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  • Professor Robert Shiller: Today's lecture is about

  • behavioral finance and this is a term that emerged into public

  • consciousness around the mid-1990s;

  • before that it was unknown. The term "efficient markets" is

  • much older; I mentioned the idea goes back

  • to the nineteenth century and the term goes back to the 1960s.

  • But behavioral finance is a newer revolution in finance and

  • it's something that I have been very involved with.

  • I have been organizing workshops in behavioral finance

  • ever since 1991, working with Professor Richard

  • Thaler at University of Chicago. We've been doing that for

  • eighteen years; amazing, that's a long time for

  • you, right? When we started we were total

  • outcasts, we thought; nobody appreciated us.

  • I had tenure so I could do it but the problem is,

  • you don't want to do things that are too out of fashion.

  • Fortunately, we have a system that allows it

  • to happen and I'm very happy to have that.

  • What behavioral finance is a reaction against extreme--some

  • extremes--that we see in efficient markets theory or also

  • in mathematical finance. Mathematical finance is a

  • beautiful structure and I admire what the people have done and

  • I've worked in it myself, but it has its limits.

  • Eventually--you know the way a paradigm develops--it goes

  • through a certain phase. When mathematical finance was

  • new, say in the 1960s, it was the exciting thing and

  • nobody wanted to work on anything else;

  • you wanted to be doing the exciting thing.

  • As the '70s and '80s wore on, it got to be a little bit

  • overdone; people run with it too far,

  • they think that's all we want to do, and we don't want to

  • think about anything else. Then they start to get

  • sometimes a little crazy. Than we had to reflect that,

  • well, things aren't perfect. The world isn't perfect and we

  • have real people in the world, so that led to the behavioral

  • finance. Behavioral finance really

  • means--what does it mean? It's not like behavioral

  • psychology. It doesn't mean behavioral

  • psychology applied to finance. It really means something much

  • more broad than that. It means all of the other

  • social sciences applied to finance.

  • The economics department is just one of many departments in

  • the university that teaches us something about how people

  • behave, so if we want to understand how

  • people behave we can't rely only on the economics department.

  • I think that it's coming around to a unifying of our

  • understanding. Since then--since the

  • beginnings in the '90s, our behavioral finance

  • workshops have grown and grown and,

  • of course, so many people are involved in it now;

  • it's now very well-established. Before I get into that,

  • I want to give some additional reflections on the last lecture.

  • I have this chart, which you saw last

  • time--actually it's an Excel spreadsheet that--I also put it

  • up already on the classes V2 website so you can play with it.

  • I just want to reflect again--I know I'm repeating myself a

  • little bit, but it's very important.

  • What we have in this chart is the blue line,

  • which is the Standard & Poor Composite Stock Price

  • Index going back to 1871--from 1871 to 2008,

  • right now--so that's like 130 years of data.

  • That's the blue line. You can see the--do you know

  • what that is there? That's 1929 and that is the

  • Crash of 1929. Well, actually it extended to

  • 1932 and you can see other historic movements.

  • There's the bull market of the 1990s--a very big upswing--and

  • then there's the crash from 2000 to 2003.

  • I don't know if you remember these things,

  • they were big news, not as big as the 1929 crash,

  • but the upswing was just as big as the 1920s upswing,

  • wasn't it? Here's the 1920s upswing and

  • here's the 1990s upswing--huge upswing in stock prices.

  • This is in logs, by the way, so that means that

  • everything--the same vertical distance refers to the same

  • percentage change in the price. Then I had, as I said last

  • period, I have a random walk shown--that's the pink line.

  • The random walk is generated by the random number generator.

  • I fixed the random number generator, so I made it truly

  • normal this time. It slows it down a little bit,

  • but if you press F9 we get another random walk,

  • but it's always the same stock price.

  • This is a random walk with a trend that matches the uptrend

  • of the stock price. I can press--it kind of looks

  • similar, doesn't it? It kind of shows that in some

  • basic sense the stock market and the random walk are the same.

  • Here we have the crash of--here we have the market peak of 1929

  • except it turned out in this simulation to have occurred in

  • 1910 or thereabout. Then we have the--that's The

  • Depression of the '30s except it's not the '30s.

  • I can just push a button and we get something else.

  • I find this amusing. I don't know.

  • Unfortunately, we live through only one of

  • these in our lifetime. There's a TV show about

  • parallel universes, right?

  • What's the name of that show? I can't remember it.

  • Don't you know this show? Where they go in some kind of

  • time machine and they emerge in another parallel universe where

  • history took another course. Well anyway,

  • these are parallel universes that we see.

  • In some of these universes, Jeremy Siegel would write his

  • book, Stocks for the Long Run,

  • and in some of them he would not becausewell,

  • this one he might not because in this case the stock market

  • was just declining for the better part of a century.

  • The thing I don't see in these charts and I think we haven't

  • captured it perfectly with just the standard random walk is I

  • don't see any crash as big as the 1929 crash.

  • It's hard to get them. I keep pushing F9--this just

  • seems to dominate, right?

  • There's nothing as big here--press F9 again--you can

  • keep pushing and pushing, maybe you'll get one but you

  • have--you get the idea that there's something anomalous

  • about that crash from the standpoint of this random walk

  • theory. I'm not getting one, right?

  • That's something that we'll talk about.

  • I would--I'm not--I can push for a long time and I don't

  • see--well there's a pretty big one.

  • Isn't that just about as--not quite as sharp as the 1929

  • crash, but it's hard to get them.

