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I'm James Ladyman,
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol.
My name's Samir Okasha, I'm Professor of Philosophy of Science
in the Philosophy Department, University of Bristol.
The topic we're going to discuss concerns the status of ethics,
in particular, objective versus subjective views of ethics.
According to the subjective view,
there are no facts of the matter about ethical questions.
For example, if someone says "euthanasia is right"
and someone else says "euthanasia is wrong",
ultimately, that's a matter of subjective taste, not scientific fact.
So if that's the case,
why do people think they're having disagreements
that can be resolved by argument?
After all, if I say "chocolate ice cream's nice"
and you say "No, it isn't",
there's nothing more to be discussed
because we acknowledge that each of us is expressing our taste
and there's no further fact of the matter.
One of the strongest arguments for the subjective view,
which in part responds to that objection,
is the fact that different communities around the world at different times
have held widely divergent ethical views.
Some people have thought, for example, it's OK to perform honour killing
of young girls who get pregnant out of wedlock.
Other communities find that to be an abhorrent thing to do.
And you can think of many examples like that.
A natural response to that
that the subjective view gives is to say
"That's because there's no fact of the matter in the first place".
It's a bit like a preference for chocolate ice cream over strawberry.
There are also widespread divergences
in beliefs among different cultures
about matters that we're not tempted to regard as not factual.
For example, different cultures have disagreed
about whether or not the Earth is round
as opposed to flat
or about the origins of the universe of the nature of matter.
The difference with the ethical case is that, in those scientific cases,
there's a reasonably agreed-upon method
for establishing which answer is correct,
even if it's hard sometimes.
In the ethical case, there don't seem to be any comparable methods
to decide whether, for example, euthanasia is or is not morally wrong.
I take your point that we can't do experiments
to find out the answer to ethical questions, however,
we do have procedures and methods.
One of those methods is the method of rational persuasion which people use
in attempting to bring others round to their moral point of view.
So if we think of the Abolitionist Movement
or the campaign for the emancipation of women,
in both cases, a large part of their methods
were that rational persuasion of other people through argument,
so how do you explain what's going on in that process
from a subjectivist point of view?
It's certainly true that, from a subjective point of view,
it's difficult to account for the idea
that we've made moral progress, for example.
We all tend to believe that we have made moral progress,
we've moved from times when slavery was dominant
to its abolition, say, over a period of a few hundred years -
and that seems to be progress.
But a subjectivist will say that it doesn't follow
that we've learnt the truth of some factual thing about the world
like slavery is wrong, where we used to think slavery was OK.
But a subjectivist will try to account for our sense of moral progress
without appealing to the idea
that it involved apprehending the truth
about objective moral facts.
Yeah, that's interesting. I'm not yet persuaded
that we have a reason to deny
that there are ethical truths.