In February 2013, my wife and I moved to Singapore.

2013年2月，我和妻子搬到了新加坡。

Exactly at the same time,

正是在同一時間。

Uber has announced it started operations in the country.

Uber宣佈在國內開始營運。

Now, my wife and I agree on a lot of things,

現在，我和我妻子在很多事情上都達成了一致。

but using Uber was definitely not one of them.

但使用Uber絕對不是其中之一。

While I was excited about the technology

當我對這項技術感到興奮時

and how maybe we don't need to own cars anymore,

以及如何也許我們不需要擁有汽車了。

she felt that every Uber car is here to steal jobs from taxi drivers.

她覺得每一輛Uber車都是來搶計程車司機的飯碗的。

And Sarah was not the only one.

而莎拉不是唯一的一個。

As the Ubers, Airbnbs and Amazons of the world --

作為世界上的Ubers、Airbnbs和Amazons --

what we call "online marketplaces" --

我們所說的 "網上市場"--

as they started expanding their presence,

因為他們開始擴大自己的存在。

we have heard, all of us, countless policymakers

我們聽到了，我們所有人，無數的政策制定者

worried about how to deal with these new risks

擔心如何應對這些新的風險

of job destruction, lower wages and tax leakage.

工作崗位被破壞、工資降低和稅收流失。

We've also heard company leaders

我們'也聽到公司上司

worried about aggressive competition from global platforms

擔心來自全球平臺的激進競爭

eating up their local businesses.

吞噬了他們的在地企業。

And on the rational level, of course I understand.

而在理性層面，我當然明白。

After all, this is basic supply and demand economics.

畢竟，這是基本的供求經濟學。

If, in any market, you dramatically increase supply,

如果在任何市場上，你大幅增加供應。

you should expect prices, profitability and growth to go down

你應該預期價格、利潤率和增長都會下降。

for existing players.

對於現有玩家來說。

But in my personal experience,

但以我個人的經驗來看。

I've also seen the other side of the story.

我'也看到了故事的另一面。

Where online marketplaces,

凡是在線市場。

like Gojek in Indonesia or Jumia in Africa,

如印尼的Gojek或非洲的Jumia。

have helped their business ecosystems and the communities around them.

已經幫助他們的商業生態系統和周圍的社區。

The positive side I have seen

我所看到的積極的一面

demonstrated itself in a woman, a taxi driver in Egypt,

在埃及的一名女子、一名計程車司機身上表現出來。

that now had the opportunity to work

現在有機會工作的人

without the harassment she faced in the taxi business.

沒有她在計程車行業面臨的騷擾。

It demonstrated itself through a village in Kenya

它通過肯亞的一個村莊展示了自己

that got an economic boost,

，得到了經濟的推動。

because the nearby beautiful but completely unknown lake

因為附近有一個美麗而又完全陌生的湖泊

is now becoming a national ecotourism spot.

現在正成為國家級生態旅遊景區。

Online marketplaces will continue to grow.

在線市場將繼續增長。

And they will transform the way we shop,

而它們將改變我們的購物方式。

the way we travel

行路

and the way we transact with each other.

以及我們之間的交易方式。

So we really need to understand

所以我們真的需要了解

where is the truth between those two stories.

這兩個故事的真相在哪裡。

Should we expect more of the bright side

我們是否應該期待更多光明的一面

or more of the dark and worrying side?

還是更多的黑暗和擔憂的一面？

And is there a way to get the first without getting the second?

那有沒有一種方法可以在不得到第二種的情況下得到第一種呢？

I believe there is.

我相信有。

As a strategy consultant, I study businesses for a living.

作為一名戰略顧問，我以研究企業為生。

And as a mathematician at heart,

而作為一個數學家的內心。

I couldn't live with something and its opposite being equally true.

我無法忍受某件事情，而它的反面也同樣如此。

So, I went back to fundamentals, and I asked the question:

於是，我回到了基本面，我問了這個問題。

What do online marketplaces really do?

網上市場到底是做什麼的？

What do they do?

他們是幹什麼的？

Well, at their core,

嗯，在他們的核心。

they're doing something very simple.

他們'在做一些很簡單的事情。

They match sellers and buyers.

他們為賣家和買家牽線搭橋。

That's it.

就是這樣。

For drivers and passengers,

對於司機和乘客來說。

you get Uber, Grab in Southeast Asia

在東南亞，你會得到Uber、Grab

or DiDi in China.