  • I think that one thingthere are a couple

  • of things that we'll come back to.

  • One is--I think I've already mentioned it--fat tales.

  • Stock price movements have a tendency to show some extreme

  • outliers that are not represented by the normal

  • distribution. But also, there are variations

  • in the variance. So, in this period here--in the

  • '20s and '30s--the stock market was extremely variable on a

  • day-to-day basis; it was way beyond anything

  • we've observed since. So, that's why it seems to be

  • more volatile in that period because the accumulation of

  • bigger random shocks. Anyway, we can play this game

  • for a while but now I want to go and talk about--remember that

  • the random walk that we see in stock prices is not the behavior

  • of a drunk, even though you can describe a

  • random walk as drunken behavior. The idea in the theory is that

  • these movements only appear random because they're news and

  • news is always unpredictable. If the market is doing the best

  • job--this is efficient markets--in predicting the

  • future, that means then that any time

  • the stock market moves it's because something surprising

  • happened. Like there might be a new

  • breakthrough in science or there could be war or something

  • outside--this is the story--outside of the economic

  • system that disrupts things. The next question

  • thennow, I've added something--it's on

  • this little tab here--I've added something, which is a plot of

  • present values. This is something that I

  • published in 1981. That's a long time ago,

  • isn't it? It was my first big success.

  • Not everyone liked this article, but what I had--I got

  • into a lot of trouble for it. I learned some people react

  • with hostility when you offend their cherished beliefs,

  • so I was on the outs for a while with this article.

  • I said, it's kind of interesting to think that all

  • these apparently random movements are really resulting

  • in news about something that is fundamental--that's the

  • efficient markets. Every time the stock market

  • moves it's because there was some news about what?

  • Well, it's about present value. The efficient markets theory,

  • in its simplest incarnation, says that the price is the

  • expected present value of future dividends.

  • What I did, in a paper that I published in 1981,

  • is I said, well let's just plot the present value of dividends

  • through time. That's how I constructed this

  • long time series back to 1871; nobody else was looking at it.

  • Typically, researchers want the best data, the high quality

  • data, and so they would look at recent data,

  • which was the best data, and they would think going back

  • to 1871 is crazy because that's so long ago.

  • We have daily or minute-by-minute data by now,

  • but we can't get it for that remote period.

  • On the one hand, as I argued,

  • the stock market is pricing things that occur over long

  • periods of time. The present value formula is

  • pricing dividends into the future, decades into the

  • future--well, actually to the infinite

  • future, but most of the weight is on the next few decades.

  • So, we can't evaluate the theory by just looking at ten

  • years of data we've got to get a lot of data.

  • What I did then in that paper was I computed the actual

  • present value of subsequent dividends for each year--that's

  • on this tab--and compared it with the stock price;

  • so that's what I did. This is an update of a plot

  • that I showed in my 1981 American Economic Review paper.

  • The blue line--because when I published it I was right here.

  • It's amazing how time goes by; it was 1979, I was right here.

  • We had just come off from the big stock market drop of the--it

  • was the '73-'75 drop and it was a couple of years later,

  • so we were kind of bumbling around down here.

  • We didn't have any idea whether this was coming at the time.

  • What I did was I just, for each year,

  • computed the present value of the dividend.

  • I have a dividend series for every year.

  • In fact, it's right over here. I have to--this is the data,

  • so I have the--this is the S&P Price Index monthly,

  • back to 1871, and here are the dividends they

  • paid per share every year since 1871.

  • I just, for each year, I took all subsequent dividends

  • and I priced them out at the present value formula and I used

  • the constant discount rate of 6% a year.

  • So, you see how we get what the present value was.

  • Of course, there's a problem because we don't know dividends

  • after 2007 because we don't have data on dividends past then.

  • But, I just made some assumptions, so the value at the

  • end is maybe a little bit arbitrary.

  • It could be dragged up or down if I made a different assumption

  • about dividends at the end. More or less,

  • this is going to be what actually the present value of

  • dividends was over this whole period.

  • Here's the dilemma--this is what I said in my 1981

  • article--this is the thing that is supposed to be forecasted.

  • That's the present value and the blue line is the forecast of

  • that thing. Then you ask,

  • does this look like a good forecast?

  • Were people doing a good job of forecasting the red line with

  • the blue line? Now, that may be a loaded

  • question; but, I think that you get the

  • impression that there's something possibly wrong here

  • with efficient markets because the red line is just a smooth

  • growth path like nothing happens to it and yet the stock market

  • is going up and down all over the place.

  • It's a little bit like if you had a weather forecaster and

  • this morning he says, I predict today that the low

  • today will be -100º and then two days later he

  • says, I predict that the low today

  • will be +150º. You would eventually start

  • concluding that this weather forecaster can't be trusted

  • because we never get to those temperatures.

  • That's sort of what the stock market is doing;

  • it's fluctuating much more than the thing that's forecasted.

  • You've got to be careful; I ended up with so many critics.

  • There are lots of issues here that--some people said,

  • well people don't know where the red line was last period.

  • And other people said, well you just are showing one

  • reality for the realization--you're

  • showing--they kind of get back to this parallel universe story.

  • There must be another universe where there's another Earth and

  • where everything looks the same except that the red line did

  • something very different; that could be.

  • So, people are saying, you never know,

  • there could have been a communist revolution in America

  • in the 1930s and they could have nationalized the whole stock

  • market and then the red line would be down at zero--they

  • would have taken the whole thing.

