Subtitles section Play video Print subtitles [MUSIC PLAYING] SPEAKER 1: Hello, everyone. Aswath Damodaran is here and I couldn't be more pleased because I have learned a lot about investment valuation from just reading his blogs. I think he is one person who has single-handedly made investment valuation open source and available to all of us. In addition to his original classroom at NYU, he also has a virtual classroom on YouTube of tens of thousands of students spread all over the world. And one thing I really admire about Aswath is that he does not shy away from discussing current ideas and let them be examined over time in real time. He's also somebody who has been very open and transparent about sharing investment mistakes, which you don't really see in the investment community in general. I think they're the really special thing about professor is that he brings the side of an academic and bridges it all the way to that of a practitioner and does it in a very open, candid way. He's written phenomenal books about investing and today he is here to discuss with us the latest in the edition of books, which is "Narrative and Numbers." So without any further ado, I am very delighted, please join me in welcoming Professor Aswath Damodaran. ASWATH DAMODARAN: Thank you. [APPLAUSE] So let me start with a story. I came to NYU in 1986, that was when I was hired as an assistant professor. And I was given a class to teach called security analysis, which is an old class with a collection of topics that I chose to replace with a valuation class. I actually didn't tell them I was doing it, I just went into the class and made it a valuation class. And that was 1986. This will be my 31st year teaching valuation, my 53rd semester. And everything I know about valuation I've learned in the course of teaching this class. So one of the lessons I'd like to talk about is something I didn't know when I started teaching this class that I had to teach myself. So I'm going to take you on a personal journey on something I had to learn to do better to actually do valuation. So I'm going to start out with a question that I start off every one of my classes. Let me give you a sense of what my classes look like. I have a typical class of about 300. It's an MBA class, it's about 300 people who walk into the room. And if you're familiar with how MBA programs have evolved, they've become more and more diverse. So I've got not just bankers, but I've got museum directors, I've got ballet dancers and NBA players. In a sense, it's a very diverse classroom. So here's one of the first questions I ask them, and I'm going to start off this session with that question. There's no right answer, don't look at your neighbor. So here's my question. If I asked you to classify yourself as a person, would you more naturally think of yourself as a storyteller or a number cruncher? Think about it for just a moment. What comes more naturally to you, storytelling or number crunching? Howard, I know you've known for a long time, so you probably knew. I'll tell you when I knew. I knew when I was about 13 or 14, right after my first English literature class. And I was asked to read "Moby Dick," and I did. And I was ready for the discussion, ready to talk about whales and captains. So I show up in class ready to talk about whales and captains and there's nary a mention of whales or captains. And about 15 minutes into the session, the instructor says, there was no whale. And so what? I distinctly remember a big black fish going all the way through the book. And then she started talking about hidden meanings in the book and I remember sitting there saying, really? That's what Herman Melville was thinking when he wrote that? And my reaction when I came out of that class was, never again am I going to subject myself to this kind of bullshit. And my life was laid out for me-- it was Algebra I, Algebra II, Algebra III, out of high school. And these were the good old days when you could go to college and not have to deal with the crap you have to do today-- core curriculum, you know where they make you take classes for two years you never want to take. Those days, you could take numbers class, numbers class, numbers class, numbers degree out there. And then you had a numbers job-- you were a banker, an engineer. And after about four years of entering numbers into spreadsheets, you got incredibly bored so what did you do? Come back to business school, you're in that class. About 180 people in my class are number crunchers, recovering number crunchers. But there were people in that literature class who loved this hidden meaning stuff. I've never understood them. They're the poets. My youngest son is a poet. He showed me his first poem and I don't think he's going to show me too many poems after this because he showed me the poem and I said, [INAUDIBLE], I think there's a problem. Aren't the last words supposed to rhyme? He said, Dad, you're not a poet, that's why you don't get this. I said, you're right. But there were people who loved this hidden meaning stuff. They took Literature I, Literature II, Literature III, became history majors at Yale, went to work, and discovered that even Yale history majors don't get paid very much. So after about three years of poverty-stricken lives, they come back to business school, they're the other 120 people in my class. That's roughly speaking what my class breaks down into, 60% number crunchers, 40% storytellers. And once this classification happens, the number crunchers start to preen. They say, what the hell are you guys doing in this class? This is a numbers class, it's a valuation class. And that's when I let them in on what I think is the biggest hidden secret in valuation. Valuation can never be just about the numbers. If you have just a collection of numbers in a spreadsheet, you just have a collection of numbers in a spreadsheet. To me valuation, is a bridge between stories and numbers. And let me explain what I mean by that. When you show me a valuation, I point to a number and ask you, why is that number what it is, I need your story. And when you tell me a story about a company, about great management, about a brand name and I say, what does that story mean, I need to hear a number. Good valuations bridge that divide. And it is what-- I mean, I know this word is going to sound strange in the context of valuation. The story is what gives soul to your valuation. A valuation, that's a spreadsheet. The story is what gives your valuation a soul. And here's where my personal journey begins. I started teaching the valuation class in '86. And when I first started teaching it, I taught it as a number cruncher does, which is what? All numbers all the time. When in doubt, add an equation. You're in further doubt, add two equations. That's how number crunchers think. And about six years into the process, I discovered I had no faith in my own valuations, another word you don't see in the context of valuations, right? And here's what I mean about faith in your own valuations. When you value a company, especially if you're not being paid to do the valuation, why do we value companies? It's not because we're intellectually curious. I don't lie awake and say, I wonder what Facebook is worth right now. If you do, see a psychiatrist. I value companies because I want to act on those valuations in what sense? If I find something to be undervalued, I need to be able to buy that stock, right? And what I discovered about six years into this process was I could value a company, but I wasn't willing to act because I knew it's a collection of numbers. I knew how easily I could make those numbers move if I wanted to, make that revenue growth from-- I could hide my biases all over the place and you would never find it. That's when I started thinking about what am I missing? And what I found I was missing was the capacity to tell a story. So what I'd like to do is take you on this journey because if you're a number cruncher, you have some delusions to overcome and if you're a storyteller, you have your own set of delusions. So let me ask this room that question, how many of you are natural number crunchers? So let me list some delusions. Let's see if we share these delusions. The first is the delusion of precision. The way I describe this is when a number cruncher is in doubt, you know what he or she does? Adds decimals. It makes you feel much better, right? Three decimals, maybe make it five-- delusion of precision. The second is the delusion that you being objective. Why-- I just use numbers, I'm not being biased. And the third is the delusion of being in control. Just because you have a number for something doesn't mean you control it, but it gives you the delusion of control. Those are the number cruncher's delusions. If you're a storyteller, you have your own set of delusions and here are some of those delusions. The first is you think being creative should bring its own reward. I told you such a great story, it should be worth at least $3 billion, right? You think number crunchers dream in black and white, they're incapable of dreaming in color, they have no imaginations. And you love anecdotal evidence. You're like my mother-in-law, and I don't mean that as a compliment. She comes up with the most outlandish conclusions. You wonder, where did that come from? I'll give you an example. About 10 years ago, she mentions in passing that the best car to drive in a snowstorm is a Volkswagen bug, you know the old ones that you could pick up with two errands and move? I said, how do you come up with this? And she told me-- I should never ask her, how do you come up with this because she always tells me. She said 25 years ago she was driving in Lake Tahoe in a Volkswagen bug in a snowstorm. There were two cars in front of her which went off the road and she made it back home. Therefore, a Volkswagen bug is the-- sample size of one. Amazing how you can extrapolate from there. So when I look at my 300 students, I tell them, this is what I hope this class will do for you. I turned to the storytellers first and say, by the end of this class, I hope you learn enough number crunching skills to develop some discipline. Because when you tell stories, you sometimes get carried away, right? You wander across that line between fact and fantasy and you're not even sure that you walked across the line. I hope you develop enough number crunching that you know that you're crossing the line. I hope that you become disciplined storytellers. Then I turn to my number crunchers and say, by the end of this class, I hope you trust your imagination. To me, that is the essence of somebody who's good at valuation, disciplined storytellers or imaginative number crunchers. So let me ask you a final question before we move on. Who do you think I have more trouble with, getting storytellers to develop discipline or number crunchers to trust their imagination? It's not even close-- number crunchers. You give me 100 history majors, I can teach them enough valuation in a day that they're going to be OK tomorrow. You give me 100 engineers, I'll give up right away. You guys are beyond redemption because you've spent your entire lifetime bludgeoning your imagination into the ground. You don't trust it anymore. So to me, this is the key to valuation is working on your weak side. I know it's a legend about the left brain and the right brain, but if that legend is true that the left brain controls logic and the right brain, why are you using only half a brain? It's tough enough using your entire brain and doing things right. If you trust only half your brain, you're not using the other