或中國的DiDi。

For matching merchants and consumers,

用於匹配商家和消費者。

you get Amazon, Alibaba or Jumia in Africa.

你在非洲得到亞馬遜、阿里巴巴或Jumia。

And for housing, you get Airbnb;

而對於住房，你會得到Airbnb。

for fundraising, you get Kickstarter --

為了籌集資金，你得到Kickstarter --

the list goes on.

不勝枚舉

What all these examples have in common

所有這些例子的共同點是

is that they transition this basic functionality

是他們過渡這個基本功能

of matching sellers and buyers

賣方和買方匹配的問題

from the physical world to the digital world.

從物理世界到數字世界。

And by doing so,

而通過這樣做。

they can find better matches,

他們可以找到更好的匹配。

do it faster

加快

and ultimately, unlock more value for everyone.

並最終為大家釋放更多價值。

In fact, online marketplaces' core benefit

事實上，在線市場'的核心利益。

is that they get us more from the same amount of effort.

是他們用同樣的努力讓我們得到更多。

For example,

例如：

if you're a taxi driver in San Francisco

如果你是一個計程車司機在舊金山

and you decide to work 10 hours per day,

而你決定每天工作10小時。

then you're actually having a paying passenger in your car

那麼你'實際上有一個付費乘客在你的車。

for four hours out of the 10.

10個小時中的4個小時。

If you take the same car and put it on a platform like Uber,

如果你把同樣的車，放在Uber這樣的平臺上。

you can have paying passengers

有錢人

for an additional one and a half hours.

延長一個半小時。

This is the same car becoming 40 percent more productive.

這就是同樣的汽車成為40%的生產力。

And the same has been proven true for other online marketplaces.

而其他網絡市場也已經證明了這一點。

By design, they create more value for the economy.

從設計上看，它們為經濟創造了更多的價值。

Now, we need to figure out who gets this additional value.

現在，我們需要弄清楚誰能得到這個額外的價值。

You can give it to the drivers --

你可以把它給司機 --

more passengers, more income.

更多的乘客，更多的收入。

You can give it to consumers, if you reduce prices.

你可以給消費者，如果你降價。

Or you can decide that the platform gets to keep all of it.

或者你可以決定，平臺可以保留所有的錢。

What usually happens is that all three of them

通常的情況是，他們三個人

would somehow split it.

會以某種方式將其分割。

But what about the rest of us?

但我們其他人呢？

We can also be impacted

我們也會受到影響

without being on either sides of this business.

而不在這一行的任何一方。

If my neighbor decides to rent his apartment on Airbnb,

如果我的鄰居決定在Airbnb上出租他的公寓，

and we have more people coming in and out of the building,

而且我們有更多的人進進出出的建築。

more noise than usual,

比平時更多的噪音。

then I'm getting an unpleasant side effect of this productivity magic.

那麼我'這種生產力魔力就會產生不愉快的副作用。

This is what economists would call a "negative externality."

這就是經濟學家所說的 "負外部性"。

The negative externality of Uber cars becoming more productive

Uber汽車變得更有生產力的負外部性

is taxi drivers seeing the value of their licenses drop

計程車司機是否看到自己的執照價值下降？

by as much as 30 percent in New York, for example.

以紐約為例，他們覺得價值下降達到百分之三十。

This is the dark side.

這就是黑暗面。

And this is what sparks street demonstrations

這就是引發街頭示威的原因

and sometimes, sometimes, even violence.

有時，有時，甚至是暴力。

I profoundly believe this is avoidable.

我深刻地認為，這是可以避免的。

And it became clearer to me

然後我就明白了

the more I have spent time in emerging markets.

我在新興市場的時間越多。

In fact, during my time in Singapore,

其實，在新加坡期間，我。

I spent half of any given week traveling in the region,

我花了半周的時間在該地區旅行。

between Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia,

馬來西亞、泰國、印度尼西亞之間。

and I became a user --

我成了一個用戶 --

actually, more of a fan --

其實比較像是粉絲 -

of online marketplaces that were not that well-known back then.

的在線市場，當時還沒有那麼知名。

But some of them made interesting strategic trade-offs

但其中一些人做出了有趣的戰略取捨。

that dramatically reduced their side effects,

大大降低了他們的副作用。

their externalities.

其外部性；

Take Gojek, for example.

以Gojek為例。

They're basically Uber for motor bikes.