  • Or there could have been some good news, some great

  • breakthrough that we haven't discovered yet but in another

  • reality they could have. So, all this noise in the stock

  • market could have somehow been new information about things

  • that didn't happen. I think we're getting kind of

  • philosophical when we go to that.

  • The point is that we've never seen any movement in the present

  • value of dividends that would justify the movement.

  • If we knew the future with certainty, according to this

  • model, then the stock market would behave like the red line,

  • not like the blue line.

  • Well, anyway. For example,

  • let's look at the Great Depression of the 1930s,

  • at the very least I think this chart will reveal some

  • misconceptions that some people have.

  • The Great Depression of the 1930s was awful,

  • right? I mean you hear these stories;

  • I assume you hear these stories. We had 25% unemployment at the

  • peak--it sounds really bad. We had people selling apples on

  • the street; you must know these images,

  • right? It sounds awful,

  • but look what happened to p* in the Great

  • Depression. I can hardly see anything.

  • Well, what actually happened was businesses continued paying

  • their dividends right through the whole Depression and some of

  • them cut their dividends, but it was only for a few years.

  • The present value of--the value of stock depends on what it pays

  • out over decades not just next year.

  • The stock market--if people knew the--even if they knew the

  • depression was coming, they shouldn't have marked down

  • the stock market so much, according to this simple

  • efficient markets story--according to the present

  • value story. At the very least,

  • I think that this diagram helps you to see what is wrong or what

  • simple theories are wrong. So, it must be that if the

  • stock market is reacting to new information over all this

  • century of history, it must have been new

  • information about things that just didn't happen.

  • It could be that an asteroid almost struck the Earth and then

  • it just missed and so the stock market crashed.

  • Then when it missed it came back up again,

  • so we don't see any interruption in dividends.

  • But it has to be something like that.

  • The problem is, I can't think of anything like

  • that. I don't think that any asteroid

  • came close to the Earth--not close enough to be worried

  • about--and I can't think the communist revolution had much

  • chance of taking place in the United States--but you can

  • imagine--so we don't know. Behavioral finance kind of

  • tends to reach the opposite conclusion: that this volatility

  • in the stock market is the sign of something else;

  • it's some social force, some speculative bubbles,

  • some activity that is not related to anything fundamental.

  • The reason I got so much hostility when I wrote these

  • papers is I was striking a nerve,

  • I guess, because many people have developed these beautiful

  • mathematical theories that said that the stock market was the

  • optimal predictor of everything and I was saying the emperor has

  • no clothes; so there were others like that.

  • What is happening? What I'm coming around to

  • think--maybe it's my cynical view, I've always been a cynic.

  • I don't know if you are cynics or not, but I think people

  • convinced themselves of things. They--people think they

  • understand things better than they do.

  • You spend your whole life looking at this one picture of

  • the stock market and you think you have an explanation for all

  • of it--all rational good--but it's just over-confidence that's

  • doing that; it's an illusion.

  • I want to talk about over-confidence and I thought

  • I'd trythere's also no eraser.

  • Can you find another eraser? There's probably one in this

  • closet.

  • I wanted to try an experiment of asking you a series of a few

  • short questions. It's a game we'll play,

  • which I'll need your cooperation with.

  • So, these are questions about over-confidence.

  • Actually, I just want you to try to give me 90% confidence

  • intervals for the answers to these questions.

  • Do you know what a 90% confidence interval is?

  • It's, for example, if I were to ask you what--how

  • many people are there in New Haven?

  • I want you to not just give me a number, I want you to give me

  • a range such that you're 90% sure that you're right.

  • I could say, well, it's between 90,000 and

  • 100,000 people and I'm 90% sure I'm right.

  • If you give me a true 90% confidence interval,

  • then you should be right 90% of the time, right?

  • What I'm going to do is give you a few questions and ask you

  • for a 90--ask you to write down--you have a piece of paper

  • there--a 90% confidence interval.

  • I have five questions; this is just an experiment.

  • The first one is about the Statue of Liberty.

  • What does it weigh in pounds--in tons?

  • Good, thank you. So, weight.

  • Incidentally, just to remind you,

  • a U.S. ton is 2,000 pounds--not a

  • British pound, which is 2,240 pounds--and a

  • ton is 907 kilograms. Can you write down on your

  • paper your 90% confidence interval?

  • For example, I won't use realistic numbers.

  • If you thought it was--you might write down,

  • it's between one pound and three pounds and that you're 90%

  • sure it falls in that interval. I didn't say--its tons, tons.

  • I'm asking--it's more than a pound--I'll give you a hint,

  • it's in tons. Let me also say,

  • we're not weighing the base. The Statue of Liberty stands on

  • a tall edifice; we're not counting that but

  • we're counting also the steel reinforcing that they put in a

  • few years ago. Remember, the Statue of Liberty

  • was getting weak and they were worried that something might

  • topple down, so they reinforced it and we're

  • counting that. So, it's a copper structure

  • with steel reinforcement. Can you write down on your

  • notes a range within which you're 90% sure that the statue

  • weighs, in tons?

  • If you could do that--I'm going to come back--what I'm going to

  • do is come back and see how often you are right so we'll go

  • back through these. Have you all written down a

  • weight for the Statute of Liberty?

  • Population of the country, Turkey.

  • Since I don't have the current population, I want it in the

  • year 2000. I didn't get the latest

  • estimate; so, how many people were there

  • in Turkey in 2000? And again, put down a range,

  • a low and a high, that's 90% sure.

  • Third, the Sahara Desert.

  • How many square miles in the Sahara Desert?