half. So what I'd like to do is take you on my journey of how I taught myself storytelling. And I'm going to take you through five steps that I go through to get to a valuation. Why five steps? Because I'm a number cruncher, I think linearly. I have to think in steps. If you're not a number cruncher, jumble them all up. It doesn't matter the sequence. So here are the five steps I'm going to take you through. I'm going to start off by telling you a story about a company. And to tell a story about a company, you know what, I need to understand what the company does. If I think Cisco makes vegetable oil, the story I'm going to tell you about Cisco is going to make no sense at all. So that common sense wisdom you're given, you've got to understand a business to value it, that applies in spades. I've got to tell you a story about the company. Second step, I've got to stop and make sure the story I've told is not a fairy tale. I've got to ask three questions-- is it possible, is it plausible, is it probable? Sounds like I'm playing on words, right? Which is the weakest test-- possible, plausible, or probable? Possible. Lots of things are possible. A subset of those are plausible. An even smaller subset are probable. For every 100 business stories I hear, maybe 15 are plausible and five are probable. I'll give you a very simple way of thinking about possible, plausible, and probable. Any San Francisco Giants fans here? Nobody? OK. Any Yankee fans here? I'm a Yankee fan. OK, they're 10 and five right now. I'm feeling very good. Is it possible that they could go 157 and five this season? There are 162 games in a baseball season, you don't know. Is it possible? Yes, it's possible. Is it plausible? No. Why not? No team in history has ever won 147 games in a row, ever. It's possible, but not plausible, and it's definitely not probable. Three different levels of tests. Once I've established that my story is possible, plausible, and probable comes what I call the craft part of valuation. And here's what I mean by the craft part. I have to be able to take every part of my story and make it into a number in my valuation. And you say, what if my story can't become a number? I view it as a challenge when somebody says, I have a variable you can't or I have a story you can't-- you tell me a story, I'll find the number and a valuation to reflect it. And once I convert my story into numbers, the valuation does itself. By the time you look at the valuation, it's my story that's driven the valuation. so if you point to a number in my valuation, I should be able to back it up with the story. And then comes the most difficult part. So you've told this great story, right? Do you like your story? Yeah, of course. It's your story. You've converted the story into a valuation. Do you like your valuation? Absolutely. And when you present that valuation to other people, what do you want them to tell you? This is amazing. This is exactly the way I'll value the company. So here is my advice to you, don't talk to people who think just like you. Don't hang out with people who think just like you because they're going to say, this is amazing. This is exactly how I'd value the company, too. So here's what I call keeping the feedback loop open. Seek out people who think the least like you. When you present your valuation to them, you know what they're going to say, right? This is horrible, this is a stupid way to value a company. Listen because they might be telling you things that can make your story better. So what I'm going to do is take two companies through this process so you can see this game play out. And the two companies I'm going to use I know you're familiar with. And the reason I'm going to pick familiar companies is here's what I'd like you to do. As I tell my story, I'd like you to think about how wrong my story is. So I want you to think about what you disagree with my story, but don't interrupt me. This is my story, my turn. But after I'm done, I'm going to give you an architecture where you can take your story about these companies and make them with your valuations. To me, that is the essence of investing is you take ownership of your own stories. So here are the two companies I'm going to use. The first is Uber in June of 2014. So why does the timing matter? Because my story for Uber shifts over time. Why does it shift? Because the world shifts around me. So I've actually on my blog valued Uber in June of 2014, September of 2015, September of 2016, and I plan to do it again in a month. And my stories change and I have no shame about admitting the fact that my stories change all the time. The second company I'm going to value is Ferrari in October of 2015, just before their initial public offering. Ferrari has actually been around a long time, since the 1940s. But in the 1960s, Enzo Ferrari got into some trouble and he had to sell off 90% of Ferrari to Fiat Chrysler and for about 50 years, Ferrari stayed as a part of Fiat Chrysler, until 2015 when it was spun off as an independent company. So I'm sure everybody in this room is at least familiar with what Uber does and what Ferrari does. So these are stories that should have a hint of familiarity to you. So let's start the game. The first step in the process before I tell a story is I need to understand the company, understand the business. One of my problems with the way research has evolved, it's become too much around financial statements. When I ask you to do research, what do you do? You collect financial statements. And the other thing that's become a problem is Google search because when I ask you to do research, what do you? You type the name of the company, hundreds of articles pop up. That's not a bad place to start, but it should never be the place you end. You know you learn more about a company? Talk to people. Talk to people who use the product, talk to people who work at the company. You need to understand what the company does, what makes it tick, to be able to value it. So I'm going to tell you when I first heard of Uber and when I say this, you're going to laugh. You'll say, you didn't hear about it until then? I heard about Uber in June of 2014. You're saying, what were you doing, living under a rock? I was actually living underground. Because I live in New York City, I take the subway, I never take the surface roads. Because who wants to deal with the traffic? So I see this new story in the "Wall Street Journal" that says Uber has been priced by a venture capitalist at $17 billion. Notice the word I used. I used the word priced, not the word valued. So let me put this on the table. No venture capitalist in history has ever valued anything, they have priced things. It's a very different game because the way you win as a venture capitalist, you buy at a low price, you flip it to somebody else at a high price. They had priced it at $17 billion. And I said I hadn't heard of Uber, but that was a bit of a lie. I'd seen the word Uber on my credit card statements in the three months leading into June of 2014 because it turned out that my son, who was going to college in North Carolina, was using Uber and using my credit card to back it. I don't know how that happened. But I thought he was taking German language classes, to be quite honest. the no umlaut on the U should have kind of given it away. So I called him, but he was still sleeping. It's like 11:30 in the morning, college student hours, which means you go to bed at like 5:00, you wake up at noon. So I called my niece, who worked in Chicago, and she was on her way to work and not in a good mood. So I said, what's this Uber? She said, it's a ride-sharing service. I said, what the heck is a ride-sharing service? She said, I don't have the time to tell you. Why don't you just download the app and find out for yourself? So I hang up the phone, I download the app, and I hit the app. Magical things start to happen on my phone. I see a GPS open up and I see a car trying to get to me. It's New York City-- you only try to get to a place, you don't actually get there because it's all one-way streets. And I could see a guy called George sitting in the front seat. This has never happened to me with a yellow cab. The car pulls up, I run out to the car and say, hi, George. He says, where do you want to go? I said, I don't want to go anywhere. Can you drive me around for about 30 or 40 minutes? I have some questions to ask you. [LAUGHTER] He thought I was a serial killer, but then he took one look at me and said, I can take this guy. Get in the backseat. So I get in the back seat I start asking him questions. I said, this is an Uber car you're driving? He said, no. This is my car. I said, are you an Uber employee? He said, I'm an independent contractor. I said, why do you do this? He says, I have a regular job. I don't make enough money and this allows me to make a second income in a car that I already own. I said, why do you need Uber? He said, without Uber, I can't pick up people in the street. It's illegal in New York City to pull up to somebody in the curb and say, do you want a ride? Uber is my matchmaker. So at this stage, I could understand why this guy used Uber, because it allowed him to take a car he already owned-- in fact, I asked him, do you pay extra insurance? He said, I don't mention it to the insurance company. What they don't know, they don't know. So basically, he was taking the car, he was using the insurance he already had and making a second income and Uber was the matchmaker that allowed him to do it. So he lets me off in front of my office. I offer to pay him. He should have just take the money. He said, you don't have to pay me. I said, it's free? He said, no, it's not free. When you downloaded the app, did they ask you for a credit card number? I said, yes, and bells go off in my head. They're going to charge you. And I said, how do you get paid? He said, they'll send me 80% of whatever the fare is. I remember asking, why 80%? He said, I don't know. That's what they all do. Now I could understand why Uber did what they did. For essentially being matchmakers, they collected 20% of whatever you pay. I said, this is a great business. Which left me with one missing piece, why do customers like Uber? So this time, I called my son at a civilized hour, like 3:30 in the afternoon, when he was awake. And I decided to put him on the defensive right away. I said, I've been noticing you've been using my credit card to back up your ride-sharing-- I made it sound like I knew what Uber was doing all the time. You have your own car, why do you need Uber? He said, Dad, on some nights, I like Uber. Some questions as a parent you don't dig too deeply on. I kind of got it. But this is a kid I can't even visualize him calling a traditional cab. It's not even in his frame of reference to go out on the street and wa-- you know. I said, what do you like about Uber? And he said, I can call the car from my phone. And I said, these cars must cost you a lot more than a cab, right? He said, no, they're cheaper than a cab. I said, you must wait a lot longer, right? He said, no, no, they, come faster than a cab. I said, these cars must be filthy, right? They're cleaner than a cab. I said, let me get this straight-- they're cheaper than a cab, they're faster than that cab, they're cleaner than a cab. That's when I knew cab service was destined for doom. We can dance around as much as you want. The final question I had to clean up for myself was, why couldn't I do this in my basement? I could be a matchmaker just like Uber. And there were three answers I came up with in June of 2014. The first was $3 billion. That's how much they