他們'基本上是電動自行車的Uber。

They are one of the most liked online marketplaces in Indonesia,

他們是印尼最受歡迎的在線市場之一。

and this has a lot to do with the role they chose to play.

而這與他們選擇扮演的角色有很大關係。

Instead of picking a fight

而不是找茬

with every other transportation option out there,

與其他所有的交通選擇有。

they choose to gradually integrate them within their own platform,

他們選擇在自己的平臺內逐步整合。

so that without leaving the Gojek app,

以至於不用離開Gojek應用。

you can check the public transportation schedule

您可以查看公共交通工具的時刻表

and choose to take a bus for a long distance.

並選擇乘坐公車長途跋涉。

Then, maybe, a motorbike or a traditional taxi

然後，也許，一輛摩托車或傳統的計程車。

that you can order and pay for from within the same app.

您可以在同一應用程序中訂購和支付。

If you look at Gojek today,

如果你看看今天的Gojek。

nine out of 10 previous motor taxi drivers

十人中有九人

believe their quality of life has improved after joining the platform.

認為他們的生活品質在加入平臺後有所提高。

And nine out of 10 consumers --

而10個消費者中有9個...

nine out of 10 --

十有八九 --

believe that Gojek has a positive impact on society in general.

相信Gojek對整個社會有著積極的影響。

Now, this level of trust is what allowed Gojek to grow

現在，這種程度的信任是Gojek成長的原因。

into what is today a super online marketplace for everything

變成了今天的超級網上市場，什麼都有。

from food to grocery

從食品到雜貨

even massages and laundry pickups.

甚至是按摩和取衣。

It all came from a deliberate trade-off

這一切都來自於刻意的取捨。

to be an orchestrator of a bigger ecosystem

成為一個更大的生態系統的協調者。

where others also have their role to play,

在這裡，其他人也要發揮自己的作用。

instead of a single winner, a hero,

而不是單一的贏家，英雄。

that takes for himself what would, at the end, be a smaller pie.

這對他自己來說，最後會是一個小餡餅。

Another interesting example is Jumia.

另一個有趣的例子是Jumia。

Jumia is the equivalent of Amazon in Africa.

Jumia相當於非洲的亞馬遜。

But they don't generate the same level of fear

但他們不會產生同樣程度的恐懼。

in the small-business community.

在小企業界。

And one of the reasons for that

其中一個原因是

is because they have decided to actively invest

是因為他們決定積極投資

in African entrepreneurs,

在非洲企業家中。

to grow them into the digital age.

使他們成長為數字時代的一員。

Now keep in mind,

現在請記住：

Jumia is operating in countries with some of the lowest digital literacy

Jumia在一些數字素養最低的國家開展業務。

and digital connectivity scores in the world.

和數字互聯互通的成績在全球。

Now they could have dealt with that

現在他們可以處理好了

the usual way, through lobbying for reforms --

通過通常的方式，通過遊說改革 -- -- --

and they probably do that --

他們可能會這樣做 -

but they have also built Jumia University,

但他們也建立了朱米亞大學。

an e-learning platform

網絡學習平臺

where merchants can come and learn basic digital and business skills.

在這裡，商家可以來學習基本的數字和商業技能。

We have studied online marketplaces in Africa last year.

我們去年研究了非洲的在線市場。

And during that study, we have met one of Jumia's merchants.

而在這次學習中，我們認識了一位朱米亞'的商家。

His name is Jomo.

他的名字叫Jomo。

He was fired from his job in 2014,

他在2014年被解僱。

and at that time, he decided he wanted to become his own boss.

而在那個時候，他決定要成為自己的老闆。

He wanted to be independent.

他想獨立。

He also wanted to never be fired again.

他還想再也不被解僱。

So at that time,

所以當時。

Jomo had no clue what a business is.

喬莫根本不知道什麼是生意。

So he needed to go through a series of trainings

所以他需要經過一系列的培訓。

to learn how to select products, how to price them

學習如何選擇產品，如何定價。

and how to promote them online.

以及如何在網上推廣。

Today, Jomo has a 10-employee online business.

如今，喬莫已經擁有了10名員工的網絡業務。

And as of a few months ago,

而在幾個月前。

he just opened his very first brick-and-mortar shop

他剛開了他的第一家實體店。

in the suburbs of Nairobi.

在內羅畢郊區。

Now, through its university,

現在，通過其大學。

Jumia has the potential of helping a huge number of Jomos.