  • Remember that a square mile is 2.6 square kilometers;

  • just in case you think in terms of kilometers,

  • you can devise your answer in kilometers and then multiply by

  • 2.6. Again, write down a range.

  • Enrollment at Yale.

  • By the way, I should have asked, you have to be honest

  • with it. You could game me by writing

  • really wide intervals for nine of ten questions and then an

  • extremely narrow interval for the tenth.

  • I'm expecting some sincere cooperation here--then you would

  • guarantee that you were right exactly 90% of the time,

  • right? I mean, you could say the

  • Statute of Liberty weighs between zero and a hundred

  • quintillion tons and you know you're right.

  • Then you could deliberately say the population of Turkey is

  • between one and two people and then you know you're wrong.

  • You could do--you're not supposed to do that.

  • I want the enrollment in Yale; I don't have the latest

  • number--2005. That's the total number of

  • students at Yale University in 2005, including Yale College and

  • all the graduate schools. The fifth question is about the

  • Pulitzer Prize.

  • Do you know this prize? It's a prize that journalists

  • win for writing great articles or books.

  • I want to know, what is--how much do you get in

  • cash if you win the Pulitzer Prize?

  • I have it for last year, 2007; it might be different in 2008,

  • so I'm asking for the 2007, in dollars.

  • I hope you were honest in putting confidence intervals.

  • Have you gotten them? Now, what I'm going to do,

  • if you've answered all five questions, I'm going to tell you

  • the answers--the correct answer--and then ask for a show

  • of hands of how many--please be honest and don't be embarrassed.

  • Raise your hand if you were right, meaning that if my answer

  • falls within your 90% confidence interval, okay?

  • Let's go to the Statue of Liberty.

  • The Statue of Liberty weighs 252 tons.

  • So, can I have a show of hands--how many people here have

  • 252 in the interval? You're doing fairly well;

  • what fractionkeep your hands up--looks like it's about,

  • what would you say, 20-25%?

  • Thank you for being honest and not gaming me.

  • It should have been 90% who were right.

  • What is the 2000 population of Turkey?

  • I'll give you the exact number that I got from their statistic:

  • 65,666,677. That's a little over sixty-five

  • million. How many people have that in

  • their interval? That's better;

  • that's like 40%--40% or 50%. You're doing better but it's

  • still not 90%. How many square miles in the

  • Sahara Desert? 3.5 million.

  • Can I get a show of hands--how many were right on that?

  • Well, this one really got you, that was like 5%.

  • Was anyone right on all of them so far?

  • Nobody. Enrollment in Yale, Fall 2005?

  • 11,483 students. How many were right?

  • Okay, that's about 40%--right close to 40%,

  • I'd say. Finally, how much do you win

  • if--how much do you receive if you win the Pulitzer Prize?

  • $10,000. Can I have a show of hands?

  • That was really low, that's like 5%.

  • I knew that was a trick because you've heard about the Nobel

  • Prize. Those are both prestigious,

  • right? Nobel Prize gives you something

  • on the order of $1,000,000 and the Pulitzer Prize gives you

  • something like--it only gives you $10,000.

  • So how can that be? I sort of picked something that

  • I thought you might be wrong on. That reveals something about

  • human behavior. It's a choice in life.

  • You go into different walks of life.

  • This is something that's fundamental to economics:

  • there are just different expectations about how much

  • money you're going to make. If you go into the news

  • media--and I think that's a wonderful career--you're not

  • going to make much money probably.

  • The whole thing is just scaled down and I think there's

  • something revealing about this that we just have social norms

  • for how much someone is to be paid.

  • If you were to give Stephen Schwartzman a $10,000 prize,

  • it would be more like an insult than anything.

  • But if you are working for The New Haven Register and you get

  • this prize, it's a life-changing event,

  • not because of the $10,000 maybe--even they get more money

  • than that. Anyway, the point was that

  • people tend to be overconfident. Incidentally,

  • it's not just males; females are well-known to be

  • overconfident too. There is a thing about macho

  • males--"know it all"--but experiments prove that women

  • have the same problem. That's why I think that when we

  • look at charts of the stock market, we see things that we

  • think we understand, especially young people.

  • They get deluded into thinking they understand more than they

  • really do. I wanted to talk about some

  • authors that I admire who have written about this.

  • These are books that I don't have on the reading list,

  • but they're fun to read. There's a professor at The

  • Harvard Business School, Rakesh Khurana;

  • he has a book on the search for charismatic CEOs.

  • It's not just overconfidence in yourself;

  • we tend also to put overconfidence in leaders.

  • We have a sense that some people are just natural geniuses

  • and know everything, so we think that they can

  • transform our lives or our companies.

  • So, boards of directors are constantly looking for a CEO who

  • is a genius and they keep getting fooled and disappointed.

  • They bring someone in and this person often messes things up

  • more than helps because this person realizes that he or she

  • has to live up to this genius role,

  • so they better do something. So, they do something in a

  • flailing way, not understanding what they're

  • doing, and they mess up the whole company.

  • Really, a lot of what happens--good things that happen

  • in human society--are the result of lots of people doing their

  • own special things and all working together.

  • There's no great genius but there's this idea in our mind

  • that we are going to be such a thing.

  • Related to that--and I wanted to mention, it's on the reading

  • list--an article by one of my students in this class,

  • who's now at MIT. He took this class about ten

  • years ago, Fadi Kanaan and co-authored with another MIT

  • professor, Dirk Jenter,

  • again looking at overconfidence in our judgments.