raised from the VC. I didn't have $3 billion. That puts me at a disadvantage. The second is this is a game with a networking benefit, you see what I mean? As you sign up more drivers, it becomes-- a new driver wants to join, he's going to go where the rest of the drivers are because the bigger that space, the more likely it is you'll get customers. And the third is it is a company that is using data in ways that hadn't been used before. Like what? The surge pricing, for instance. So when I talk about understanding your company, I'm essentially talking about learning more about what your company does-- why do people like it's products, why do they work for it-- and getting a sense of what the business model is. So to complete the story, after I did this research-- if you can call it that-- on Uber, I drew a picture and I try to do this with almost every company I value, a picture of what the company does, what it produces, who buys from the company, why they do it. In the case of Uber, what completes the story is they have a business model-- and I could see this in June of 2014-- that is easily scalable. You know what I mean by easily scalable? For Uber to go to a new city, all they need to do is hire one person, put them in a motel room and say, sign up as many drivers as you can. There's no infrastructure investment. They don't buy the cars, which means they are going to-- it comes with pluses and minuses. It means they can grow much faster, that's a plus. What's a minus? It means that other people can use the same-- so it's a business that's going to grow fast, but it's going to be difficult to defend and make money on. I had a sense, at least, in June of 2014 of what Uber did. Let's turn to Ferrari. Technically speaking, it's a car company, right? That's the bad news. Why is it the bad news? Because this is not a great business to be in. It's one of the 10 worst businesses in the world to be in. That sounds like a categorical statement, but every year I actually rank the 10 worst businesses. Online advertising has not made it there, so don't worry. Your businesses are safe. The automobile business is an awful business. Let me start laying out the basis for that statement. In the 10 years leading up into 2015, which is when Ferrari went public, the revenue growth at automobile companies on an annual basis globally was only about 5.6%. That's it. That's pretty anemic growth. And half that growth comes from? I tell my MBAs, when somebody asks you a question you don't know the answer to, say China. [LAUGHTER] It's amazing how often that is a good answer. Whatever the question, China works. Why are interest rates low? China. Why are interest rates high? China. Why is inflation going up? China. It's like six degrees of separation from Kevin Bacon. Every question, China is within six degrees of hey, that's the right answer. So 5.6% growth, half of it comes from China. You're saying, so what? If China slows down, the 5.6% is going to become 4%. Operating margins are abysmal. The average operating margin-- so this is not net profit margin, this is higher up in the income statement-- is 4.4%. And 1/3 of all automobile companies lose money. So you've got low revenue growth, you've got abysmal margins, let's nail the coffin shut. Normally, when you have low revenue growth, one of the few bonuses you get is you don't have to reinvest very much. But in the case of automobile companies, that is not true because they've had to reinvest not in assembly lines, but in R&D. Do you know why they have to invest in R&D? The modern car is more computer than car, so they had to invest in R&D to catch up. This is your definition of a bad business-- low revenue growth, abysmal margins, lots of reinvestment. The way this manifests itself is in nine of the last 10 years leading into 2015, automobile companies earned a return on capital less than the cost of capital. That's the bad news for Ferrari, they're in a bad business. The good news for Ferrari is they're not another car company, right? In fact, I'm not even sure if it's a car. It's a very impractical car. There's one guy in my town owns a Ferrari, I've never seen him drive it. It's kept in an extra armored garage with two security guards in front. You could break into his house multiple times, but his car is protected. Rumor is once every year, he takes the car out of the garage and drives it around town, back into the garage, locks it up for the next year. And who can blame the guy? What are you going to do in your Ferrari, go grocery shopping? Can you imagine parking your car, walking into the grocery? AUDIENCE: A lot of them, the insurance covers only the weekends. ASWATH DAMODARAN: There you go. And even the weekends, you probably have to have two guards running next to your car to make sure nobody is scratching your car as you're driving it. You can't go grocery-- how about carpool in a Ferrari? You've got four kids to pick up, one seat. What are you going to do, stack them up? So why would people spend all this money to buy a car you can't drive anywhere? Because you're part of a very exclusive club. How exclusive? Let me give you a picture. In all of 2014, the year leading into the IPO, Ferrari sold 7,255 cars globally. In the entire year, 7,255. Think about that. That's how many cars Volkswagen probably rejects on its assembly line every day. 7,255 the whole year, that's bad news. The good news is their operating margin is 18.2%. Remind me again what it was or the rest of the automobile business. 4.4%. So why is their margin so high? One answer is because they've priced the car so high. The other is they spend almost nothing on traditional advertising. Have you ever seen a Ferrari ad on TV? Come on in, 10% off. It's not the kind of person they want coming in. In fact, I'm not even sure how you buy a Ferrari. You walk in, the dealer probably says, do you have any references? To what? Billionaires you know. You know no billionaires? Get out of here. It's an exclusive club, they can't let the riffraff walk off the street and buy a Ferrari. So it's doesn't sell very many cars, high margins. And here is the final advantage. Normally, when you sell these high priced luxury goods like Tiffany and Guccis, in good times you sell a lot-- you're affected by the economy, because people are reaching to buy your stuff. That's not been true at Ferrari. They've sold about 7,200 cars in the 10 years leading into 2014, including 2009. Know why I picked 2009? The year after the crisis you'd expect sales to drop off. Nothing happened at Ferrari. Why not? The people who buy Ferraris are so rich that if you ask them, what's the economy doing, their response is, what's an economy? Because to them the essence of a bad year is I'm worth only $4.5 billion instead of $7.5 billion-- not exactly cutting corners or cutting costs. So the final bonus you're getting is you actually get pretty stable revenues even though you have this luxury product because you've kept it so exclusive. Those things are all going to play out when I tell you my story for Ferrari. So let me talk about business stories. What exactly is a business story, how should you tell it? If any of you are entrepreneurs, want to be entrepreneurs, dream of being entrepreneurs, take this for whatever it's worth. If you're telling a business story, keep it simple. As opposed to what? Don't make yourself so George RR Martin and tell me a "Game of Thrones" story. I still remember trying to read the first "Game of Thrones" book. About halfway through, I gave up. There are like hundreds of characters. They die. They come back to life. There are like six empires. I said, I'm too old for this. You tell a "Game of Thrones"-- you don't have seven seasons and 70 episodes to tell your business story, you probably have five minutes. Keep it simple and keep it focused. What's the end game for every business? You have to show me a pathway to making money. Pathway doesn't have to be next year, it might be seven years from now. So don't keep talking about how many users you have. That's nice. Tell me how you plan to convert these users into profits. That might come way down the road, but without thinking about it, it's not going to magically happen. So I'm going to try to follow those rules in trying to come up with stories for Uber and Ferrari. So in June of 2014, here was the story I told for Uber. And every word in the story is going to have consequence, so kind of hang in there. I described Uber as an urban car service company. So already, I'm trying to tell you where I think Uber is going to succeed, right? Urban means cities and big towns, car services is the basic business. Remember I said I wanted you to think about where you disagree with my story? So given where Uber is now, start thinking about that's wrong. That's fine, but this is my story in June of 2014, an urban car service company that's going to attract new users into the car service business. Like whom? Like my son, people who normally never take a cab who have now tried to take this car service. With local networking benefits, I've already talked about what networking benefits are. As you become the largest ride-sharing company in New York, there's a tipping point where you're essentially going to end up dominating the market. You think, what's the local doing there? Let's say Uber becomes the largest car service company in New York and I fly to Chicago. I don't care about the largest car service company in New York, I now care about the largest car service company in Chicago. So in my story, here is what's going to happen. Uber can end up dominating New York, Lyft can end up dominating Chicago, Didi Chuxing can end up dominating Beijing, and Ola can end up dominating Mumbai. You think, so what? When I start assigning market share of the market, this story is going to come into play as to what kind of market share you're going to see. And finally, I'm going to assume that Uber is going to be able to continue to do what it does now, which is what? Not own the cars, not hire the drivers, which means that they can scale up really fast. And they're going to be able to keep that 80-20 mix. That's completely arbitrary. Why not 85-15, 90-10, 95-5? They're going to keep that mix. So that was my Uber story in June of 2014. Here's my Ferrari story in October of 2015, at the time of their IPO. I assumed that it would stay in an exclusive club. It doesn't have to, right? It could pull what I call a Maserati. Maserati in 2008 looked a lot like Ferrari, it sold about 7,000 cars, had high margins. But in 2009, Maserati decided that they wanted it to grow faster. The way they did this, they introduced a new Maserati, a cheaper-- don't get too excited, it's not that cheap-- called the Ghibli, going after a bigger market. And it succeeded. In what sense? Their growth jumped to 15% a year. That's the good news. But what do you think happened to their margins? They went down because they had to advertise, expend. So they went from 18% to 14%. And in addition, you are now selling to people who are rich but not super rich. So they actually knew what the economy was doing and stopped buying cars if they felt the economy was not doing that well. So I'm going to assume that Ferrari is going to stay with their exclusive club model and not pull a Maserati. Now comes that test where-- one of the biggest things about stories is your biggest test is yourself. You've got to make sure that you ask of your story the question before somebody else asks it. So is it possible, is it plausible, is it probable? The reason you ask that question is probably easy to build into your cash flows, right? There are all these