朱米亞有可能幫助大量的朱莫斯。

And we have estimated that together with other online marketplaces

而我們估計，連同其他網上市場

on the continent,

在大陸。

they can generate three million additional jobs by 2025.

到2025年，它們可以創造300萬個額外的就業機會。

And they would do that either directly,

而他們會這樣做，要麼直接。

or through their impact on the wider community.

或通過其對更廣泛社會的影響。

And sometimes,

有時候

taking that wider impact into consideration

考慮到這一更廣泛的影響

or forgetting about it

或者忘記了

can make or break a platform.

可以成就或打破一個平臺。

To illustrate that, let's go back to Singapore.

為了說明這一點，讓我們回到新加坡。

So, when we decided with my wife to leave the country last year,

所以，當去年我們和妻子決定出國的時候。

Uber decided to do the same.

Uber也決定這麼做。

At the same time,

同時。

again, we started to see that pattern,

再次，我們開始看到這種模式。

but maybe it's a coincidence.

但也許這是'的巧合。

In reality, Uber lost the ride-hailing battle

現實中，Uber輸掉了打車之戰。

to a Malaysian-born start-up called Grab.

到馬來西亞出生的一家名為Grab的創業公司。

Now, interestingly,

現在，有趣的是。

my wife didn't have the same level of concerns with Grab,

我的妻子沒有'對Grab有同樣程度的關注。

because when Grab started, it had a different name.

因為當Grab開始時，它有一個不同的名字。

It was called MyTeksi,

它叫MyTeksi。

and as the name suggests, it started as a platform for taxis.

而顧名思義，它最初是一個計程車平臺。

So when Grab started expanding the driver pool beyond taxis,

所以，當Grab開始將司機庫擴大到計程車之外時。

it was seen as gradual and reasonable.

它被認為是漸進和合理的。

They were also very careful while doing so.

他們在這樣做的時候，也是非常小心的。

They thought of what kind of social safety net

他們想的是什麼樣的社會安全網

they should bring to all drivers.

他們應該給所有司機帶來。

So they put in place special insurance packages

所以，他們推出了特別的保險套餐

and even financial education programs.

甚至金融教育項目。

Now, compare that with what happened in London,

現在，將其與倫敦發生的事情進行比較。

in New York, in Paris,

在紐約，在巴黎。

where taxi drivers didn't feel that the platforms understood

在那裡，計程車司機並不覺得平臺理解了

they had to pay 200,000 euros for their license --

他們不得不支付200,000歐元的許可證 --

and mostly in loans.

且多為貸款。

When you don't take that kind of social environmental information

當你不接受這樣的社會環境資訊時

into account,

考慮到。

you get strong reactions.

你會得到強烈的反應。

I'm not trying to argue that the trade-offs

我並不是想爭辯說，權衡利弊。

by either Grab or Jumia or Gojek are risk-free.

無論是Grab還是Jumia或Gojek都是無風險的。

Did they slow down growth at some point, temporarily?

他們是否在某些時候，暫時放緩了增長速度？

Maybe.

也許吧

But look at them today.

但看看今天的他們。

Gojek is worth 10 billion dollars.

戈耶克身價100億美元。

Jumia is one of only three unicorns in the whole of Africa.

朱米亞是整個非洲僅有的三家獨角獸之一。

And Grab, well, they pushed out Uber

而Grab呢，他們把Uber推出來了。

out of the whole region of Southeast Asia.

在整個東南亞地區中，出。

And I also think these trade-offs have nothing specific to emerging markets.

而且我也認為這些取捨並不是新興市場所特有的。

Amazon or Uber or others can learn from them

亞馬遜或Uber或其他公司可以向他們學習

and adapt them to their own realities.

並根據自己的實際情況進行調整。

In the long run,

從長遠來看。

this doesn't need to be a zero-sum game.

這不需要是一個零和遊戲。

In the long run --

從長遠來看 -- --

and this is maybe the Asian side of me speaking --

這也許是我說的亞洲的一面 --

it pays to be patient.

要有耐心

It pays to reconsider your goal and your priorities

重新考慮你的目標和你的優先事項是有好處的。

in the light of a much bigger equation

從更大的角度看

that includes you and your users, of course,

當然，這包括你和你的用戶。

but also it includes regulators,

但也包括監管機構。

policymakers, your communities.

政策制定者，你們的社區。

And I would argue, above all,

而我想說的是，最重要的是。

it includes the very businesses you are meant to disrupt.