  • Again, they looked at CEOs, chief executive officers of

  • companies, and they found that companies in industries that

  • fail tend to fire their CEOs. This is unjust;

  • this is an overreaction. You bring in this CEO who's

  • supposed to be brilliant and then the business fails,

  • so you fire the guy right after that.

  • We're kind of manic-depressive about these guys.

  • When the business fails, we think we were such a

  • mistake. This guy had such promise and

  • he just didn't live up so we get rid of him;

  • but in fact, they found that the CEO gets

  • fired even if the whole industry went down.

  • So, you can't blame the CEO for the fact--if you're one company

  • in an industry and the whole industry goes down--or the

  • remaining industry even not including that firm--it's not

  • the CEO's fault. We tend to be kind of wild and

  • extreme in our judgments. You've seen that a lot--a lot

  • of CEOs lost their jobs recently in the subprime crisis.

  • Was it their fault? Probably not,

  • but they get fired anyway. We go through this

  • manic-depressive--we try to hire charismatic CEOs,

  • then we get disappointed and we keep going through musical

  • chairs one after another. Nassim Taleb,

  • who lives here in Connecticut and I know him well,

  • has a book called Fooled by Randomness,

  • which was a best-seller and it's very fun to read.

  • It's a story--he's a Wall Street--he had an investment

  • management firm and he observed a lot of people.

  • It's a book about how people over interpret--they tend to

  • blame themselves for failures and congratulate themselves for

  • successes too much and they don't realize that it's just

  • random. Some guy who's in a

  • business--business is succeeding--why is it

  • succeeding? Because the guy came in,

  • dumb luck at the right time and everything is supporting that,

  • concludes that he's a genius. Then Taleb observes them later,

  • after things don't go so well, and suddenly they're depressed.

  • – I talked to stockbrokers before and after

  • the '87 stock market crash and one of them told me--or maybe

  • more than one of them told me--I can tell that the crash occurred

  • from the tone of voice of the people when they call up the

  • phone. When the market was soaring

  • just before the '87 peak, he said they would call up and

  • they were brash and rude to me and they would say,

  • let's trade this, get this done--kind of just

  • disparaging subtlety, the stockbroker.

  • Then after the crash, when these people were sort

  • of--many of them--wiped out, they'd answer the phone in a

  • sheepish way. You could just tell in the tone

  • of their voice that they were crushed.

  • So, that's what happens. I also have down on this part

  • of the reading list Irving Fisher, who was a professor at

  • Yale, who was a very prominent

  • economist in the first half of the century.

  • He's another Yale graduate, Yale Class of 1895,

  • I think. I'm sure he lectured on this

  • stage because this building was--his office was in this

  • building, I believe. He died around the mid-1940s

  • but he's famous for overconfidence.

  • In 1929, he was interviewed just before--two weeks

  • before--the 1929 peak and--do you know what I'm referring to?

  • He said he thought the stock market was on a permanently high

  • plateau and he wrote a book in 1929--actually it came out in

  • 1930--with this extremely optimistic outlook for the

  • market. He had a beautiful mansion;

  • he was a wealthy man for a while, but he lost everything in

  • the stock market crash. In fact he had to--he had

  • borrowed against his home and he lost his house,

  • so Yale University bought his house for him and rented it out

  • to him; otherwise, he would be on the

  • street. I have an article written by

  • him in 1930--I think it's 1930 or at the end of

  • 1929--discussing the stock market crash.

  • He still is unrepentant. This was our most brilliant

  • professor here at Yale, but he just totally misjudged

  • the market, He's just totally

  • unrepentant--he just went back over his book.

  • There are so many good reasons--the 20s were a

  • spectacular era--so many good reasons the stock market will

  • keep going up and he just wouldn't back down.

  • In fact, what he actually did was he started borrowing from

  • his relatives--he had wealthy relatives--and he lost all of

  • it. He just couldn't have imagined

  • that the stock market would go down--there was just no reason

  • that he could think of--and that's what he says in the

  • article. Anyway, I want to talk more

  • precisely about how people behave;

  • this is all general about overconfidence,

  • but there's some other factors that I want to start with.

  • The most important theory in behavioral finance is the

  • Kahneman and Tversky Prospect Theory.

  • Danny Kahneman, who is now a professor of

  • psychology at Princeton, and Amos Tversky,

  • who died a few years ago--they wrote, I think,

  • the most famous article on behavioral economics;

  • it goes beyond just finance. The title of the article was

  • Prospect Theory and that was 1979.

  • This is, I think, theactually,

  • I think there was a ranking of economics articles--scholarly

  • articles--by numbers of quotations and this was number

  • two out of all articles written in the last fifty years.

  • Number one, it was quoted for some other reason--I'm not

  • sure--it was some statistical method that everyone quoted.

  • In terms of an intellectual contribution,

  • this is the most important economics article in the last

  • fifty years, at least judged by how many

  • times it's cited. Kahneman and Tversky are not

  • really talking about overconfidence but something,

  • well, perhaps related to it--something more general.

  • It's how people make choices and there are two elements to

  • this theory. It replaces expected utility

  • and it has--what it does, it replaces the utility

  • function with a value function--with value

  • function--and replaces the probabilities with,

  • what they call, weights. I'm going to explain what that

  • is and we'll move on. Let me give a little story that

  • leads up to it and it's a story that Paul Samuelson,

  • who's a professor at MIT, told.