techniques we can use. Plausible I can build into growth, possible I'll just wave my hands and perhaps use some option pricing to kind of bring it in. But to illustrate what I mean by possible, plausible, probable, the best way I can do this is to flip it on its head and talk about implausible stories, implausible stories, and improbable stories. I'll give you one example of an impossible story. Every person in my class has to pick a company to value and they can pick whatever they want. So about two years ago, one of the students in my class picks Netflix to value. This is a company that is a great company value-- exciting, dynamic-- but a company where you have to really stretch to get the value up to the price because it's a really richly priced stock. So it's trading at 1.8, comes back with a $500 value per share. I'm flabbergasted. So I look at the numbers and he's projected revenues of $600 billion for Netflix 10 years from now. So I call the kid in-- he wasn't even a kid, he was 29 years old-- and I said, do you have Netflix? He said, yes. I said, how much do you pay for a year? He pulled out his calculator, which seemed to be attached to his hip. He hits the numbers, about $100 a year. I said, how many subscribers would you need to get to $600 billion in revenues? He pulls out this calculator again. I said, you don't need a damn calculator. Divide $600 billion by $100, you've got six billion subscribers. He says, I don't see where this is going. I said, just hang in there. I have a couple of more questions for you. I said, what's the population of the world? He says, I don't know. I have to go check Wikipedia. I said, I'll save you the trouble. It's about maybe six billion, six and a half billion. I said, is there something I don't know maybe that you should be telling me? Maybe there's been a law that's been passed that says every man, woman, and child and perhaps pet in every household has to have a Netflix account. He says, don't be absurd. I said, I'm not the one estimating $600 billion in revenues. That's an impossible story. I'll make a statement-- you might not believe this, but as you look at valuations, you try this out. One in four valuations that I see, maybe one in three, from big name appraises and banks are impossible valuations, it just can't happen. Its a fairytale. An implausible valuation can happen, but you have to have a really good explanation for it. I'll give you one example. A student of mine went to work for an NFL team, I won't name the team, and he sent me a valuation of the team, I don't know for what reason. So I looked at the evaluation, he's put in 3% growth and revenue. It looks pretty reasonable until you get to how much money are you putting back into the business. And they own their own stadium and there was nothing going back into the stadium, no investment at all. So I called him and I said, I looked at your valuation. How come you're not putting any money back into the stadium? Don't you have to maintain it? He said, that's easy to explain. Every time we need to get the stadium refurbished, here's what we do. We go to the city and we threaten them. With what? We're moving to Las Vegas. Are you going to fix the stadium? And it works. It's an implausible story, but if you can tell me why. So implausible stories can happen, but I'm going to push you back and if you can give me a really good explanation, OK, that's good. And improbable stories are stories where your assumptions are at war with each other. Let me explain. When I look at a valuation, there are three sides what I call my valuation triangle. There's the growth side, the re-investment side, and the risk side. So help me out here. If I have a company with high growth on one side, what should I expect to see when I look at your reinvestment? High reinvestment and usually high risk. high, high, high. OK. That makes sense. Low, low low makes sense. You have high, low, low, I'm going to push back. And again, you can have a really good explanation as to why your company has high growth and low reinvestment. You're a toll road company, you've spent the last 10 years building your told roads. Now you're getting the growth from those roads. So you get the high growth, but you don't have to reinvest because the reinvestment is all-- so if you're an infrastructure, I get it now. My job in valuation is to push you on these assumptions. And if you've thought through it, you can give me a good explanation. But if you say, look, I didn't even notice that, then you have the valuation that's at war with itself. So I took my Uber story and I checked it out. Is it possible? Is it plausible? Is it probable? And guess what, I'm describing them as an urban car service company, which they're already succeeding at. I argued that they're bringing new users in. I could use my son as an example, but then I'm behaving like my mother-in-law. So I'll use the part of the country where ride-sharing has its deepest roots, which is the Bay Area. Do you know that by some estimates, the size of the car service business in this part of the country has tripled since ride-sharing companies came in? You know what that's telling you, right? That there are people now who take Uber who would never have taken a cab, who might have driven their own cars or taken mass transit. It's making inroads. So clearly, that part of the story works, as well. It's plausible. The one part of the story I wasn't willing to go to in June of 2014 was the story of how Uber could replace your second car. It's a story that I'm more willing to buy into today, that if you live in the suburbs like I do. I drive my car to the train station every morning. It's a three-minute drive, I'm too lazy to walk. I park it there all day, I come back in the evening, I get back in the car, I drive it home-- six minutes a day. Weekends I go crazy, like 25 minutes on a weekend. Collectively, I keep a car, I pay insurance. It's insane. But if I lived in the suburbs 10 years ago, my answer would have been, what other choice do I have? It's not like I can call a car service. Uber is in my town now. In fact, in the last few months, I've been noticing a billboard that you can see from your train as you're going through and it's like every station. The billboard says, did you drive to the station today? And right below it says, take Uber. The message is not to me, I'm too old to change. But if you are you're 35, you move to the suburbs, instead of buying that second car, you might take Uber. This is really good news for Uber, it's really bad news for whom? Automotive cars. We talk a lot about the disruptors. The more exciting thing is what happens to the disrupted? And there is, in fact, a price that's going to be paid by those companies. So that's basically your check on your story. Now, I'm going to take a little tangent here. Let's suppose you're tired of working at whatever you're doing. You quit and you become a movie producer. You move to LA. You hang out at the Bel Air, Beverly Hills Hilton, something by the pool. And I'm going to come and pitch a story to you. And as I pitch this story, you tell me whether this story sounds good to you. It's about a 19-year-old who drops out of Stanford. Who does that? What's their acceptance rate, like minus 3%? You got into one of the most selective schools in the country and you drop out? To make it interesting, let's make the 19-year-old a woman. Usually it's a male geek dropping out and starting a tech company. This is a 19-year-old woman who drops out of Stanford and starts a business-- but not a tech business, but a blood testing business. This is something we all have experience with in our lives, right? We hate the way it's structured right now with the labs that take forever to run your tests and charge you $1,500 to take two buckets of your blood and feed it to Dracula, I don't know what. So she's created a business where she needs only two drops of your blood in a nanotainer. That sounds pretty fancy to begin with. And 32 tests are going to be run in 45 minutes and emailed to you and it will cost you $50. Do you want this story to be true? I do. These are what I call runaway stories, stories that sound so good you're afraid to ask the question. You know, the question that's going to show that the story doesn't work. I wish I had made up this story because it's not a made-up story. The 19-year-old who dropped out of Stanford was called Elizabeth Holmes. The company she created was Theranos. And in the middle of 2015, venture capitalists had priced Theranos-- again, that word comes out-- at $9 billion. Some of the biggest names were on that list. And it's not just the VCs who got excited. It was the Cleveland Clinic, Walgreens. If you'd asked me in the middle of 2015, what do you think about Theranos, my reaction, there must be some substance here, you have all these big names. But let me ask you a question. You're investing in a blood testing company. What's the first question you're going to ask before you put your money into the company? Does it work, right? And you'd assume that somebody in here would have asked that question. But that turned out to be not true. In October of 2015, a "Wall Street Journal" reporter decided to ask the question. And this is a question, the answers are actually out there in the public domain because you have to file with the FDA. He went to the FDA and said, have they been approved for 32 tests? The FDA said, no. They've been approved for one of the 32. He said, why? Because the other 31, the results are too noisy. Noisy blood tests-- it's not a feature you want in a blood test, right? Maybe you have leukemia, maybe you don't. But don't worry about it, we'll get back to you later, right? It's not exactly something you go looking for. And of course, the story unraveled after that. And the final pieces of the story are playing out with Elizabeth Holmes being banned from the blood testing business for the next two years and Theranos kind of unfolding. Runaway stories are stories where you want the story to be true so much that you're afraid to ask the question because you're afraid what the answer might be. I would love to tell you that if I'd been an investor in Theranos, I would have asked that question. But I don't know. Can you imagine being in that room with Elizabeth Holmes saying do your blood tests work? You'd have felt like the hunter who shot Bambi's mother. Have you ever felt-- I felt badly for that guy in the movie. Somebody shot that-- you have no idea what I'm talking about, right? This is what happens when you don't watch enough Disney movies. Go watch "Bambi." So you're afraid that the answer is going to ruin the story and you don't ever ask the question. I mean, you'd be amazed at how many business stories take off and keep going because people don't want to ask that question. Let me do one other tangent. Sometimes I look at banking valuations just for fun, just to see inconsistencies pop up. And this is the valuation of Tesla, another one of my favorite companies. This is a valuation where the analyst had projected out growth for Tesla where the number of cars that Tesla would produce would go from 25,000 in the most recent 12 months-- this was in 2013-- to 1.1 million in 10 years. Is that possible? Sure. Is it plausible? Yeah, I can tell you really-- because let's face it, this is a big business. So I was OK with that part of the story. He then projected on margins of about 7%, again plausible. So up to now, we're on plausible story. Now, what's the capacity of that Fremont Plant that Tesla has, 150,000, maybe 250,000 cars? So I went looking for the third piece of the puzzle, are you putting