  • what do you invest in to grow?

  • R&D.

  • And what do accountants do with it?

  • Screw it up big time, right?

  • They treat it as an operating expense.

  • And if I ask a company like Google,

  • what do you have to reinvest to grow,

  • you can already see the accounting definitions are not

  • going to capture what you put money in to grow.

  • You might have to grow by buying young technologies

  • because that's what you need to bring into the space.

  • So one of the things we need to do

  • is stop getting focused on what does the accountant call capex.

  • Because that's not going to capture what

  • I want to call capex at a company like Google.

  • Because that's the only way for me to be rational in the way

  • I think about valuing these companies.

  • If you're a consulting company, what do you

  • have to invest in to grow?

  • Human capital.

  • So those recruiting and training expenses that you have,

  • some of that at least should be treated like capex.

  • So my definition of capex is not going

  • to match an accountant's definition of capex

  • because my definition of capex is driven by how quickly do

  • you want to grow and what do you need to put money in

  • to get that growth?

  • SPEAKER 1: Same thing about capital,

  • like tangible capital versus--

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: Same thing.

  • Once you make that definition.

  • My invested capital at a company like Google

  • will require me to capitalize R&D, right?

  • Because if you put money in R&D and I

  • do what the accountants do, it will never shop as--

  • SPEAKER 1: What about goodwill and non-operating assets

  • and stuff like that?

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: Goodwill is kind of a useless area.

  • It's the most dangerous variable ever created

  • because it shows up when you do an acquisitions

  • and accountants-- it's a plug variable.

  • SPEAKER 1: So you would not count it.

  • ASWATH DAMODARAN: I wouldn't count it

  • as part of invested capital, simply because you could

  • consistently keep [INAUDIBLE].

  • Because goodwill captures future growth, it captures stupidity,

  • it captures premiums you're paying.

  • It captures everything you do over and above that book value.

  • So to me goodwill is a non-asset, right?

  • SPEAKER 1: OK.

  • Thank you so much for humoring us

  • with our questions and your valuable time and talk.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • Thank you so much.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

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