  • Paul Samuelson was a highly esteemed--he is--I think he's

  • ninety-two or about ninety-two years old now and still writing

  • and still working. He was a--he is a mathematical

  • economist, retired now, but he told a story that

  • illustrates some of the beginnings of Prospect--in fact,

  • he kind of anticipated Prospect Theory.

  • This goes back to an article that he wrote in 1963.

  • In 1963, he was having lunch with one of his colleagues,

  • another economist; he doesn't name this other

  • person because it would be embarrassing,

  • but everyone knows it was E. Cary Brown, a professor at MIT.

  • Samuelson, in a playful mood--he was always sort of a

  • playful person--he said at lunch--he said,

  • hey let's toss a coin. Let's make a bet just for the

  • fun of it and if it comes up heads, I'll give you $200,

  • but if it comes up tails, you give me $100.

  • He said, let's do it I'm ready. This kind of took E.

  • Cary Brown by surprise. That sounds like a lot of

  • money, especially in 1963; prices were much lower--that's

  • like $1,000 or $2000. It was big money.

  • But of course, these professors could afford

  • it; it's not that much money.

  • So, let's just say it's $100 and $200.

  • Do you feel like--if I were to offer that to you right

  • now--let's do it because you don't have cash on you now,

  • but you'd have to promise to pay me if you came out wrong.

  • Do you feel like doing that? No, someone is answering me

  • honestly. Introspect and think about it

  • while this is suddenly thrust on you.

  • E. Cary Brown said,

  • come on I don't want to do this--Samuelson was being

  • annoying by doing this. Then Samuelson thought--had

  • another idea-he said, what if I offered--he didn't

  • actually offer this--what if I offered to--let's do this 100

  • times. We'll toss a coin 100 times and

  • each time it comes up heads I give you $200 and each time it

  • comes up tails you give me $100. Well, E.

  • Cary Brown, knowing mathematics of statistics and the law of

  • probabilities, he said,

  • well, if we do it 100 times, by the binomial theorem,

  • I'm sure to win. I couldn't possibly--this is

  • elementary--100 times is a lot of times.

  • In fact, I'll make thousands of dollars.

  • So, E. Cary Brown said,

  • I'll do it. I would do it,

  • but he didn't actually do it. Samuelson then said--he went

  • back to his office and he wrote a paper--that's this 1963

  • paper--proving that E. Cary Brown was irrational.

  • You cannot possibly say, I will take 100 of them but I

  • won't take one of them. That's not rational.

  • That was one of the motivating things in Kahneman and Tversky.

  • What Kahneman and Tversky said is that people behave--if you

  • can introspect and imagine why some of you didn't feel like

  • taking this bet--people behave as if they have a kink in their

  • utility. This may sound an abstract way

  • of putting it, but expected utility

  • theory--the traditional theory says that everybody has a

  • utility function that they consistently refer to when

  • making calculations. I'm going to put Kahneman and

  • Tversky over here and I'm going to put Expected Utility Theory

  • over here.

  • Expected Utility Theory says that I want wealth--and I'll

  • call w wealth--and I get utility from wealth--that's

  • U. My utility curve--it has maybe

  • any number of shapes, but its concave downward and

  • smooth, so you have what's called diminishing marginal

  • utility;

  • that's Expected Utility Theory. What Expected Utility Theory

  • means--the slope is always decreasing.

  • Every extra dollar of wealth gives me less happiness but it

  • always give me a little bit more, so I always want more.

  • Expected Utility Theory would say that that's a two-for-one

  • bet that Samuelson is offering and it's small compared to my

  • lifetime wealth. My utility is essentially

  • linear over the relevant range, plus $200 or minus $100,

  • so I don't really concern myself about risk.

  • I should just take every bet like that all the time.

  • You should always be looking--if you are behaving

  • this way--you should always be looking.

  • Anyone who wants to make a bet with me anytime,

  • I'll always take it if it's in my advantage--even a little bit

  • in my advantage. People seem to like to gamble

  • but they don't like to do it consistently.

  • They like to go to--they end up going to gambling casinos where

  • it's stacked against them, not for them,

  • but it's somehow arranged as an entertainment.

  • Well, Kahneman and Tversky said that people don't behave this

  • way and it's as if they have a value function as a function of

  • their money. Let's put in the middle of the

  • value function, the reference point.

  • Reference point means where you are today and your value--that's

  • V, which is like utility, but now we're talking in

  • psychological terms, so we give it a different name.

  • The value function has a kink; it's something like that at the

  • reference point. I'm trying to draw it--it's not

  • necessarily--it looks here like two straight lines and that's

  • not quite the way to do it. Let me try and do this

  • again--it's curved downward a little bit, but it becomes much

  • less--I don't--I'm having trouble drawing this on the

  • board well. I don't want to ever--kind of

  • going down. There's a kink here,

  • where the slope--I think I've got it sort of there.

  • It's concave down everywhere, just like the utility function

  • is, but there's a discontinuity of slope right here.

  • Where is that? That's where I am now.

  • What it means is that I value losses much more than I value

  • gains from wherever I am. There's a big difference

  • between losing and winning, so when I reflect on this bet

  • I'm thinking of--I could lose $100 and that scares me.

  • It feels bad--the idea that--I would just feel bad.

  • So gaining $200 is positive for me but it doesn't offset the

  • loss that I might make. So, if I have equal

  • probabilities, what you want to do is weight

  • the gains and losses and the losses tend to dominate,

  • so you don't want to take the bet.

  • The weighting function incorporates Samuelson's lunch

  • colleague's problem: that people don't want to take

  • bets that are to their advantage.