in money to build more plants? And in this particular valuation, it looked like the analyst was putting nothing back into new plants. In fact, I called the analyst and I pushed him on it and he admitted finally that it had slipped his mind. I made a suggestion to him. I said, you know what? The only way you're going to be able to get away with this is you need to watch "Willy Wonka's Chocolate Factory." Have you ever seen that movie, the old version? I was a very strange younger person, now I'm a very strange older person. I remember coming out of that movie with a big question. The question was, Willy Wonka chocolates are all over the world, but there's only one factory-- six floors, inefficiently laid out with chocolate rivers running through it and stuff. And I said, how do they produce all these chocolates from this one factory? And the answer, of course, is in the movie. It was the Oompa-Loompas. Remember them, magical creatures that dance around and chocolates come flying out? I said, here's what you need to do. Put out a press release that Tesla's fired all of its regular workers in its Fremont plant and replaced them with them Oompa-Loompas. I call these Oompa-Loompa valuations, where you have this growth and nothing set aside to create the growth. It's not going to happen. So I have my story, I'm going to convert it into numbers. So let's start at the top. I describe Uber as an urban car service company. The total market that I used for my valuation was the urban car service market, which is $100 billion in June of 2014. I assumed that Uber would pull in new users into that market. So here's what I did. Instead of letting that market grow at 2%, which is what it had been growing going into, I let it grow at 6%. I assume that Uber will have in my story local networking benefits. The market share I gave Uber reflected that part of the story. It was a 10% market share, huge relative to the typical car service company then but not a 40% or 50% market share, which would come about if you have global networking benefits. I assumed they'd be able to maintain that 80-20 mix. You're getting 20% for doing nothing, your margins are going to be immense in steady state. I gave them an operating margin of 40% in steady state. And finally, I also assumed that they would never buy the cars, they would never hire the drivers, which means that they can grow relatively easily. So the way I reflected that is for every dollar they invested, they got $5 of revenues. To give you a contrast, for a typical US company, every dollar you invest brings $2 in revenues. I gave them $5. Every part of my story has become a number. If I take those numbers, the valuation does itself. So when you look at the actual spreadsheet, it looks like a spreadsheet, but if you point to a number in the spreadsheet and say, why is Uber making what it is in year 10, my answer is never going to be, because I used a 10% revenue growth for the first five years and 7% thereafter. Its going to be because they're an urban car service company with local networking benefits. Every number in this valuation will reflect a part of my story. And if you read through the numbers, we come up with a value. The value that I came up with for Uber in June of 2014 was $6 billion. What is the story that attracted my attention? The "Wall Street Journal" story that said they were priced at $71 billion, right? So 15 minutes after I post this on my blog, I get a call from a "Wall Street Journal" reporter. She must have been just hanging out looking for this post. She said, I've noticed the valuation you put up of Uber and you came up with $6 billion. I said, yes. she said, you do know that venture capitalists have priced it at $17 billion? I said, yes. She said, how do you explain the $17 billion? I said, I don't have to. I didn't pay it. I've never felt the urge to go around explaining what other people do. So all you can do a valuation is have your story and your value. It's not my job to sell you on that value. I'm not a salesperson, I'm not an equity research analyst. I'm not asking you to sell short on Uber, I'm not saying don't buy Uber. I'm saying I wouldn't buy Uber. And I'm entitled to make my choices. So my story has become a valuation. I did the same thing with Ferrari and here's how my exclusive club story rolled out. Because it's an exclusive club, I had to give them low revenue growth, only 4% a year. Could they grow faster? Absolutely. But I can't let them grow faster in my story. The bad news is revenue growth is going to stay low. The good news is I'm going to continue to give them these hefty margins, 18% margins. And I'm going to give them a low cost to capital because they're selling to people who are so rich that they don't feel the effects of the economy. The value that I came up with for Ferrari was 6.3 billion euros. It actually went public at about 7.5 billion, it danced around six billion. It's kind of settled in now. But this was my story playing out as a valuation. Last piece and then we'll kind of open to questions. As I said, you finish a valuation, you feel pretty good about your valuation because it's your story of value. And as I said, the best thing to do is actually put it in places where people who don't agree with you will read it. And I got incredibly lucky with my Uber post because it got picked up in four very different places. The first was a site called 538. Are you familiar with 538? It's where numbers geeks go to hang out because they apply statistics and numbers to everything. It's like money ball and everything. The second place it got picked up was the Forbes blog. Who reads the Forbes blog? People who are geriatric investors who are basically old time value investors. The third place it got picked up was Tech Crunch. You know who reads Tech Crunch. And finally, the final place it got picked up was this blog called the Ride-Sharing Guy. It's a guy who actually writes for Uber and Lyft drivers. There are actually enough of them that he can write a blog just for them. I got four very different sets of reactions to my blog post. The people in 538 nitpicked. They said, why did you use a 10% chance of failure? Why not a 9.96%? This is how numbers geeks think. So I said, why don't you take the spreadsheet-- because I put the spreadsheet-- and change the 10% to 9.97% and see what happens. Five minutes later, I get an email, now I see why you used 10%. So all that nitpicking with really no big picture. The Forbes blog people loved it. They said, this is the way they should be valuing companies, those crazy Silicon Valley people. I ignored the Forbes blog. No point going there and getting patted on the back saying, this is amazing. The Tech Crunch people absolutely hated it. They said, how dare you value one of ours with your d.c.f. We don't do that in Silicon Valley. I got this wave of abuse. And in addition to the wave of abuse, I got some things about this business I wouldn't have known. I'm not a tech person, I don't want to be a tech person. I'm not a ride-sharing expert. Remember, I hadn't even heard of ride-sharing until June of 2014. So there were things about the business that I would never have known if I hadn't read those posts. And finally, from the Ride-Sharing Guy, I had some very interesting things about the 80-20 mix. They said, this is unusual. Uber doesn't get to keep 20% because they kick it back. They pay us $1,500 to switch from Lyft. And I would never have found this out by talking to Uber's top management, right? Because they want to preserve the illusion for the investors of its 20%. In fact, that's what they said even in the most recent announcement. They said, we're still keeping 20%. Then how the heck are you losing $4 billion on a $6 billion revenue? The numbers don't gel, right? And it all came to fruition while I was sitting waiting for a flight to Munich and I get an email from Bill Gurley. I knew who he was. And the email says, I read your post on Uber and I did not like it and I've written my own post to counter your post, a blog post to blog post warfare, very new age. He said, I've said some mean things about you. I just want to let you know. I close the email. I have an hour and a half left for my flight, so guess where I go next. I go Above the Crowd, which is Bill's blog, and right there on the top, it says, "Damodaran Misses by a Mile." Get it, Uber driving, misses by a mile. And he took issue with every part of my story. He said, Uber is not just a car service company, it's a logistics company. Words have consequences, right? Because all of a sudden, what have you done? You've expanded your business to be car service, it's moving, it's delivery. He said, it's not just urban, it's going to be everywhere. He gave examples of suburban services that they were going to offer. And he talked about how they were going to connect with airlines and credit card companies so that when you flew to Jakarta on United, before they drag you off the plane you'd get a little Uber thing at the bottom where you could click the Uber and say, when I land in Jakarta, I get-- so basically, you want to connect with airlines and have your credit card already on there so your local networking benefits become global benefits. I was fascinated by the story. In fact, right after I read the story, I took his story and put it into numbers. And it's easy to do. The $100 billion becomes a $300 billion total market if you make it a logistics market. The 10% market share becomes a 40% market share, the $6 billion value becomes a $53 billion value. And then I said, you know what? Those ride-sharing drivers told me that 20% is fake, so I replaced the 20% with 10% because if that's the true margin, I should be putting it in. And that reduced the value to about $29 billion. You're saying, does this mean any number goes? No. That's not what I would take out of this. But your story drives your valuations. If you're a start-up entrepreneur, the way you describe your company can make a huge difference in what people walk out of the room willing to pay. So in fact, in December of 2014, I basically took this in a blog post-- and you're welcome to visit this-- and I let people pick what they thought about Uber, what kind of company is it, what kind of networking benefits. And at the end of the blog, I essentially put a list of values ranging from less than $1 billion to over $90 billion, depending on your story. And with young companies, that should always be the case. You'll have vast disagreements among people because of your story. And in fact, it's what, two and a half, three years later with Uber and you're still getting a big set of disagreements about what the stories are. There are obviously people who think it's worth $100 billion and there are people that think it's worth nothing. And this is what makes it so fascinating, a story in motion. So as you go through this process, one final point. You finish the story, don't rest too long because the world changes around you. There are macro shifts happening. The French election tomorrow could change your story about not just every French company, but about every global company. You have macro stuff going on, you have micro stuff going on. Every time a company reports earnings or announces an acquisition, it's changing its story and your job, in a sense, is to bring it into your valuation. And your stories can break, they can shift, or they can change. Broken stories are stories where your story just blows apart. An example would be Aereo. Remember the company that said they'd come up with a way of streaming things to your device? You could watch cable channels on your device without paying cable fees. Sounds too good to be true, right? And it turned out that in June of 2014, the Supreme Court found that what they were doing was illegal. Overnight, the company essentially went from being a billion dollar company to nothing. That's a story break. A story shift isn't the same story, but it can be small. I've told the same story about Apple for the last six years, which is it's the most incredible cash machine in history that derives almost all of its value from the smartphone business. And that business is maturing with margins that are going to come under pressure over time. That's the same story I told in 2012. My valuation for Apple hasn't shifted very much, but the price goes up and down. And that's part of investing. And you can have story changes, where a company convinces you that they can do stuff you never thought they could do. My valuation for Facebook has gone from $30 per share when they went public to almost $90 per share because every time they show me they could do things I didn't think they could do, I have to revisit my story and change it. It makes investing in valuation a lot more fun if you think about these valuations not as spreadsheets and numbers, but as stories that evolve over time. And if you're an entrepreneur, your job is to nurture that story and make it bigger over time. And if you're an investor, it's to be skeptical about that story and push back. And if you're an outsider, to just observe what's happening in the stories and attach a number to those stories. That's it. If there are any questions you have, I'd be glad to answer. [APPLAUSE] AUDIENCE: I have a question about the online advertising business. Is in the top 10 worst businesses? ASWATH DAMODARAN: No. No, it's not. It's actually-- you know it's a profitable business. The only thing is there are only two giants in the room sucking up all the profits-- one is you, the other is Facebook. For the rest of the world, it's become a bad business. And you're responsible for-- and that's your job is to make it a good business for you and a bad business for the rest of the world. And you've succeeded beyond your wildest imaginations. And I think that's what the-- last year if you look at the growth in this business, I think 60% of the growth came from just Facebook and Google. So it is a profitable business, but it's a very skewed profit. The two companies at the top get almost all of the profits, the rest don't even get the droppings off the table. They're like Twitter, they basically have revenues but they can't show profits. AUDIENCE: What about the partners that we have in the ecosystem-- the agencies, the marketers? Where do you see them moving as you said the industry seems to consolidate around Google and Facebook? ASWATH DAMODARAN: I think they're more commoditized. They're not going to make the margins that they do. They will be profitable, but you're not going to let them become too profitable because if they make excess profits, you know what your job is, right? It's to mop it up and take it back into the parent company. So you're like a parent spaceship that essentially is watching all these other little ships. You look too prosperous, we're going to-- so again, there's nothing amoral. That's the nature of business is if you're creating the value, you want to claim that value. So I think your ecosystem will survive, but there will never be the prosperous mother ship that you have as a company because that's what's creating all those revenues. AUDIENCE: Measurement it's a big part of that business, so teaching brands that online advertising is valuable, how do we do a better job of using the kinds of narratives that you talked about today? ASWATH DAMODARAN: I think that ultimately, it's the richness of the data that lets you convince them. Because right now you can show people that they're clicking on-- I think it's easier for you than it is for Facebook, for instance, because you have a search engine that people go through. It's much more direct to say, this is how you landed on a site is through us. I think that increasingly, you're going to start seeing people ask questions about, oh, people are clicking on it but are they actually buying stuff on it? And as the data gets richer, you'll be able to answer the question. And sometimes you might not like the answers you have to give your-- so it's not always going to be good news. So you will have to learn from what works and what doesn't to kind of adapt, modify, which you probably already are doing. AUDIENCE: My question is in doing number crunching or forming the narrative, I guess in these two examples it felt like the background was assuming competent companies and management. ASWATH DAMODARAN: Oh, I've told some horror stories, too. AUDIENCE: OK. ASWATH DAMODARAN: So read my story about Valeant. AUDIENCE: Yeah. So how do you account for Uber has a misogynist toxic culture or United's assaulting their passenger? How do you account for lack of conversion that a company just can't achieve their-- ASWATH DAMODARAN: That's actually a very good point. Uber has this combination of being aggressive-- they've always been an aggressive company that's broken every rule in the book and they've succeeded with it. But in a sense, it's also their biggest weakness. In fact, the best way to see this play out is I have a story about Lyft in the book. And if you think about Lyft, I describe Lyft like you know how in bike racing if you're a racer, you actually want to hang out behind the lead racer because he or she picks up the wind resistance? Lyft is like the rider who hangs out behind Uber. So Uber is the one who does the wind resistance, goes after the regulators. Lyft says, we're the good guys, we're the good guys, we're the good guys. It's actually an interesting different story, right? It's a much less ambitious story. It's a story where you keep your head down and say, we're the good guys. And they're going to do things very conspicuously to show that they're the good guys. You saw that in the last few weeks, right? You're the bad guys, we're the good guys. It's actually interesting, but the good guys don't always win in these stories. That's, I think, the other thing is sometimes this aggressive toxic culture might actually be what ends up winning. So unlike novels, where you can make the good guys win, sometimes the bad guys win in these stories and it becomes part of the value of the business. So in that sense, justice doesn't always prevail and morality doesn't always win out. It is investing, right? But I do tell stories about-- I mean, I don't enjoy them as much-- about companies that are horror stories. I mean, I've been telling the story about Valeant for the last two years of a company that fell from grace, right? It's a reverse Cinderella story. It starts off with this-- you start off in the castle, you end up cleaning the chimneys. And I think it's fascinating sometimes watching horror stories unfold because you can see the behavioral and the psychological issues that play into these valuations. SPEAKER 1: So one of the questions was regarding a company which in your blog posts you call the "Field of Dreams" company. The question is, growing revenues, the earnings are maybe shown, not shown, but the cash flows are there. And a lot of that is still driven by changes in working capital. So for those of you who don't know, I'm talking about Amazon. The question is, how do you look at a company like that and what do you think about it? ASWATH DAMODARAN: You know I call it the "Field of Dreams" company, right? Seen "Field of Dreams?" Kevin Costner builds this baseball field in the middle of nowhere and people ask him, what are you, crazy? Why are you building a baseball field in the middle of nowhere? And remember what he said, if I build it, they will come. That to me is-- when I think about Amazon, that is the message that Jeff Bezos has been sending right from day one. If you get a chance, go check out the letter that Jeff wrote about Amazon in 1997. You know where I found it? I found it in Google search, so you can find it, too. It's actually an incredible letter because it lays out what he was going to do at Amazon. He said, at Amazon we're going to go for revenues first and then after we've built the revenues, they will come, the profits. That's the story told in '97 and he's told the same story for 20 years. And he's acted consistently with that story. You know what I mean by acted consistently? How many people here have Amazon Prime? What do you pay for it? $99. Do you know what it costs Amazon to service every Prime member? About $400. That's crazy, why would you do that? If you build it, they will come. What is he building with Amazon Prime? He's building this block of consumers who are addicted to Amazon, for lack of a better word, Who don't even know what a retail store looks like anymore. And one of these days, he's coming for you. So don't be surprised if a third nine pops up after the first two nines and you have nothing you can do, because where are you going to go? Everything else will be out of business by then. So the conspiratorial view about Amazon is he's building a business where ultimately, he's going to get you. And that explains the $700, $800, $900 per share. The problem there is it is a business where keeping newcomers out, new ways of doing business, is going to be tough to do. So the challenge here is what if that doesn't happen? Well, you could end up growing revenues and never being able to deliver the profits. So it's, again, a fascinating case study of how if you can tell a consistent story. Because people often say, markets are short-term. You heard that probably in Silicon Valley. What short-term market would let a company go for 20 years without making a profit and keep pushing up their market cap? To me Amazon is the perfect counter-example of if you can tell a consistent story, markets will cut you a heck of a lot of slack. You know why they don't do it for most companies? Because the story keeps changing every year. The top management is incapable of telling the same story over time and then the market says, we don't trust you. So the other lesson that I think you get out of Amazon is if you're building a business, you're telling a story, don't keep swinging like a weather vane to whatever works. You have to have a consistent story, you have to act consistently with that story. And you'll be surprised at how much slack you get cut because of that. SPEAKER 1: Professor, before we get to a specific question, there's one question that we generally ask of all the guests, and this is mostly not only for this audience, but also for your audience on YouTube. You've written this fantastic book, in addition to others. What are some books that you have found useful that are generally underappreciated? ASWATH DAMODARAN: Generally underappreciated. I thought you would ask me what my favorite book was because I was going to revealed my number crunching roots and you that my favorite book is "Moneyball." That tells you where I-- and I think it's-- but I think in terms of underappreciated books, I think that I learn a lot more about investing in valuation from non-business books than I do from business books. It, again, goes to the storytelling. I need to build my storytelling side. I don't know whether you've ever read, there's a book written by an insider at Pixar. It's a book I absolutely love because it taught me things about storytelling that I did not know, things-- because let's face it, if I can tell a story like "Toy Story," I'm going to be able to sell incredible businesses, right? So I read diverse