  • It goes back to a kink in the utility function.

  • Now, incidentally, this is fundamentally different

  • from--in economic theory, economists would say,

  • well you can put a kink in the utility function.

  • There could be some wealth level that's special to you.

  • But a theory economist--that kink has to stay at a certain

  • wealth level. With Kahneman and Tversky,

  • this kink moves around with you, so whatever--it's

  • whatever--you're always at the kink because it's not rational;

  • this is not rational Expected Utility Theory.

  • This is--I'm always looking at where I am now and exaggerating

  • in my mind the importance of deviations from that.

  • People are very concerned with small losses;

  • that's what th kink in the value function is.

  • Now, I want to talk about another Kahneman and Tversky

  • thing, called the weighting function.

  • The weighting function refers to the fact that people distort

  • probabilities in their mind.

  • It's not that they don't know probabilities but they distort

  • them in their thinking. I'll give an example that

  • illustrates the Kahneman-Tversky weighting function and it goes

  • back years before Kahneman and Tversky.

  • It's a famous example from a French economist,

  • Maurice Allais, and it's called the Allais

  • Paradox. It illustrates thinking that

  • violates Expected Utility Theory.

  • I'm going to give you a choice between two "prospects," as

  • Kahneman and Tversky called them.

  • Suppose I offered you a 25% chance to win $3,000 or,

  • alternatively, a 20% chance to win $4,000.

  • Maybe I can get a show of hands. This is like Samuelson's lunch

  • colleague again, but a little different.

  • Suppose I'm offering--I'm not offering this,

  • but suppose I offered this--you have a choice between Prospect

  • One or Prospect Two. Prospect One--I'm going to toss

  • a four-sided coin and if it comes up with a probability of

  • one-fourth, in a certain way, you will win $3,000.

  • In Prospect Two, I'm going to give you a chance

  • of 20% to win $4,000. Can you tell me which of these

  • you'd pick if you had to pick only one of these?

  • Do you understand the question? How many would pick number One?

  • It seems like it's about 20%. How many would pick number Two?

  • So, most of you would pick number Two.

  • Now, let's do a variation on this question here--a very

  • simple variation. Which would you prefer?

  • This is the one that you picked--most people picked.

  • Another prospect--100% chance of winning $3,000--or Two,

  • that would be an 80% chance of winning $4,000.

  • Do you see the--if you pick Prospect One,

  • you're going to just get $3,000 for sure.

  • If you pick Prospect Two, you'll probably get $4,000 but

  • an 80% chance of it. How many would pick One?

  • That looks like the--how many would pick Two?

  • Very few of you would pick Two. Have to reflect--so we picked

  • One this time. Now, you might want to reflect

  • on that. Why was it such a

  • different--why did you pick One in this case and pick Two in

  • this case? The thing I want to point out

  • is that the number--the cash amounts are the same in the two

  • examples but the probabilities are just multiplied by four.

  • So the expected utility of the two is just four times as great,

  • no matter what. They're the same--the utilities

  • are the same, with the same numbers.

  • All I've done is multiply your expected utility by four in this

  • case, so you can't make a different choice.

  • If you picked Two over here when comparing these two

  • prospects you should also have picked Two when you compared

  • these two prospects. Why didn't you?

  • Most of you switched. Can you tell me why?

  • Yes. Student: I would prefer

  • not to gamble, so if I had the chance a--in

  • the first situation, I would take the chance to make

  • $4,000. Professor Robert

  • Shiller: You would choose not to gamble.

  • Does this mean it's like a moral judgment or--

  • Student: No, I prefer certainty.

  • Professor Robert Shiller: Okay,

  • you got it exactly. That's yeah--you got--you

  • prefer certainty. There's some anxiety about

  • maybe--you got it exactly right. I think people like certainty

  • and ambiguity is difficult for them to adjust to.

  • Kahneman and Tversky put it in this following way:

  • it's a little bit like we're cavemen.

  • It turns out, we were all taught to count and

  • to do arithmetic but primitive people actually have difficulty

  • counting. There's an old story that

  • cavemen had only three numbers: one, two, and many.

  • I used to disbelieve this story but I'm not--actually it was a

  • psychologist at Princeton told me that,

  • as a matter of fact, it's proven that there are some

  • people whose languages have only those numbers:

  • one, two, and many.

  • For example, they're called--in Laos in

  • Thailand, there's a very primitive group of people with

  • primitive technology. I don't mean that they're

  • primitive people but they only have one, two,

  • and many; and there are others that have

  • been discovered. Emotionally we're like that.

  • I used to wonder how could they have only those numbers:

  • one, two, and many. You ask a mother,

  • how many children do you have? She couldn't answer;

  • she didn't have the word three, but as a matter of fact they

  • didn't. So I guess, if you asked the

  • mother, how many children you have, she would probably just

  • name them. She couldn't say,

  • I have three children. But anyway, we're all kind of

  • like that when we think about probability;

  • that's Kahneman and Tversky. Kahneman and Tversky say what

  • we do is that in our minds we weight the probabilities in a

  • distorted way and this is the weighting function.

  • So, we have the weight--that's weight not wealth here--against

  • the probability and I'm going to exaggerate a little bit.

  • This is zero and this is one because probabilities range from

  • zero to one. The weighting function looks

  • like this--I'm exaggerating a little bit so you can see

  • but--and then it jumps up or it jumps down here;

  • this is the idea. What Kahneman and Tversky said

  • in their original 1979 article is, we act as--there's a wide

  • range of probabilities here that are all kind of blurred and put

  • together. We minimize

  • andemotionally, the difference between

  • probabilities--they're all kind of in the middle.