things. I read fairy tales, I read-- I mean, I love serial killer books because they always end badly. But I think in a sense, I get my stuff from all kinds of different places. AUDIENCE: So there are some companies that need external capital at the beginning, like Tesla, right? For those companies, they're actually more valuable if they are priced higher because the capital will be very low, right? If they are priced at $2 trillion, again, issue the stocks very cheaply and they get any money they want. And it also applies to real state investment trusts. How do you put that in your valuation? ASWATH DAMODARAN: OK. The first thing to remember is you don't set the price, the market does. So if you can get them to give you a high pricing, it does make your life easier. I mean, you hear this word cash burn thrown around Silicon Valley all the time, right? Cash burn basically means you have negative cash flows up front because you need that cash flow to grow. And you have cash burn, you need capital to cover the cash flow. You can't survive as a company. And if you're priced high, the advantage is you can raise that capital at a very advantageous price. So here is, in fact, what it plays out as. For these companies, there's actually an incentive to tell really, really big stories up front, right, because big stories get the big prices. The pricing allows you then to cover the capital. There will be a letdown at some point because people are going to say, well, that story never was going to work. And then you get all kinds of disappointment kicking in. I might be hitting too close to home, but anybody ever hear of Juicera? I've been reading the story about Juicera and I said, what kind of story would you need to tell me for me to invest in it? How many people would pay $400 for a juicer that's-- I mean, it's a very small market. So if you were telling that story and I was assuming a market of 50 million Americans buying, it's a story that doesn't fly. But if you could push the story bigger, you'd push pricing up. It allows you to raise capital to cover your cash burn needs. So that's something to remember. I don't think that's Elon Musk's rationale. I think he just likes telling really big stories and making them bigger over time. But I think for some start-ups, I think part of this is a game. If you can push your pricing up, it actually makes it easier. It greases the skids for you while you have those early years of cash burn. SPEAKER 1: Don't hit me for asking this, I'm just the messenger here. How do you decide when there was something wrong with your estimate of value and the price to value divergence stays on for an extended period? What are some examples that you can share with us? Could you talk a little bit about your investing in Valeant and Twitter and so on. And again, I'm just the messenger. ASWATH DAMODARAN: As I said, one of the things I find that gets in the way of good investing is I tell people the three words that you need to be able to say openly in investing is, I was wrong. Because once you say that, it frees you from your own story. Because as long as you're not willing to say that, you're going to find ways to kind of take your old story that it's not wrong, this part of it-- it's somebody else's fault. I have absolutely no qualms about accepting the fact that I'm wrong and I'm horribly wrong sometimes and it's not my fault. That's what allows me to get away with it. It's not my fault in the sense there are things happening around that I really can't control. So when I'm wrong, I have to look at what portion of it was my fault and what portion of it is out of my control. With Valle, here's what happened. I bought Valle and Brazil went to hell in a handbasket in the year after I bought Valle. You say, why didn't he predict that? If I had been able to predict it, there were a lot easier ways to make money than to go out and buy-- I could have sold short in Brazilian bonds. It was out of mind control. I call this the karmic moment in investing. You've heard of karma, right? Basically, karma means there are some things that are going to happen, nothing that you and I can do can change that. You've got to accept that on Valle I was wrong, but there's nothing I could have done about it. With Valeant I was wrong and it was partly my fault. And here's what I missed in Valeant. For those of you not familiar with Valeant, Valeant built its reputation as an uncommon pharmaceutical company by going out and acquiring other drug companies and doing something that is morally and ethically questionable. They would take underpriced drugs and reprice them. You know what that means, right? So you're a company which is at a-- let's say you're heart drug that's been around, it's been patented for eight years. They're charging $50 a dose. It serves only like 7,000 people. And Valeant said, those people will pay $5,000. They need it to live. They raised prices. They did incredibly well for a period. But that story was a story that worked only as long as they stayed under the radar, right? Because this is not exactly a story you're going to tell openly-- we buy other companies, we take their drugs, we increase the price 50% or 500% or 5000%. So when Valeant came apart, it was because they got too ambitious. They got too big. They bought Salix, an $18 billion company. When they tried to raise the price of the drugs, people noticed. And the minute that happened, the whole company unraveled. It dropped from $200 down to $32. And I bought it at $32 saying, look, there's still enough value in the company. You know what I missed is this company did so much damage to its reputation. We talk about corporate sustainability. It taught me a lesson about why corporate sustainability has a place in Valeant. They had done so much damage to their reputation that nobody trusted them. Because I assumed that they would become an old fashioned drug company. But to become an old fashioned drug company, what do you have to do? You have to build an R&D department, you've got to hire scientists. Let me ask you a question. You're a scientist, I'm Valeant. I come and say, do you want a job at Valeant? What's your reaction? I've heard about you guys, I'm not coming there. So they're having trouble building their business. They try to sell a portion of the business. I'm Valeant, I try to sell a portion of my business to you. What's your reaction? You guys are liars. I don't trust anything you do. So what I missed in the case of Valeant is the damage that they had done to their reputation that makes it almost impossible for them to be a going concern. That damage cost me, what, 60% of my investment in Valeant. But it's a lesson that I can use when I think about other damaged companies. So would I buy United after the billion dollars? Maybe. Here's why. It's a damaged company, but it's in a business where they're all damaged. There but for the grace of God goes Delta, right? Don't assume that Delta would not have dragged you off. Maybe they'd have dragged you off a little more gently, OK? This is a business-- and that's why I bought Volkswagen after the-- because I looked at Volkswagen and said, hey, do you think only Volkswagen does this stuff? They all do it. You've knocked down the value of Volkswagen 24%. So it's a game I've played before. But in the case of Valeant, I got this warning sign of sometimes a company can step across the line so much that coming back over is going to be really tough to do. And the other thing is a mistake will cost you a lot less if you don't have half your money invested in the mistake. So this is actually a pushback against what you sometimes hear from value investors which is don't spread their bets, buy four great companies. I have never believed that advice. That's hubris to think that somehow you've got these four winners forever. So to me, the reason I keep any investment I make at 10% or below my portfolio is because I know I can make mistakes and I have to be aware of that. SPEAKER 1: What does your typical positions always look like? ASWATH DAMODARAN: I would say on entry about 5%. If it does well, if will get to 10%; if it does badly, it takes care of itself, it goes away from my portfolio. So Valeant is no longer 5% of my portfolio. So it's really the stocks that do well that I have to nurture. And in fact, with Apple this will played out over a 15-year period because I bought Apple in 1998 and I bought it as a charitable contribution. Because I loved Apple so much. It looked like it was going out of business and this was going to be my final contribution, look how much I loved you. Here, take the $14. It turned out to be the best investment I ever made. Sometimes shows you that your best investments don't come from all your intrinsic value stuff, it comes from your charitable contribution. The problem with Apple is did so well that it kept pushing into that 10%. I left about half the profits I'd have made on Apple on the table because I had to keep selling. And I have no regrets for doing it because that's what I need to do to be disciplined. And one of the things I've discovered is if I-- the way I do this is I automate it. Do you know what I mean by automate it? I have limit sells on every single investment in my portfolio that I have put in before it happens. Because if I wait for it to happen and then I say, should I sell it now, I find delusional ways of saying, this time is different, this stock is going to keep going up. So sometimes lots of time you've got to realize that you can't trust yourself. You essentially have to automate the process to take it out of your hands. SPEAKER 1: So we were talking about your limit order on Apple before, and I think it would be nice for the audience to maybe share some of that conversation. But I found it very interesting. So you had an estimate of intrinsic value and once it hit, the limit order executed for Apple. My question to you was, if the price then goes below that price, are you going to buy again? In other words, how do you think or quantify the margin of safety and how do you differentiate buying and selling? ASWATH DAMODARAN: When I bought Apple, I got lucky. I bought Apple at $94, I put a limit sell at $140, and it executed so Apple is out of my portfolio. I've bought Apple four times and I've sold Apple four times in the last six years. Why? Because my value stayed stable, but here's what happens to Apple. A new iPhone comes out, revenues jump 8%, people start dancing in the streets. It's a growth company again. They push up the price too much and then four quarters later, their revenues drop because the iPhone is aging and people are convinced that this is the end, they sell Apple off. So it's almost like your taking advantage of a manic depressive, which is what the market is-- manic, I sell to it, and it's depressed, I buy from it. My rule of thumb, though, in investing is I want to buy when I feel that a stock is undervalued. And when I value a stock, I come up with a point estimate. But that's, again, hubris, right? Because I made assumptions. The assumptions were revenues will grow 7%. But if you push me, I'd say, well, you know what? They probably can grow 5% to 9%. So over the last few years, I've taken to using Monte Carlo simulations in my valuation, partly because it forces me to be honest about how uncertain I am and then it forces me to be specific about how uncertain I am. And I get a distribution of value, that becomes my basis for deciding when to buy. So I'm not going to buy Apple when it drops to $139. My value is $140. It dropping to $139, I'm still with-- if you look at this distribution, I'm so close to my expected value. So by having a distribution, I can look up a trigger point and say-- and I have to set the trigger. It has to be at least 80% undervalue to kick in, which would be about $124 to $122 for Apple. That becomes the basis that I think about both buying and selling is in terms of distributions, not in terms of point estimates. SPEAKER 1: So do we have one live question from the audience? Yeah. AUDIENCE: So this actually echoes-- I guess you mentioned a Monte Carlo simulation. I actually did a Monte Carlo simulation for my PhD and part of my feeling is just that all of the assimilation-- simulations, number crunching, storytelling-- all of this is assumptions that goes into it, right? And it echoes the uncertainty, the prediction part you're talking about. At the end of the day, how do I know I made the right assumption? ASWATH DAMODARAN: The word you used was know. You never know. And that's something that-- and that's I said one of the biggest problems that number crunchers have is a psychological barrier you've got to overcome, which is we're so used at the end of a math problem to checking the answer and saying, I know I got it right. Look, I can check it. That's why accounting is so much more comfortable to do than valuation, right? Balance sheets have to balance. It balanced, I'm done. The problem in valuation, you get done with a valuation, and you look at it and say, how do I know I'm right? I'll tell you the answer, you don't. And you have to be OK with it. There is no confirmation mechanism that I can offer you. That's why I used the word faith. What's the essence of faith? Why do you go to church every week or temple every week? It's because you have faith that God exists. You say, prove it to me. I can prove it. The same thing applies in investing. If you ask me, prove to me that valuation works. I don't have proof, I have faith. And I can't pass that faith onto you. So when I teach my valuation class, I tell people, at the end of this class you have to decide for yourself whether this works for you. I can teach you how to value a company, but I can't give you faith. That's got to come from within. Maybe you will develop faith, maybe you will not. And if you don't develop faith, it's not the end of the world. You can buy ETFs and index funds and you'll be perfectly happy. And here is my definition of faith, and it's going to sound morbid. I ask people who are active investors, let's say you get to the age of 85, you're on your deathbed-- I told you it was a morbid thought-- and I come to you with some statistics. I say, look, over the last 60 years, you've been doing valuation and picking stocks and you made 8.13% a year. This is cruel and unusual to somebody on their deathbed. And then I say, you know what, if you had put your money in ETFs and index funds over the last 60 years, you would have made 8.22%. So you've spent 60 years of your life doing two hours of research every night and you've essentially made less money than you could have by just putting your money-- would you be OK with it? And if your answer is no, I tell people don't do active investing. I'd be OK with it. You know why? Because I enjoy the process so much that even if at the end of the game you told me, you're not going to make any money off this, I would say, I'm OK. I've had lots of fun doing it. And that's, to me, part of the reason the storytelling works is if I were just crunching through spreadsheets, I would drive myself crazy. Because when you do spreadsheets, you want affirmation-- I did all this hard work, I tortured myself. I need to be rewarded. And the market says, no, you don't need to be rewarded. I'm going to take away 20%. And your neighbor, who picks stock based on astrological signs, is making millions. You say, this is so unfair. It's the way the world is. So unfortunately, there is no way to know. But that's the part about faith is it might come, it might not. But it's got to come from within. AUDIENCE: And a small quick follow-up question is, when we look at valuation, how do we learn? For instance, if the numbers come back agreeing with my prediction, does it mean that I did a good job? How can I tell which part is my work, which part is not? ASWATH DAMODARAN: Here's what I tell myself. When I pick a stock and it goes up, the first thing I say is, I got lucky. And then I say, OK, maybe I did something on the side because luck is the dominant paradigm in this business. There's so much stuff that's out of your control that you really can't do much about. And it helps you both on the plus and the minus side. That's why I can be sanguine about the stocks that go down is you can't be selective. And this is what behavioral finance finds, when something works you want to claim credit by yourself. When something doesn't, what do you do? You blame the rest of the world. I mean, when I talk about taking ownership of your investments, what I'm talking about is taking ownership of both sides of the investments. So we need to behave exactly the same way when we win as we lose. And that's really tough to do. I have to force myself to try to do it and it doesn't come easily to me. SPEAKER 1: You've written about Facebook, about Amazon, about Apple. Traditional value investing has generally sort of put tech in a certain light because of the risk of, I guess, innovation disruption and whatnot. Do you think over time that has changed and does value investing in technology work well? ASWATH DAMODARAN: It should change. And I think part of the problem is we use the word tech to capture this very diverse set of companies now. In the 1980s, if you said tech, I'd have said, young, high growth, risky. Today when you say tech, you're talking about 22% of the market. And you're talking about companies that range the spectrum in life cycle. Intel is tech, but so is Facebook and so is Snap. But what do they share in common? One is a company that's I mean, not quite the walking dead, but if you think about Yahoo, so you can have walking dead tech companies which are essentially looking towards the exit and you can have companies growing. So a couple of years ago, I actually took every tech company in the US and I broke it down by age. It took the founding year and I then looked at the metrics by age. And tech companies age in what I call dog years. Do you know what I mean by dog years? A 20-year-old tech company is like a 140-year-old manufacturing company. Because the old man-- if you look at GM and how long GM and Ford took to go from start-up to mature company, it took them 60 years. They stayed at that cash cow status for about 30 and then they went into this long-term decline. A tech company, you look at it, the growth that took 60 years, you do in eight. That's the good news. The bad news is you don't get much of time to enjoy yourself as a cash cow. And then when you start declining, the drop is precipitous. So if you think about life cycles, the life cycle is a much steeper lifestyle. So in tech companies, I think we need to stop talking tech as a collective space and think about some of the best bargains in this market are in the old tech space. I'm talking the Microsofts, the Intels. These are cash cows. Can be disrupted? Sure. So can GM, so can Ford, so can Coca-Cola, so can McDonald's. What makes us think that just because you have a consumer product company, I can't disrupt you? Disruption is part of this process. So to me, ignoring tech because you feel it's too risky means that you're at least 75 years old. Because we have frames of references that come from the 1980s and the '90s that people are still carrying through. I was happy when Warren Buffett finally bought Apple because it's a small step, but for a long time his view was, I don't buy tech companies. In fact, his view was, I don't buy anything I don't understand. And that basically means 80% the world is going to go outside the domain if that's your definition of not being able to invest in things. So I think we need to start breaking tech into old tech, middle aged tech, and young tech. SPEAKER 1: This is a little bit more into accounting because you've written a lot about accounting. ASWATH DAMODARAN: I say very nasty things about accounting, so hopefully I don't have to say it [INAUDIBLE]. SPEAKER 1: Well, they still invite you to events and to give talks, so I'm hoping all is well. But you've written about reinvestment, growth and return on capital, and how these are connected and you talked about that in your talk as well. The question is about definitions. When you think about return on capital, capital can be defined as equity plus debt minus excess cash. Some people define capital as tangible capital that is used in operating the business. What really drives compounding? Is it the tangible capital and returns on tangible capital or is it how you define it and sort of I guess what I'm asking is what is the difference between the two approaches and how do you make sense of that? ASWATH DAMODARAN: The first thing is to stay away from the accounting definition from all of these things. And let me explain what I think about as reinvestment. You want to grow as a company. The question I want to ask you is, what do you have to spend money on to grow? When I ask that of a manufacturing company-- what do you have to spend money on, new factories, new plant, new equipment-- and old time accounting captures with the capex. You look at a pharmaceutical company, what do you invest in to grow? R&D. And what do accountants do with it? Screw it up big time, right? They treat it as an operating expense. And if I ask a company like Google, what do you have to reinvest to grow, you can already see the accounting definitions are not going to capture what you put money in to grow. You might have to grow by buying young technologies because that's what you need to bring into the space. So one of the things we need to do is stop getting focused on what does the accountant call capex. Because that's not going to capture what I want to call capex at a company like Google. Because that's the only way for me to be rational in the way I think about valuing these companies. If you're a consulting company, what do you have to invest in to grow? Human capital. So those recruiting and training expenses that you have, some of that at least should be treated like capex. So my definition of capex is not going to match an accountant's definition of capex because my definition of capex is driven by how quickly do you want to grow and what do you need to put money in to get that growth? SPEAKER 1: Same thing about capital, like tangible capital versus-- ASWATH DAMODARAN: Same thing. Once you make that definition. My invested capital at a company like Google will require me to capitalize R&D, right? Because if you put money in R&D and I do what the accountants do, it will never shop as-- SPEAKER 1: What about goodwill and non-operating assets and stuff like that? ASWATH DAMODARAN: Goodwill is kind of a useless area. It's the most dangerous variable ever created because it shows up when you do an acquisitions and accountants-- it's a plug variable. SPEAKER 1: So you would not count it. ASWATH DAMODARAN: I wouldn't count it as part of invested capital, simply because you could consistently keep [INAUDIBLE]. Because goodwill captures future growth, it captures stupidity, it captures premiums you're paying. It captures everything you do over and above that book value. So to me goodwill is a non-asset, right? SPEAKER 1: OK. Thank you so much for humoring us with our questions and your valuable time and talk. [APPLAUSE] Thank you so much.
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