  • So, when I said twenty or twenty-five, in your mind you

  • said, here's twenty and here's twenty-five but I don't think

  • they're much different to me emotionally.

  • The money sounds different but the probability sounds the same.

  • It's like I have only three probabilities:

  • can't happen, might happen,

  • and it's certain to happen. You tend to be totally in to

  • the certainty story, so you give it much more

  • weight. The way--what people do then,

  • summing up--in expected utility theory, you maximize the

  • probability-weighted sum of utilities.

  • You maximize the summation of the probability of the

  • i^(th) outcome times utility in the i^(th)

  • outcome. But in Prospect Theory,

  • you maximize the sum of the weights times the value

  • function--the values. This is the Kahneman and

  • Tversky variation on Expected Utility Theory.

  • There's something related to it that psychologists talk about,

  • it's called Regret Theory. It's a little bit different but

  • it's essentially the same aswell,

  • it's consistent with Prospect Theory.

  • That is, people experience pain of regret and they do a lot of

  • things to try to avoid the pain of regret.

  • For example, when the stock market goes up

  • they try to sell it and lock in the gain because they are

  • worried that if it goes down again they will regret not

  • having sold it; that's not a rational

  • calculation. If you come to something,

  • you just have it and then it escapes you, you feel pain.

  • I guess that's what happened at the Super Bowl last night when

  • the New England Patriots had a winning streak and they messed

  • up at the very end--that's exceptionally painful and that's

  • part of Regret Theory. I don't know how pained any of

  • you are but it must have been painful to them anyway.

  • I just mentioned some other things that are related to

  • Prospect Theory. There's something called

  • "mental compartments" that people--Expected Utility Theory

  • says, your utility depends on your

  • whole lifetime wealth, so you should be always

  • thinking that everything that happens today is just part of a

  • bigger story; I'm always thinking about my

  • lifetime. I had you do an exercise at the

  • beginning where I asked you to estimate the present value of

  • your lifetime income and it probably came out to several

  • million dollars. So, if you were behaving

  • rationally you would always be weighing things against that big

  • sum of several million dollars. That's why plus $100,

  • minus $200--who cares, right?

  • That's the way you should be thinking but you don't think

  • that way because you're human. People put things in mental

  • compartments, all different compartments in

  • your mind, and you have separate values

  • for things depending on which compartment they're in.

  • For example, when you go to the gambling

  • casino, the winnings and losses are completely different.

  • You just put them in a game compartment and you think,

  • I can accept these and it doesn't matter.

  • Investors are that way too, they'll sometimes put part of

  • their portfolio in "I can play with this" mental compartment

  • and others in another mental compartment.

  • Anyway, I just want to come back--I have maybe a little bit

  • more to say about this, but let me come back and talk

  • just about the problem set we talked about last period.

  • Problem Set #3--you've got your second problem set here--Problem

  • Set #3 is a stock market forecasting exercise and the

  • spreadsheet that I have up here is one spreadsheet that you

  • could use to do that. It's illustrated--I clarified

  • it a little bit in the version I put up.

  • So, you run a regression like that to predict the stock

  • market. This is actually a hands-on

  • experience that's supposed to help you eliminate your

  • overconfidence by trying to predict the market.

  • This is the example where I tried to use time as a predictor

  • of the stock market and failed pretty decisively to do so.

  • What I want to say is that I have this spreadsheet up here

  • that has some data--it has monthly--this is my 130-year

  • long stock price series, but you could add other data

  • and whatever--if you can find data series somewhere it would

  • be more fun to try to predict using other data.

  • This is just for you to really try to do it.

  • Some people do sports things, so if somebody wins the Super

  • Bowl--I don't know what the story is--this is a famous story

  • actually--the stock market goes up or goes--do you know that.

  • I don't know this exact repeated story--so you could

  • create other variables like a dummy variable for winning

  • the--somebody winning the Super Bowl and put that in.

  • There's a famous story--it goes back to the 1930s--about skirt

  • lengths and the stock market. Do you know this story?

  • In the 1920s, an unprecedented thing happened

  • in women's fashion, never been seen before in the

  • United States, maybe in--women started wearing

  • short skirts and it was scandalous.

  • They weren't quite mini skirts, but they were scandalous.

  • The women's hemlines rose and peaked in 1929 and then the

  • skirt lengths came down in the 1930s, right with the market;

  • so that was noticed. Some people thought there was

  • some euphoria that was driving women crazy or something about

  • the 1920s--the optimism, the sense;

  • it sort of happened again in the '70s.

  • Remember, the mini skirts came in the 1970s,

  • right? Then the 1970s--'74 crash

  • didn't exactly--I don't know if hemlines came down.

  • But anyway, I had one student who thought, well maybe there

  • are other fashion things that explain the market and she went

  • back to microfilm newspapers and measured the width of men's ties

  • in fashion advertisements. She thought,

  • wide ties are a sign of--it's like a short skirt I guess--a

  • sign of optimism and excitement, so she collected data on widths

  • of ties. She had a time series--this is

  • a very good answer to a very good problem set--and she

  • collected fifty years of data on the width of men's ties and

  • correlated--to see if it predicted the market.

  • Unfortunately it did not, but it was a wonderful choice.

  • I'm hoping that some of you can think of interesting things to

  • do to try to predict the stock market.

  • Alright, I'll see you again in two days.

Professor Robert Shiller: Today's lecture is about

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